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DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY 
 
Sir Julian Corbett (1854-1922) is one of the two most influential theorists of sea power.  
He defined maritime operations, limited war, and our understanding of the “British Way of 
War,” while also foreshadowing the Great War at Sea.  Corbett’s lasting theoretical contributions 
to strategic thought are captured in Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (1911).  It remains a 
centerpiece of military and international relations theory and continues to be studied in 
professional military education alongside Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Antoine-Henri Jomini, Carl von 
Clausewitz, and Alfred Thayer Mahan.  Corbett’s influential theories were shaped by multiple 
influences, including Mahan, Corbett’s own study of British sea power, his reading and 
understanding of Clausewitz’s On War, and Admiral John Fisher’s naval revolution at the turn of 
the twentieth century.    While Mahan linked sea power with national power, Corbett illuminated 
this relationship and displayed a keen understanding, developed through his own historical study, 
of the limits of sea power, and war more broadly, as an instrument of national policy. His 
influential theory on the role of sea power in the geopolitical context of the European balance of 
power at the turn of the twentieth century is a clear reflection of Britain’s rapidly changing 
strategic environment and the equally rapid changes in military technology.  Heavily influenced 





Clausewitz, defined maritime strategy, limited war, command of the sea, and, at the height of the 
British Empire, laid the ground work for understanding a “British way of war.”  Corbett was first 
and foremost a historian and a professional military educator.  Corbett tied the study of history to 
the development of theory with a constant focus on the role of education in developing a leader’s 
critical thinking and judgment.  Corbett introduced new interpretive approaches to the study of 
military history based on his interaction with the burgeoning military theory of the nineteenth 
century.  Corbett’s historical writing evolved over a prolific decade of multi-volume works from 
1898 to 1911 and directly influenced his conception of maritime strategy that underpinned his 
lasting contribution to military theory.  Corbett was one of the earliest and most enduring 
contributors to fully establish the link between history, theory, and professional military 
education. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy was the culmination of Corbett’s study of 
history and his lasting achievement.  Ultimately, however, Corbett wrote Some Principles of 
Maritime Strategy, at Fisher’s behest, to educate officers and statesmen about the Royal Navy’s 
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JULIAN CORBETT AND THE VERDICT OF HISTORY 
 
 
Today, Sir Julian Stafford Corbett is generally considered one of the most influential 
theorists of sea power and a key proponent of linking policy and military strategy in a broader 
approach to grand strategy. Corbett’s lasting theoretical contributions to maritime and strategic 
studies are captured in Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (1911).  Most modern analysis, 
however, suffers from a solitary focus on Some Principles of Maritime Strategy and fails to 
consider the work within context of Corbett’s broader thinking and purpose for which he wrote.  
When placed in context, it is clear that Corbett was one of the earliest writers to fully establish 
the link between history, theory, doctrine, and professional military education.  Some Principles 
of Maritime Strategy was the culmination of Corbett’s study of history, teaching at the Royal 
Navy College, and work for Admiral John Fisher at Admiralty.   Ultimately, Corbett wrote Some 
Principles of Maritime Strategy, at Fisher’s behest, to educate officers and statesmen about the 
Royal Navy’s strategic and doctrinal thinking for meeting the rising threat of Imperial Germany. 
It is as an educational tool that Some Principles of Maritime Strategy retains its lasting value. 
Since the end of the Cold War, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy has returned to 
prominence in military and security studies.  War Studies scholar J.J. Widen recently noted:  
Only a theory can provide the necessary intellectual tools to understand the 
totality of a subject, in this case war at and from the sea. Corbett’s work on 
maritime strategy presents such a rare theory. Like Carl von Clausewitz’ On War, 
it has greatly influenced scholars and practitioners alike, and, therefore, warrants 
serious study and critical analysis if we aim to develop further the field of naval 
thought.1  
 
                     
1 J.J. Widen, Theorist of Maritime Strategy: Sir Julian Corbett and his Contribution to Military and Naval Thought 





Since the publication of Some Principles in 1911, Corbett and his maritime doctrine have 
not always received as fulsome a reception or interpretation by either scholars or 
practitioners.  When first published in 1911, Some Principles proved controversial, 
coming under criticism from defense analysts and many senior and retired naval officers.  
During the First World War, the controversy only increased as several commentators 
blamed Corbett and his theories for what they perceived as a lack of aggressiveness in the 
Royal Navy’s officer corps, manifest, they argued, in the Battle of Jutland.  After 
Corbett’s death in 1922, his maritime strategy began to fade from professional 
consideration.  By the Second World War and then throughout the Cold War, references 
to Corbett primarily relegated him to a minor player in Sir John Fisher’s Admiralty 
during the “Dreadnought Age.”  Only after the American experience in Vietnam and the 
end of the Cold War did practitioners and scholars begin to reassess Corbett and the 
relevance of his theories to the post-Cold War world.  This reassessment expanded into 
multiple new areas including: the development of the relationship between Corbett’s 
thought and the other great military theorists of the nineteenth century; Corbett’s 
influence on the Royal Navy during the “Dreadnought Age” and the First World War; 
and the role of the historian in influencing national policy and strategy debates.   
  Upon publication in 1911, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy received mixed 
reviews.  Many in the Royal Navy, a service steeped in the Nelsonian tradition, were not 
receptive to Corbett’s qualifications concerning the limitations of sea power.  The leading public 
critic was noted historian and prominent military affairs commentator Spenser Wilkinson.  
Wilkinson provided regular commentary on British military policy in the Morning Post and 





respected Corbett’s work as a historian, he launched some of the most vitriolic attacks on Some 
Principles of Maritime Strategy.  Wilkinson adamantly opposed, what he saw as, Corbett’s 
departure from previous naval strategy: Corbett’s claims that seeking out the enemy’s main 
battle fleet should not always be a navy’s primary objective, and Corbett’s emphasis on limited 
war theory.  In reviewing Some Principles, Wilkinson wrote:  
It seems to me that in the absence of the personal experience which would justify an 
independent judgement…Mr. Julian Corbett, whose instinct seems to lead him on paths 
of his own. He seems to me to assume that the teachings of the strategists whose names I 
have mentioned (Admiral Philip Colomb, Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, Admiral Sir 
Reginald Custance, and Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan) are to be regarded as of doubtful 
value, and that he must begin de novo. He seems to question the conclusions which they 
regard as firmly established. My impression is that if Mr. Corbett’s volume were read by 
young naval officers it must have a disastrous offset upon the Navy.2 
 
Wilkinson attacked Corbett’s lack of emphasis on decisive battle, writing that “the naval 
commander ought never allow anything but the enemy’s naval forces to occupy the first place in 
his mind.”3  He accused Corbett of misinterpreting Clausewitz’s consideration of limited war and 
misrepresenting the lessons of the Seven Years War in order to demonstrate the viability of a 
maritime power conducting a limited war against a continental opponent.  While some of 
Wilkinson’s vitriol was likely due to Corbett’s services to the Fisher Admiralty, his fundamental 
disagreement with many aspects of Corbett’s theory were clear.  These attacks, coming from 
such an influential military publicist, negatively impacted perceptions of Corbett’s work prior to 
the First World War.  Corbett’s arguments concerning decisive battle remained the most 
controversial aspect of Some Principles during his lifetime and drew critics both in and out of the 
service.  The opposition to his attempt to see beyond the decisive battle culminated shortly after 
his death, when the Board of Admiralty issued a disclaimer on the title page of his third volume 
                     






of the official Naval Operations: History of the Great War, “Their Lordships find that some of 
the principles advocated in this book, especially the tendency to minimize the importance of 
seeking battle and of forcing it to a conclusion, are directly in conflict with their views.”4  
Corbett did not live to see the disclaimer on his work, having died upon completion of this third 
volume in 1922.    
After his death, Corbett and Some Principles slowly faded from discussions of naval and 
military strategy.  According to historian Geoffrey Till, after the First World War and the failure 
of the Dardanelles campaign, “Corbett’s concept of maritime warfare was put into cold 
storage.”5  Corbett, during the interwar years and Second World War, was primarily remembered 
as the controversial official historian of the Great War at sea.  Corbett’s primary disciple in the 
study of naval history was Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, who, as a mid-grade officer, had first 
worked with Corbett in 1902 on a series of newspaper articles concerning education in the Royal 
Navy.  Corbett had inspired Richmond to write and eventually publish a three-volume history of 
The Navy in the War, 1739-48, Richmond’s first foray into academic, primary source-based 
historical research.6  Richmond became a staunch advocate for the use of history in both naval 
education and strategic planning.  Richmond believed Corbett’s theories had been misunderstood 
and, therefore, often ignored in the years following the Great War.  Ultimately, however, the 
outspoken and controversial Richmond failed to revive Corbett’s maritime strategy or make any 
significant lasting impact on British naval education, which actually regressed during the 
                     
4 Julian Corbett, Naval Operations: History of the Great War (London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1923), III:Title 
Page. 
5 Geoffrey Till, “Sir Julian Corbett and the British Way in Naval Warfare,” in Navies and Global Defense, ed. Keith 
Neilson and Elizabeth Jane Errington (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), 47. 
6 Barry D. Hunt, Sailor-Scholar: Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, 1871-1946 (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfred Laurier 





interwar years.7  He did, however, work to advance much of Corbett’s thought through 
collaboration with another prominent interwar military commentator, Basil Liddell Hart.  
During the First World War, Liddell Hart had served as a captain in the British Army on 
the Western Front, but injuries suffered during a gas attack forced him to leave the service.  He 
became an influential military correspondent with the Daily Telegraph. Drawing from the 
theories of Corbett, Richmond, T.E. Lawrence, and Sun Tzu, Liddell Hart, developed his “British 
Way in Warfare.”  A recent biographer characterized Liddell Hart as a “prolific raider” of others 
theories and the creator of an “invented tradition.” 8  After the war as Corbett’s theoretical work 
faded from view, Liddell Hart described his version of the “British Way of War,” borrowing 
heavily from Corbett’s England in the Seven Years War (1907).  It was the limited commitment 
to an unlimited war which became the foundation of Liddell Hart’s “British Way of War.” 
Historian Andrew Lambert has argued that, in co-opting Corbett’s principles, Liddell Hart 
transformed them “from a pragmatic flexible response into dogmatic prescription.”9  Liddell Hart 
published his arguments in The British Way in Warfare (1932). Despite borrowing heavily from 
Corbett, Liddell Hart’s focus was never on maritime warfare.  Corbett’s more modest and 
persuasive argument came to be overshadowed by the work of Liddell Hart and his obsession 
with the British Army experience on the Western Front and a fervent desire to avoid repeating 
another British continental commitment.  According to British military historian Brian Bond:  
Liddell Hart was original only in his rather extreme and one-sided statement of the 
maritime case. To go back no further than the 1900s, Corbett, Esher, Hankey and Sir 
Herbert Richmond had all espoused similar views, and it would hardly be surprising if 
such a general strategic outlook was popular in naval circles.10   
                     
7 Ibid., 216, 235. 
8 Alex Danchev, Alchemist of War: The Life of Basil Liddell Hart (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998), 170-5. 
9 Andrew Lambert, “The Naval War Course, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy and the Origins of ‘The British 
Way of War,’” In The British Way in Warfare: Power and the International System, 1856-1956: Essays in Honour 
of David French (London: Routledge Publishing, 2010), 251. 






Liddell Hart’s less pragmatic approach continued to overshadow Corbett’s thought throughout 
the Second World War and much of the Cold War.  
Beyond Liddell Hart, the only other major military theorist to significantly engage 
Corbett’s writing during the interwar period was the French Admiral and theorist Raoul Castex.  
Castex spent much of his naval career as a professor at the École de Guerre Navale and became 
the foremost naval authority during the interwar period.  He was a strong advocate for historical 
instruction within the French Navy.  Castex was promoted to Admiral in 1926 and wrote 
extensively on naval affairs throughout the interwar years. He published five volumes of his 
commentaries as the Théories stratégiques and many other works over the period.  Castex, an 
ardent follower of Alfred Thayer Mahan, was highly critical of several aspects of Corbett’s 
maritime strategy despite the fact that he adopted many ideas from Some Principles.  He 
portrayed Corbett, a civilian, as ignorant of the realities of war and lacking the knowledge, 
expertise, and experience to challenge Mahan.  Additionally, Castex was critical of Corbett’s 
narrow British focus and resultant fixation on limited war, writing:     
As a good Anglo-Saxon, he has a phobia about permanent armies on the continent…He 
rides his hobby-horse of limited war that he presents as original and above the 
understanding of continental strategists.  Fundamentally, he only develops the well-
known strategy of combined operations led by a strong power, strong from the naval 
point of view and weak from a terrestrial point of view. And, with little logic, he attacks 
in the name of the principles of that strategy those that govern the entirely different case 
of pure land warfare or of pure naval warfare. He breaks with the idea of the nation in 
arms, of the importance of organized force, of battle, of the offensive, etc.… He 
frequently looks across history, failing to recognize the military effort of England’s allies 
during the wars of the first Empire.11 
 
                     
11 Herve Coutau-Begarie, “Corbett and Richmond in France,” In Mahan Is Not Enough: The Proceedings of a 
Conference on the Works of Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond,  ed. James Goldrick and John B. 





Castex argued that Corbett became preoccupied with the dangers of new technology to the 
dominant battle fleet and failed to consider many other scenarios.  Yet, Castex had wrestled with 
Corbett’s maritime strategy and acknowledged that:  
Personally, he [Corbett] has given me an intense, intellectual and almost moral crisis.  I 
have felt the columns of the temple move. I have gone down and verified the foundation.  
I have ascertained that they remain; he has only found some cracks there.  For my part, I 
have examined, repaired and modified this foundation. Then, I have gone up again, 
reassured of the solidity of the new edifice, recognizing, despite all, this killjoy who 
obliged me to a disagreeable but useful review of myself.12 
 
Castex concluded that Corbett’s maritime strategy was primarily based on Great Britain’s unique 
situation and held little relevance beyond Britain.  Castex’s arguments, influential at the time 
with many continental navies, also faded rapidly with the onset of the Second World War. 
During the 1930s, Some Principles disappeared from the United States Naval War 
College required reading list, only to reappear again in 1972 as part of the readings for a course 
in strategy and policy.13  As Liddell Hart borrowed Corbett’s ideas without acknowledging the 
source, Richmond failed to substantially alter the Royal Navy’s education system, and Castex 
drifted into obscurity, Corbett and his theories faded from professional military and strategy 
publications prior to and during the Second World War.  Simultaneously, however, he began to 
reappear in naval history as professional historians began to address the “Dreadnought Age” and 
the First World War.  Prior to the Second World War, American historian Arthur J. Marder was 
granted special individual access to Admiralty records from the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.  As a result of this exclusive access, Marder published The Anatomy of 
British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905 
(1940), and, after the war, he published his monumental five-volume From the Dreadnought to 
                     
12 Ibid., 283. 
13 John B. Hattendorf, “Mahan is not Enough: Conference Themes and Issues,” in Goldrick and Hattendorf, ed., 





Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919 (1961-1970).  Marder’s work and the 
eventual opening of the Admiralty archives led to intense interest in the “Fisher Revolution,” the 
Anglo-German naval arms race, and the First World War at sea; all topics that continue to 
generate disagreement and controversy to the present day.  In the first volume of From the 
Dreadnought to Scapa Flow Marder presented Julian Corbett as a minor figure supporting 
Admiral Fisher’s reform program by providing historical case studies and policy editorials.  
Despite the limited coverage of Corbett, Marder’s works were central to an emerging interest in 
the naval history of the period and led historians to address the role of Corbett, the historian, 
educator, and publicist. 
 Naval historians writing on Julian Corbett during the Cold War included Peter Stanford, 
The Work of Sir Julian Corbett in the Dreadnought Era (1951), Donald Schurman, The 
Education of a Navy: The Development of British Naval Strategic Thought 1867-1914 (1965) 
and the biography Julian S. Corbett, 1854-1922 (1981), John Hattendorf, Sir Julian Corbett on 
the Significance of Naval History (1971), and Clark G. Reynolds, Command of the Sea: The 
History and Strategy of Maritime Empires (1974).   These historians focused extensively on 
Corbett as a leading historian in the new field of naval history, his role as a professional naval 
educator at the Royal Naval College, and his influence within Admiral Fisher’s inner circle at the 
Admiralty.  Donald Schurman, as Corbett’s sole biographer, is the most representative of the 
period and the most important in establishing the early historiographical approach to Corbett’s 
life, career, and works.         
While teaching naval history at the Royal Military College of Canada, Schurman became 
interested in the role of the naval historian in educating professional military officers.  His 





in professional military education in the late nineteenth century.  In The Education of a Navy, 
Schurman argued that, during the latter half of the nineteenth century, navies around the world 
wrestled with the tremendous technological change produced by the mature Industrial 
Revolution.  Most naval officers became enamored with the rapid pace of technological change 
and focused on technologies’ impact on naval strategy and tactics.  In response to this increasing 
focus on technology, there arose a small group of men at the turn of the century who looked 
beyond the rapidly changing technological environment for enduring strategic lessons from the 
“Age of Sail.”  Schurman documented the contributions of John and Philip Colomb, John Knox 
Laughton, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Herbert Richmond, and Julian Corbett to the rise of naval 
history, professional military education, and British strategic thought.  Schurman argued that, 
while these men had limited impact during their lifetimes, they ultimately, charted the course for 
naval history and professional military education.  Schurman thoroughly analyzed the historical 
works of each of these authors, including Corbett’s extensive historical output. He did not review 
Corbett’s theoretical work, Some Principles.  Schurman credited Corbett, among those covered, 
with the most advanced professional approach to the study of naval history.14   
Sixteen years later, Schurman returned to his study of Corbett, publishing the only 
biography, to date, entitled Julian S. Corbett, 1854-1922: Historian of British Maritime Policy 
from Drake to Jellicoe (1981).  Schurman remained focused on Corbett the historian and, while 
he noted Some Principles, he did not provide any exposition or analysis of that work.  He argued 
that Corbett brought forward a conception of military history as an integral part of a broader 
general history of the state and international relations.  Corbett deftly married warfare with state 
policy and understood the role of tradition and geography in limiting military means.  Corbett’s 
                     
14 Donald Schurman, The Education of the Navy: The Development of British Naval Strategic Thought 1867-1914 





earliest historical works developed the marriage of state policy and military strategy; this theme 
ran throughout all of his subsequent work.  According to Schurman, Corbett’s books were 
increasingly about statesmen attempting to achieve national objectives through the use of 
military power.15  Schurman also greatly extended his analysis into Corbett’s role and influence 
within the Fisher Admiralty.  Schurman argued that Admiral Fisher transformed Corbett’s life by 
bringing him to teach at the Royal Navy War Course and, by extension, the Admiralty where he 
observed and participated in strategy and policy debates throughout the “Dreadnought Age” and 
the First World War.  Schurman also agreed with, and further expanded on, Marder’s view that 
Corbett served as a publicist for the Fisher Admiralty.16  Schurman, however, did not stray far 
from Corbett the historian.  He used Corbett’s two-volume history of England in the Seven Years 
War (1907) to analyze Clausewitz’s influence on Corbett’s thought rather than Some Principles.  
Finally, Schurman was the first to extensively document Corbett’s struggles with the Admiralty 
in writing the “official history” of the Great War at sea.  He concluded that Corbett’s assistance 
to Admiral Fisher during the “Dreadnought Age” was his single biggest contribution. On the 
historical side, Schurman credited Corbett with transforming the work of Mahan into a scholarly 
occupation and pointing the path for naval historians to follow in using archival research to 
illuminate current strategic challenges.17   
Schurman’s analysis was based on his in-depth reading of all of Corbett’s published 
works, including history, theory, policy editorials, and naval propaganda.   Schurman remained 
the single most comprehensive source on Corbett’s life and his extensive body of written works.  
However, within seven years of Schurman publishing the Corbett biography there was an 
                     
15 Donald Schurman, Julian S. Corbett, 1854-1922: Historian of British Maritime Policy from Drake to Jellicoe 
(London: Royal Historical Society, 1981), 21. 
16 Ibid., 35-40. 





extensive shift in historiographical focus from Corbett the historian to Corbett the military 
theorist.  Even after this shift was well underway, Schurman continued to assert Corbett’s 
importance as a historian far outweighed his theoretical contributions.  At a conference on 
Corbett and Richmond hosted by the United States Naval War College in 1992, he argued that: 
I have a really big problem in having Corbett elevated to the level of a universal thinker 
on sea power. I do not think he was that. I do not even think he was a strategist, and I 
don’t think that his so-called Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, published in 1911, 
will live forever. I do think that, as a historian, who used archival material as the 
materials to shape his country’s naval history, for that he will live a long time.18 
 
Schurman, however, was in a rapidly shrinking minority as the historiographical debate changed 
to focus on Corbett the theorist.   
Clark G. Reynolds’ Command of the Sea: The History and Strategy of Maritime Empires 
(1974) served as a precursor to this change in historiographical focus.  Following Schurman’s 
lead, Reynolds, in his chapter entitled “The Golden Age of Naval Thought, 1867-1914,” posited 
that, during the late nineteenth century, naval officers had become overwhelmingly focused on 
technology and its impact on warfare.  In response to this age of technological instability, a 
school of historical thought arose in the late nineteenth century that sought to combat the 
overwhelming focus on technology at the expense of the lessons of history.  According to 
Reynolds, this clash between the materialists and the historicists generated “a golden age of 
naval thought.”19  He placed Mahan and Corbett at the heart of this “golden age” and started a 
historiographical trend among naval historians of comparing and contrasting the two men’s naval 
thought.  In what was a much broader history of the period within a much broader work on 
maritime history, Reynolds provided a brief comparison of Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power 
                     
18 Goldrick and Hattendorf ed., Mahan Is Not Enough, 113. 
19 Clark G. Reynolds, Command of the Sea: The History and Strategy of Maritime Empires (New York: William 





with Corbett’s Some Principles.  He also provided a brief allusion to the influence of Carl von 
Clausewitz on Corbett’s thought.   
 Reynolds brief comparison, however, was outside the historiographic trend for much of 
the Cold War and truly foreshadowed a return to Corbett’s maritime strategy in 1988.  During 
the Second World War and for much of the Cold War, Corbett and his maritime theory were no 
longer a part of military and strategic debates or publications.  Michael Howard’s The 
Continental Commitment (1972) was more representative of Cold War strategic thought.  
Howard, in the preface to the 1989 re-print of The Continental Commitment, clearly recognized 
the influence of NATO and the Cold War on his own thinking when he wrote:  
I was, in writing it (The Continental Commitment), conducting an argument with that 
older generation of naval and military historians, from Julian Corbett to Herbert 
Richmond and Liddell Hart, who urged the need for a maritime strategy, a specific 
‘British Way in Warfare’ based on the avoidance of any Continental Commitment.  The 
experience of the Western Front in 1914-1918 had led an entire generation, whose most 
articulate spokesman was Liddell Hart, to eschew a ‘continental’ strategy as an aberration 
from a historic norm.  My own generation’s experience of the Second World War and its 
aftermath indicated the contrary…A subsequent more dispassionate generation may 
therefore see this book with its implicit conclusions as a tract for the times, promoting my 
own conviction as to the importance of NATO to Britain’s security, and as flawed in its 
analysis as the books of Liddell Hart.20 
  
Many current historians have come to agree with Howard’s reflective self-assessment.  Clearly, 
Corbett’s work was not a result of the trauma of the Western Front and had a much broader and 
deeper foundation in British history than did the works of Liddell Hart or Howard.   
In  a classic collection of strategic thought, Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought 
From Machiavelli to Hitler (1941) edited by Edward Meade Earle, Mahan received a full 
chapter, while Corbett was covered with a single page in the chapter entitled “Continental 
                     
20 Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defense Policy in the Era of the Two 





Doctrines of Sea Power” which focused on the French and German schools of naval thought.21  
Mahan remained at the center of naval theory after, in the opinion of many, his theories had been 
validated by the naval war in the Pacific and the decisive battles of Midway and Leyte Gulf.  In 
1986, Peter Paret edited an updated version of this classic work entitled Makers of Modern 
Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, which became a foundational text for strategic 
studies.  This later version had a new and fully updated chapter on Mahan, removed the chapter 
on the “Continental Doctrine of Sea Power,” and made no mention of Corbett or Some 
Principles.  The inclusion and praise of Mahan at the expense of any mention of Corbett 
generated controversy within the naval history community, which had begun with Reynolds, to 
shift its focus from Mahan to Corbett.   
The first response came from the United States Naval Institute which re-released 
Corbett’s Some Principles with an introductory essay from the British historian Eric Grove 
(1988).  This effort was quickly followed by Barry Gough, Maritime Strategy: The Legacies of 
Mahan and Corbett as Philosophers of Sea Power (1988), John Gooch, Maritime Command:  
Mahan and Corbett (1989), Barry D. Hunt, The Strategic Thought of Sir Julian Corbett (1989), 
and John B. Hattendorf, Recent Thinking on the Theory of Naval Strategy (1989).  Each focused 
on the juxtaposition of Mahan and Corbett as the two leading theorists of sea power and reflected 
the growing interpretation that Corbett’s work was more relevant to modern maritime and 
strategic thought than was Mahan’s.   Each came to the same general conclusion, echoed by 
Barry Hunt, that, “Corbett was the superior historian and a more subtle and cautious strategic 
                     
21 The chapter “Continental Doctrines of Sea Power” was written by Theodore Ropp, who focused on his previous 
scholarship on the Jeune Ecole, Raoul Castex and Alfred von Tirpitz.  Ropp briefly covered Corbett and Fred T. 
Jane together.  Edward Mead Earle, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1941), 453.  Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: from 





theorist.”22  Corbett’s approach to maritime strategy as a part of a broader national strategy 
which incorporated both land and maritime was clearly contrasted with Mahan’s sole focus on 
sea power.  Grove concluded that “posterity has come to regard Corbett as by far the deepest and 
most flexible thinker among the classical naval strategists…Corbett has a stronger appeal than 
Mahan to the new generation of strategists.”23  At the 1992 Naval War College conference, 
Grove disputed Schurman’s earlier claims, arguing: 
as the latest editor of Corbett’s Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, I must reluctantly 
take issue with Donald Schurman’s assessment of Corbett as more a historian than a 
maritime strategist. Indeed, I would argue that what makes Corbett such an important 
naval writer is his ability to distill from the past the ‘normal,’ from which other factors - 
notably technology – might draw us, but to which there is a tendency to 
return…Corbett’s is a much surer intellectual foundation than Mahan’s for the 
formulation of modern strategic concepts for the present and future…Corbett is no mere 
dusty historian; he is the classical maritime strategist with a relevance both today and 
tomorrow.24  
 
The comparative debate over Mahan and Corbett continued through the end of the Cold War and 
became central in the United States Navy’s search for new roles and missions following the 
collapse of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union.   
 Two distinct trends stemming from separate events came together at roughly the same 
time and led to a tremendous resurgence of writing on Corbett and Some Principles.  The first 
event was the end of the Vietnam War, the second was the end of the Cold War.  Following the 
Vietnam War, there was a tremendous growth of scholarly focus on Carl von Clausewitz and his 
seminal work, On War, among the United States military, foreign policy professionals, and 
academics.  By the mid-1990s the rapidly increasing amount of Clausewitz scholarship led to a 
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search for “disciples of Clausewitz” which brought many military and strategic studies scholars 
to Corbett and Some Principles.  Concurrently, with the end of the Cold War, the United States 
Navy was left in search of new roles and missions.  United States Navy professionals and naval 
historians searched both history and theory for relevant guidance for the future.  These two 
trends came together between 1988 and 1995, leading to a rapid expansion of scholarly 
publications focused on Corbett the military theorist.   
 At the end of the Cold War, the United States Naval War College hosted two major 
historical conferences in back to back years that brought in the top naval historians, 
predominately from Great Britain, the United States, and Canada.  Following in the tradition of 
juxtaposing Mahan against Corbett, in 1991 the College hosted a conference on the collected 
works and continued relevance of Alfred Thayer Mahan, following it in 1992 with the previously 
mentioned conference on the works of Corbett and Richmond.  The proceedings of the second 
conference were collected and published in Mahan is Not Enough (1993).  These conferences 
generated new scholarship and a spirited debate over naval and maritime theory that extended far 
beyond the collected works of the conferences.   
 Geoffrey Till, British naval historian and, since 2007, Chairman of The Corbett Centre of 
Maritime Policy Studies at King’s College, presented Corbett and the 1990s (1992) at the 
conference and embodied this search for Corbett’s relevance to modern navies and policymakers.  
He continued this theme with Sir Julian Corbett and the Twenty-First Century:  Ten Maritime 
Commandments (1999) and Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (2004).  Till 
introduced the argument that Corbett believed that the first function of the fleet was to support 





the combined arms or joint operations approach that Corbett had advocated.25  He reminded 
modern NATO navies, which had now gained command of the sea through the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, that Corbett had consistently emphasized that command of the sea was a means to 
an end and not the end itself.  Till advocated for modern NATO navies to shift operational focus 
from blue-water to green-water operations.  Till also argued in later publications that Corbett’s 
theories and his understanding of the limits of sea power remained much more relevant to the 
twenty-first century than did Mahan’s blue-water emphasis on fleet engagements.  Till 
consistently returned to Corbett’s emphasis on placing naval operations within a broader context 
of overall combined strategy under an overarching foreign policy.26  Till’s emphasis on the 
aspects of Corbett’s Some Principles that were deemed most relevant in the modern era was 
taken up by other historians following the end of the Cold War.  
 At the same conference, historian Jon Sumida introduced arguments that Corbett’s Some 
Principles should be seen primarily as a tool to educate the minds of naval professionals.  
Sumida, regarding Clausewitz, Mahan, and Corbett, consistently emphasized the great military 
theorists’ role as professional military educators.  As instructors at senior service colleges, they 
were intent on developing theories which would challenge the minds of senior officers.  Sumida 
established this argument in The Historian as Contemporary Analyst: Sir Julian Corbett and 
Admiral Sir John Fisher (1993), extended it in his survey of Mahan’s works, Inventing Grand 
Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered 
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(1997), and expanded his argument in Decoding Clausewitz:  A New Approach to On War 
(2008).  Sumida featured Corbett in each of these works.  In the initial work, Sumida focused on 
Corbett’s role within Fisher’s admiralty with an eye towards the role of a historian in influencing 
policy.  Sumida concluded from his study of Corbett that:  
the most appropriate role of historians with respect to the making of naval policy is not to 
provide either answers to critics or solutions to problems, but rather to raise the standards 
of inquiry, broaden perspectives, and otherwise modulate the process of discussion.27   
 
This analysis led Sumida to review, in his judgment, the true purpose behind each of the 
theorists’ publications and conclude that they were not primarily intended to influence policy or 
strategic decisions, rather, they were intended to educate.  In discussing Clausewitz, Mahan, and 
Corbett, Sumida argued: 
 the most appropriate use of history thus may be as an effective preceptor of militarized 
executive temperament, not as a fund of models to be emulated.  History properly applied 
to present requirements, in other words, is about how to study and what to learn rather 
than how to act.28   
 
Sumida saw Corbett’s historical works, primarily developed from his war course lectures, and 
Some Principles as fitting within the Clausewitzian view, that the role of history and military 
theory was primarily within an educational framework.  Sumida, who had started his career 
focused on the “Dreadnought Age” and the “Fisher Revolution” eventually tied the modern naval 
search for relevant lessons to the other concurrent stream of scholarly focus, the influence of 
Clausewitz.29   
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Much recent scholarship on Corbett focuses almost entirely on his military theory and 
strategic thought and its relationship to Clausewitz and On War.  Following the Vietnam War, 
Clausewitz came to prominence within professional military education in the United States.  
Corbett was far from the first military historian or theorist to wrestle with and attempt to 
incorporate Clausewitz into their own thinking.  The German “Continental School” had 
borrowed heavily from On War.  However, rather than attempting to understand the full comport 
of his theory, they selectively used ideas taken out of context to fit their own views of the lessons 
of the Napoleonic Wars which revolved around the offensive and decisive battle.  Mahan had 
also read Clausewitz’s On War, which was first translated into English by J.J. Graham in 1873, 
but shown no deeper understanding than the German school.  Historian Christopher Bassford, in 
Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815-1945 (1994), 
was the first Clausewitz scholar to focus attention on Corbett as one of the first military theorists 
to gain a deeper understanding of Clausewitz’s true import.  Bassford analyzed Corbett’s 
application of Clausewitz’s theory to the maritime environment and emphasized his limited war 
concepts stating, “Julian Corbett stood almost alone as a limited war theorist in the period just 
before World War I” and “on the specific subject of limited war the only important British 
proponent of the idea was Corbett although he was a significant exception.”30  While naval 
historians had long recognized Clausewitz’s influence on Corbett’s thought, Bassford introduced 
Clausewitzian scholars to Corbett. 
Beatrice Heuser in Reading Clausewitz (2002) epitomizes the Clausewitzian approach to 
Corbett and Some Principles.  Heuser argued that, “Corbett developed an original theoretical 
structure which draws on Clausewitz’s realistic writing but is self-confident enough to depart 
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from Clausewitz’s views where his theories are inapplicable to the sea” and notes that, Corbett’s 
theories remain applicable in the twenty-first century.31  In marked contrast to Makers of Modern 
Strategy (1986), Azar Gat in A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold 
War (2001), Heuser in The Evolution of Strategy (2010), and Hew Strachan in The Direction of 
War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective (2013) all place Corbett firmly at the 
center of maritime and strategic theory 
Almost all reviews of Corbett’s thought, however, end with Some Principles of Maritime 
Strategy.  Three years after its publication, the greatest event of Corbett’s lifetime, the First 
World War, for which he would have a front row seat in the Admiralty, played out along many 
of the lines of his theoretical work.  Corbett continued to write and publish extensively on 
current military affairs during the war.  British naval historian Andrew Lambert has started to 
extend Corbett scholarship beyond Some Principles by editing and publishing, in 21st Century 
Corbett: Maritime Strategy and Naval Policy for the Modern Era (2017), seven relatively 
obscure essays by Corbett that Lambert found relevant to modern naval and historical thought.  
Few modern scholars, however, have reviewed and attempted to incorporate any of Corbett’s 
later publications on either the Russo-Japanese War or the First World War into their analysis of 
his thought.  After the long drought in Corbett studies during the Cold War, scholarship has 
proliferated in the years since the end of the Cold War and with Lambert’s latest concentration 
on Corbett and Some Principles, the subject will likely remain a fertile ground for debate among 
both naval historians and strategic theorists.32
                     
31 Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz (London: Pimlico Press. 2002), 134. 
32 In addition to 21st Century Corbett, Andrew Lambert, by 2018, had published multiple articles on Corbett, Some 
Principles, and the Royal Navy College and has a major new work, Seapower States: Maritime Culture, Continental 
Empires and the Conflict That Made the Modern World scheduled to be published in November, 2018.  During this 






THE INFLUENCE OF HISTORY 
 
Julian Corbett’s significant work and contributions to the increasing professionalization 
of naval history and military education, and their relationship to his developing maritime theory 
is often undervalued by many recent commentators on Some Principals of Maritime Strategy.  
Corbett was first and foremost a historian and professional military educator. Corbett introduced 
new interpretive approaches to the study of military history based on his own interactions with 
the burgeoning military theory of the nineteenth century.  Corbett’s historical writing evolved 
over a decade of multi-volume works published between 1898 and 1910, including: Drake and 
the Tudor Navy (1898), The Successors of Drake (1900), England in the Mediterranean (1904), 
England in the Seven Years War (1907) and The Campaign of Trafalgar (1910).  His study of 
history during this prolific twelve year period directly influenced his conception of maritime 
strategy that underpinned his lasting contribution to military theory.  In looking at Corbett’s 
historical works, a number of influences characterize the changes in his approach to history over 
this twelve year period.     
Julian Corbett was educated as a lawyer at Cambridge and came to the study of history 
relatively late in life.  At the age of forty-five, Corbett, following an uninspired stint practicing 
law, decided to embrace writing and published four fictional novels; the most important of which 
was For God and Gold (1887).  In working on this novel, Corbett researched privateering and 
piracy and became fascinated with Sir Francis Drake.33  After these novels, he wrote two short 
biographies for the English Men of Action Series: Monck (1889) and Drake (1890).  These short 
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works brought him to the attention of former Royal Navy instructor and Professor of History at 
King’s College, Sir John Knox Laughton.  In 1895, Laughton, impressed by Corbett’s work, 
invited him to join the Navy Records Society and start work editing and cataloguing British 
naval records from the late sixteenth century.34  Corbett’s fascination with Sir Francis Drake and 
his archival work with the British naval records led directly to his first work of true historical 
scholarship, Drake and the Tudor Navy (1898), launching his career as a professional historian.    
As the academic discipline of history became increasingly professionalized in the 
nineteenth century, Laughton, Corbett, and a select group of military officers pioneered the 
pursuit of naval history.  When Corbett attended Marlborough College (1869–73) and later 
Cambridge (1873-6), neither school offered history as an academic discipline.  Like Corbett, 
none of the earliest pioneers in naval history were trained as historians.  Unlike Corbett, 
however, they were professional military officers.  During the “Age of Sail,” naval technology 
had remained relatively stable for well over three hundred years.  The late nineteenth century, 
however, was a time a tremendous technological instability for navies around the world, as they 
attempted to incorporate new technologies from the Industrial Revolution.  Coal and steam 
propulsion, steel armor, heavy guns, torpedoes, and submarines revolutionized navies at a pace 
never before seen in history; and the naval profession became obsessed with these developing 
technologies.  As an increasing majority of naval officers concentrated on technology and its 
impact on warfare, a small select group began to look to history to provide broad, enduring 
strategic principles that would continue to shape naval warfare, despite the rapid pace of 
                     
34 Laughton to Corbett, January 3, 1895, Letters and Papers of Professor Sir John Knox Laughton, 1830-1915, ed. 
Andrew Lambert, (London: Naval Records Society, 2002), 103.  Laughton first proposed Corbett undertake the 
editing of the State Papers from either 1585-87 or 1589-1596 for the Navy Records Society.  Laughton had edited 
the papers of the Spanish Armada – 1588.  Over the spring, additional correspondence finalized the arrangements 
with Corbett, who agreed to take on the papers from 1585-87 as they would benefit his ongoing work on Drake and 





technological change.  In the United States Navy, Commodore Stephen B. Luce led the fight 
against the technical school arguing with a group of line officers, “your profession is the 
profession of war and yet you do not study war.”35  Luce, and others like him, were 
representative of this school of historical thought that arose in response to the age of 
technological instability.  They led what Reynolds described as “a golden age of naval thought,” 
and at the heart of this “golden age” were Mahan and Corbett, who became the founding partners 
and rivals in modern maritime strategic thought. Mahan’s work had a resounding worldwide 
impact on naval history, strategy, and national policy, while forming the baseline concepts that 
all later naval historians and theorists, including Corbett, had to account for in their own analysis. 
Both Mahan and Corbett developed their historical works and strategic thought while 
serving as instructors at newly instituted naval war colleges.  The rise of professional military 
education for senior officers within navies of the late nineteenth century demonstrably advanced 
the study of naval history.  These schools targeted senior naval officers with the goal of 
improving their understanding of national policy and strategy, often through the study of history.  
The British founded the Royal Naval College at Greenwich in 1873, though its focus on 
educating senior officers did not begin until the College’s inaugural “War Course” started in 
1900.   In 1884, Luce founded the United States Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island 
with a much greater initial focus on educating more senior officers.  Alfred Thayer Mahan was 
an active duty officer in United State Navy who had started his career as a young midshipman in 
the Gulf blockade during the American Civil War.  After almost thirty years of unremarkable 
service in the Navy, Mahan accepted a teaching position, under Luce, at the newly created 
United State Navy War College in 1887.  In preparing to teach senior naval officers at the 
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College, Mahan became an avid student of history and developed a series of lectures on the 
influence of sea power in early modern Europe.  He eventually published these lectures in his 
earliest and most influential works, The Influence of Sea Power on History, 1660-1783 (1890) 
and The Influence of Sea Power on the French Revolution and Empire, 1783-1812 (1892).  In 
focusing on British history and the role of the Royal Navy in protecting and promoting its trading 
empire, as well as France’s failure to fully develop sea power, Mahan was primarily advocating 
that the United States dramatically expand the Navy and model the British approach to overseas 
trade and commerce.  Immediately upon their release, Mahan’s works were translated into 
Russian, German, Japanese, French, Swedish, and Spanish and made him a worldwide celebrity. 
 The Influence of Sea Power on History laid the foundation for modern naval history and 
was influential across the navies and capitals of the United States, Europe, and Japan.  Mahan 
brought serious analysis of naval grand strategy and the art and science of naval command to the 
forefront of naval history.  Mahan’s fame carried over into the academic community and 
ultimately led to his selection as the President of the American Historical Association (AHA) in 
1902.  Mahan, despite his great eloquence, came to be criticized by other historians for 
oversimplification and for his lack of archival research and reliance on secondary sources.  
British Admiral Cyprian Bridge noted that “a desire to persuade his countrymen to have huge 
armourclads clouds even Mahan’s clear historical vision.”36   In a speech before the AHA, 
Mahan, explaining his own historical methodology, offered, “original research was not within 
my scope, nor was it necessary to the scheme … facts are only the bricks and mortar of the 
historian, clarity of structuring, content, and accessibility to readers are essential.”37  For Mahan, 
                     
36 Bridge to Laughton March 14, 1893, in Laughton Papers, 84. 
37 Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought:  From the Enlightenment to the Cold War (New York:  Oxford 





providing meaning and significance were the most important aspects of historical research.  In a 
1916 article, “The Revival of Naval History,” Corbett wrote of Mahan, “the wonder is that 
Mahan could build as well as he did on a foundation so insecure.”38  Despite the later criticisms 
of his historical work, no one had greater influence on the rapid growth in the study of naval 
history than Alfred Thayer Mahan.   
While Mahan’s works were certainly more influential at the time, Corbett’s have stood 
the better test of time. Interestingly, Mahan’s most influential works were his earliest major 
publications.  While he continued to write history and theory for the next twenty-five years, 
nothing approached the importance of his Influence series of works.  Corbett, by contrast, started 
his research and writing at the same time as Mahan and published five multi-volume works of 
naval history and edited several volumes of primary source material over a twenty-year period 
before writing his most influential work of theory.  Corbett’s own extensive research on the 
influence of British sea power and his keen understanding, integration, and expansion of key 
military theorists led to his development of a much more subtle, but durable, concept of maritime 
operations, expounded in Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. 
Corbett’s methodological approach to history reflected the teaching and mentorship of Sir 
John Knox Laughton.  Laughton was a critical advocate in the professionalization of naval 
history and had a tremendous impact on Corbett’s development as a historian.  Laughton entered 
the Royal Navy as a civilian instructor during the Crimean War.  He became the head of the 
Department of Meteorology and Marine Survey at the Royal Naval College in 1873.  When he 
retired from naval service in 1885, he became a professor of Modern History at King’s College 
in London.  Laughton, having worked extensively with British Admiralty records and exploiting 
                     





the rising navalism of the 1890s, decided that it was important to open the official records to the 
public.  In 1893, with the help of Admiral Bridge, he became the founding Secretary of the Navy 
Records Society to promote the study of naval history.  Laughton edited what became the first 
published volume of the Society, State Papers relating to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada, in 
1894 and held the Secretary position from 1893 to 1912.   
The Navy Records Society under Laughton helped to transform the development and 
study of naval history.  Laughton consistently focused on the professionalization of the study of 
naval history through an emphasis on primary source material and archival research.  In editing 
and cataloguing the Admiralty records, Laughton increasingly came to notice and point out 
fallacies within some of Mahan’s broader arguments.  While finding many of Mahan’s 
conclusions generally sound, Laughton was highly critical of assertions he found to be based on 
slight or selective use of evidence.39  Despite the criticisms, Laughton maintained a full and long 
professional correspondence with both Mahan and Luce throughout the period.  Laughton’s own 
primary contributions to the field were practical and methodological; he greatly influenced 
Corbett’s views on the use and importance of primary sources in the study of history.  It would 
be left to Corbett, Laughton’s most important disciple, to synthesize the role of maritime power 
in national strategy through his own study of history and military theory.40 
  Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power on History certainly impacted Corbett’s approach 
to historical research and writing.  Corbett adopted the same broad strategic approach and 
concentrated on the purpose and function of naval operations and their linkage to overall national 
strategy and foreign policy. Corbett sought to place naval strategy within the context of military 
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strategy as one element of national power for use in achieving a political purpose.  Corbett, 
however, remained much more measured and moderate than Mahan and he more clearly 
separated theory from history.  At the International Congress of Historical Studies in 1913, 
Corbett lamented, “too often history has been used as a polemic device to prove almost anything, 
but during this period the discipline is changing with the advent of methodological sophistication 
and increasing rigor.”41  Corbett also felt it was critical for him to place himself into the exact 
state of mind of the people he was writing about and understand the full context in which 
decisions were made, leading Corbett to be much more understanding of mistakes and poor 
decisions.  In 1916, Corbett commented on his approach to history, writing:  
let us be sure we set forth the facts as truly and fully as we can.  It is not enough to relate 
the incident; we must also tell what led to it.  It is not enough to tell how battles were 
fought; we must try to tell why they were fought, and what were the results that flowed 
from them…Above all we should be careful to keep in mind what they knew at the time, 
and be sure we are not assuming in them knowledge that was not in their possession, 
though it is now in ours… When in history you avoid error and injustice you have already 
gone far to sound teaching.42   
 
Like Mahan, Corbett was focused on leadership and decision-making but Corbett attempted to 
fully understand the context and influences on any individual leader’s decisions.  In his approach 
to history, Corbett consistently focused on gaining understanding rather than judging actions.   
Corbett’s growing professionalism was evident in his turning the Drake (1890) biography 
into the much more extensive and insightful two-volume Drake and the Tudor Navy (1898).  
Corbett’s expansion of the Drake biography was greatly facilitated by his work with the Navy 
Records Society.  During the last two years that he worked on Drake and the Tudor Navy, 
Corbett concurrently edited Papers Relating to the Navy during the Spanish War, 1585-1587 
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(1898).  In the introduction, Corbett identified Drake’s Cadiz campaign of 1587 “as the finest 
example of how a small well-handled fleet, carrying a compact landing force and acting on the 
nicely timed offensive, may paralyze the mobilization of an overwhelming force.”43  It is during 
the Cadiz campaign that Corbett first identified the “birth of sound and intelligent strategy as 
distinguished from the crude cross-channel raiding of the Middle Ages.”44  In Drake and the 
Tudor Navy, Corbett developed this “birth of sound and intelligent strategy,” while also 
continuing to center the work on the life of Sir Francis Drake.   
Most previous historical writing followed a biographical approach and tended to focus on 
battles, heroic actions, and exciting stories.  The multi-volume English Men of Action Series 
published by Macmillan in the late nineteenth century fit well within that tradition.  While 
Laughton had shifted his focus from heroic exploits to one of leadership, administration, and 
professionalism in From Howard to Nelson: Twelve Sailors, which he edited and contributed to 
in 1899, he and the other authors continued to address these themes through the study of the most 
famous British naval heroes.  Corbett’s first full work of history continued to echo that 
biographical tradition as he built the narrative around Drake and, to a lesser extent, John 
Hawkins.  In the preface, Corbett felt the need to justify centering the rise of British sea power 
within the European geopolitical system on a single person by promoting Drake as an instrument 
of the state.  He sought to strip away many of the myths, legends, and the romanticism 
surrounding Drake and restore his reputation as an admiral, statesman, and great military 
leader.45  Beyond his focus on Drake, Corbett first outlined the limits tradition and geography 
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placed on British strategic thinking.  At this early stage in his career, however, he tended to 
compartmentalize the military and political while advocating the Mahanian view of command of 
the sea.  He attributed the coming of war with Spain as inevitable and caused by Britain’s 
aggressive commercial policy in the Americas.46   After a long exposition of Drake’s exploits 
that make up the majority of the first volume, Corbett concluded the volume with a discussion of 
a little known author, John Montgomery, and his treatise on naval thought written in 1570.  It 
was Corbett’s first foray into discussing naval thought and theory and demonstrated a clear 
reading of Mahan’s Influence works, which he annotated in the discussion, as well as, Rear 
Admiral Philip Colomb’s Naval Warfare (1891).  Corbett noted Montgomery’s striking 
modernity, his descriptions of the seas as highways, and advocacy of a fleet strong enough to 
dispute command of the sea.  In a clear allusion to Colomb’s work, Corbett recognized some of 
Montgomery’s arguments as reminiscent of Torrington’s “fleet in being;” important for Corbett’s 
later work. He noted that “the strategy he (Montgomery) approves is entirely defensive, and does 
not aim primarily at the destruction of the enemy’s fleet.”47  According to Corbett, 
Montgomery’s thought took hold of the Elizabethan navy and only needed Hawkins’ 
mathematical mind and Drake’s genius to implement the strategy.  Clearly this early research 
informed Corbett’s own coming disagreement with one of Mahan’s central planks concerning the 
defensive and destruction of the enemy’s main fleet.  In the second volume, however, Corbett, in 
full agreement with Mahan’s principles, attacked the British plan to divide the fleet into weak 
squadrons in the face of the main Spanish fleet and credited Drake’s opposition to the plan and 
advocacy of “a new English school that Nelson brought to perfection” based on “that kernel of 
naval strategy to destroy the enemy’s main fleet, and that no invasion is practicable without 
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command of the sea” and “the importance in naval warfare of taking the offensive and striking 
the first blow.”48  At this early stage in his career, Corbett also shared Mahan’s skepticism of the 
guerre de course strategy, arguing that: 
here we have the idea, since so often proved fatal and so often re-born as a new 
strategical discovery, that a naval war may be conducted on economical principles, and a 
great Power brought to its knees by preying on its commerce without first getting 
command of the sea.49   
 
Corbett clearly identified Drake as the great genius that first enunciated the doctrine that would 
make Britain “mistress of the seas” which, in Corbett’s mind, far exceeded Drake’s other more 
famous exploits in importance.   
By the 1911 publication of Some Principles, Corbett was much more cautious about 
advocating the seeking out of the enemy’s main fleet as he recounted Drake’s memorable 
memorandum.  Corbett had come to recognize the chances of missing the Spanish fleet had been 
too great and Britain could not take that risk, writing “clearly, then, the maxim of ‘seeking out’ 
for all of its moral exhilaration, for all its value as an expression of high and sound naval spirit, 
must not be permitted to displace well-reasoned judgment.”50  Corbett also revised his view of 
Drake’s originally proposed strategy from one focused on seeking out and destroying the main 
Spanish fleet to a strategy of using a small squadron to disrupt the Spanish mobilization which, 
therefore, did not warrant the risk involved.  Finally in Some Principles, Corbett returned to 
Drake’s 1587 Cadiz operation as an example of his minor counterattacks, a tactic popular with 
inferior navies.  While Corbett engaged some aspects of Mahan’s and Colomb’s theoretical 
works, Drake and the Tudor Navy remained largely rooted in the conventional hagiographic 
biography intended to celebrate the rise of the Royal Navy.        
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Corbett quickly followed Drake and the Tudor Navy with The Successors of Drake 
(1900), in which he moved away from the conventional biographical approach and began to 
highlight the limitations of maritime power, a theme that colored much of his later theoretical 
approach.  Successors was a sequel to Drake and the Tudor Navy and covered the Anglo-Spanish 
War from the death of Drake in 1596 through the ascension of James I and the end of the war in 
1603.  In moving beyond the glorious victory over the Spanish Armada, Corbett characterized 
this period as “one of splendid failures and it is for this very consideration which makes it so 
well worth study today.”51  Britain, a great naval power, struggled to bring the war against the 
vast Spanish Empire to a successful conclusion.  Corbett realized Elizabethan England remained 
too poor and weak, economically, to force a decision on the Spanish Empire.52  He also 
recognized that the history of sea power could not be treated as an independent aspect of war.  
He quoted Robert Devereux, the Earl of Essex, in arguing against a solely naval expedition “to 
the point of how little use is a fleet in command of the sea, if there be no land force with it to 
reap the full advantage of the position.”53  In analyzing the failure of the two major British 
expeditions, Drake’s to Lisbon after the Armada and the Howard/Essex expedition to Cadiz in 
1596, Corbett acknowledged that:  
what was wanting was an army, and England had none fit for the work…they had not yet 
advanced to the knowledge that to enjoy the vantage ground of the sea you must have an 
army as mobile, as well organized, and as highly trained as your navy…England 
appeared as unripe for a standing army as she did for colonization, and under the 
circumstances peace was the best policy.54   
 
Corbett concluded The Successors of Drake with what would become a central tenant of his 
theoretical approach to maritime strategy and a central point of divergence from Mahan:  
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we know what Nelson did at Trafalgar, and forget that its real importance was what it 
afterwards enabled Wellington to do.  We speak glibly of ‘sea-power,’ and forget that its 
true value lies in its influence on the operations of armies…(that) is the great lesson we 
have to learn in the failure of Drake’s successors.55 
 
In Some Principles, Corbett articulated what he had learned from the inability of the British to 
exploit their victory over the Spanish Armada:   
Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at war 
have always been decided, except in the rarest cases, either by what your army can do 
against your enemy’s territory and national life or else by the fear of what the fleet makes 
it possible for your army to do.56 
 
Successors was a significant divergence from Mahan’s approach to naval history and proved a 
corrective to the more excessively propagandistic views of naval history by focusing on the 
limitations of maritime power and the influence of maritime operations on war more broadly.     
 Following this three-volume history of the Anglo-Spanish War, Corbett had become one 
of the leading naval historians in Britain.  He also began to weigh in on the military affairs of the 
day through contributions to Henry Newbolt’s Monthly Review.  In 1900, Corbett, a liberal 
imperialist, weighed in on the Boer War for the Review, writing “The Paradox of Empire” in 
which he argued that Britons must face the fact that their Empire existed and they needed to 
come together to resolve the problems of empire.57  During 1902, Corbett wrote a three part 
article for the Monthly Review, entitled “Education in the Navy,” which was based on 
information provided by then Lieutenant Commander Herbert Richmond.  Corbett argued against 
the current methods of officer initial entry training and education.  After a brief sixteen month 
stay on the Britannia, cadets were immediately sent to sea to continue their education and 
training as naval officers.  Corbett argued for a four-year, land-based education for cadets from 
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twelve to sixteen years of age, followed by six years at sea for training as naval officers, and 
completed with a three year finishing school at the overhauled Royal Navy College at 
Greenwich. Corbett, channeling Richmond, primarily disagreed with the idea that cadets and 
midshipmen could be both trained and educated at sea, writing paradoxically that “you cannot 
train except at sea and at sea you cannot teach.”58  Corbett’s publications brought him to the 
attention of Admiral John Fisher, then Second Naval Lord of the Admiralty, who was intent on 
revamping education within the Royal Navy among numerous other reforms.   Fisher appreciated 
the support Corbett’s articles provided to his education reforms and noted both Corbett’s writing 
ability and the importance of the press in influencing political opinion in support of his reforms.   
In 1902, Corbett also began lecturing full-time at the Royal Naval College at Greenwich 
as part of the new War Course designed to better integrate history and strategy into senior officer 
education.  Laughton, who had primarily taught mathematics and meteorology, had introduced 
lectures on naval history during his last years with the College and Rear Admiral Philip Colomb 
had resumed those lectures during his tenure at the College.  Despite these lectures, however, the 
study of naval history had not been integrated into the curriculum and remained sporadic until 
the implementation of the War Course.59  It had been a constant fight for men like Laughton and 
Colomb to integrate the study of naval history into the curriculum.  In response to Laughton’s 
discussion of “The Scientific Study of Naval History” delivered at the Royal United Services 
Institute in 1874, the Chairman of the Institute, Vice Admiral Frederick Nicolson, generally 
supportive, asked where the Royal Naval College was supposed to find time in its extensive 
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program of studies for students to master naval history.60  In 1900, Captain Henry May was 
appointed to the Royal Naval College to begin implementation of the new War Course, which he 
based on the program of instruction at the United States Naval War College.  Corbett continued 
the fight for the full integration of historical study within all three levels of naval education when 
he took up the argument in “Education in the Navy” which eventually led to his hiring by May to 
teach naval history at the War Course. Corbett later described the system he helped implement 
upon arriving at the Royal Naval College: 
Under the new scheme, as you know, cadets, while still young, began at Osborne, 
and after two years went on to Dartmouth.  Then after a long period at sea, they 
came to the War College as commanders, captains, and rear-admirals...This 
method was particularly designed to lead up to the final study at the War 
College…entrusted to civilian lecturers, that is professed historians…as a Staff 
College and a School of Command, it was applied history that was wanted along 
with absolute history, that is, history in the broadest sense…naval history must go 
hand in hand with military, so both must never lose touch with political and 
diplomatic history.61  
 
As a civilian who had never served in the Royal Navy, Corbett found teaching senior officers, 
who had spent a full career in the navy, extremely challenging.   He recognized that he did not 
have the technical or professional service background of his students, but was convinced of 
history’s immense power as an educational instrument and that his scholarly approach provided 
an extremely important and, at the time, uncommon view.  He warned equally against the 
civilian naval historian becoming isolated from the service and the naval officer being ignorant 
of history.62  In addition to his status as a civilian, Corbett’s historical strategic message 
concerning the limitations of maritime power and the subordination of naval strategy to national 
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policy also proved unpopular with a great number of these naval officers raised on Nelsonian 
traditions and Mahan’s writing.  Corbett, in a letter to Henry Newbolt, described the challenge, 
“my strategic lectures are very uphill work.  I had no idea when I undertook it how difficult it 
was to present theory in a digestable form to the unused organs of Naval officers.”63   During the 
First World War, Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, in attacking the anti-
intellectualism of the Royal Navy, provided a backhanded compliment to Corbett:  
the Royal Navy has made no important contribution to the naval literature.  The standard 
work on sea power was written by an American admiral, and the best accounts of British 
sea fighting and naval strategy are compiled by an English civilian (Corbett)…At the 
outset of the conflict we had more captains of ship than captains of war.64 
 
More recently, however, historian Andrew Lambert has been much more charitable in his 
assessment of the War Course and Corbett’s influence on Royal Navy officers attending the 
course.  He argues that the leaders of the Royal Navy during the interwar years and into the 
Second World War, including David Beatty, Ernie Lord Chatfield, and Bertram Ramsay were all 
greatly influenced by the Course, its curriculum, and Corbett’s teaching.65  After his hiring by the 
Royal Naval College in 1902, Corbett came to write strictly for an audience of naval officers, 
educators, and policymakers, leading to a noticeable shift in style from a purely historical 
perspective to one of a professional military educator.  Corbett directly tied his historical 
research and writing to the central strategic and naval debates of the day.   
At the center of British policy debates in 1904 was the Entente Cordiale between Britain 
and France and the eventual reallocation of British forces from the Mediterranean to the North 
Sea in 1906.  It is not surprising, therefore, that Corbett published his next major two-volume 
work, England in the Mediterranean 1603-1714 (1904) in the midst of this strategic debate.  In a 
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shift away from traditional naval history, Corbett adopted a thematic approach, taken from his 
lectures at the Naval College, to analyze Britain’s ability to influence the continent of Europe 
through its strategic exploitation of the Mediterranean Sea.  In Britain’s decision to permanently 
station a fleet in the Mediterranean, Corbett recognized Britain’s growing ability, through threat 
and deterrence, to leverage sea power in shaping outcomes in the complex world of European 
balance of power politics.66  Corbett moved beyond biography and battles to an exclusive 
concentration on the connections between naval strategy, military strategy, national strategy, 
policy, diplomacy, and international relations.  He argued that the Anglo-Dutch wars “were an 
episode in our history.” The British move into the Mediterranean, however, had a lasting impact, 
broader implications for the modern world, and involved the “most vital preoccupation of the 
higher naval strategy.”67  In both a criticism of the contemporary state of naval history and his 
own more expansive view of the role and influence of sea power, Corbett noted that:  
the majority of historians have ever ignored the naval influence except where now and 
then their attention is aroused by the thunder of a great battle.  But, more often than not, 
the important fact is that no battle took place, and again and again the effort to prevent a 
collision is the controlling feature of widespread political action.68 
 
 Corbett hoped with his study to reveal how and why the British Mediterranean Fleet in modern 
times stood as a symbol and measure of British power in Europe.  With England in the 
Mediterranean, Corbett also began to argue that military strategy is “deflected” by policy and 
politics and that one cannot evaluate a military strategy without understanding the broader 
political considerations informing that strategy.69  Corbett declared the dispatch of Robert 
Blake’s squadron to the Mediterranean in 1651 to be a revolution in Britain’s conception of 
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naval defense that was to have far-reaching consequences as the protection of the merchant 
marine became the chief end of the Royal Navy.  The protection of oceanic commerce, trade 
routes, and critical chokepoints, such as Gibraltar, became the primary focus for British naval 
strategy.70  According to Corbett, “from the point of view of the higher naval strategy no war is 
more illuminating instruction for our own time and that of the Spanish Succession. Objects of 
naval power closely resembled those which exist today.”71  He credited William III with an 
understanding of continental politics that helped him recognize the leverage a small British force 
in the Mediterranean could bring to the European balance of power.  In 1904, Corbett continued 
to see British power in the Mediterranean as the main guarantor of stability in Europe.72      
As Corbett continued to lecture at the Royal Naval College, Lieutenant Colonel G.F.R. 
Henderson, a military historian at the Camberley Staff College, introduced Corbett to Carl von 
Clausewitz’s monumental work, On War.73  On War impacted both Corbett’s approach to his 
historical analysis as well as his developing maritime theory.  The deeper impacts of 
Clausewitz’s thought on Corbett and his theoretical approach will be examined in the following 
chapter.  In terms of his historical writing, Corbett read On War prior to writing the two-volume 
England in the Seven Years War (1907).  In fact, the structure of that work revolved around 
Corbett’s attempt to use Clausewitz’s political nature of war while also merging theoretical and 
historical approaches in a single work.  Corbett had already developed a consistent focus on the 
connections between policy and strategy in his previous works, but became enthralled with the 
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structure and reasoning behind Clausewitz’s dialectic approach to theory and history.  It was a 
distinct shift from traditional history and Corbett felt the need to issue an apology to the reader:  
it has been unavoidable to introduce a certain amount of strategical exposition.  For this 
some apology is due to civilian readers.  A less technical and more epic treatment of the 
great contest of maritime empire would doubtless have received a kindlier 
welcome…even for those who read history for its romance, for its drama, and its poetry, 
that surely the deepest notes of what they seek can only be heard when we watch great 
men of action struggling, as in some old Greek tragedy, with the inexorable laws of 
strategy, or rising on them in mastery of the inevitable catastrophe.74   
 
Corbett’s second chapter, in which he analyzes “the Nature and Object of the War,” follow 
directly from Clausewitz’s On War, as do many of his other analytical devices used to better 
understand the war and the opposing strategies.  Captain Edmund Slade, the new director of the 
Naval College, along with Corbett, had selected the Seven Years War for inclusion in the 
curriculum because of its emphasis on combined operations.  Corbett used the Seven Years War 
as the test case for his developing theory of a British limited war strategy.  For Corbett, the study 
of the Seven Years War offered no better education in the higher principles of the art of war and 
strategy and should be central to the education of soldiers, sailors, statesmen, and diplomats.   
As with Corbett’s previous work, England in the Seven Years War followed from his 
lectures at the Naval College, the feedback from students, and his desire to understand strategy 
and theory through the study of history.  Throughout the work, Corbett concentrated on William 
Pitt the Elder’s unified approach to policy and strategy and Pitt’s genius in subordinating military 
strategy to the higher political purposes of the war, while also constantly recognizing the 
frustrating complexity of coordinating military and political policy.  In analyzing the start of the 
Seven Years War, Corbett once again noted how military and naval strategy are “deflected” by 
political considerations.  The opening of the war demonstrated to Corbett “the way Governments 
                     






limp and stumble to vital decisions when their path is encumbered by a tangle of political and 
strategical considerations.”75  In considering Admiral John Byng’s failed relief attempt of Port 
Mahon, Corbett, unlike most naval officers or historians, took Byng to task for failing to 
understand his purpose and his seeking battle with the French fleet in the first place.  According 
to Corbett, if Byng had clearly understood his objective, Richelieu’s Army rather than the French 
fleet, he would have cut the French lines of communication between Toulon and Minorca and 
forced the French to abandon the siege of Port Mahon or fight the British fleet on its own terms. 
Corbett, however, admitted that this strategy would be the last thing any British admiral would 
ever carry out.  He argued that “for the average British admiral of that time there was nothing 
between attack and retreat.  Their besetting strategic sin was failure to appreciate the power that 
lies in a well-applied defensive.”76  Corbett, throughout his career as a historian and educator, 
consistently argued against the perceived British tradition of always seeking decisive battle 
regardless of the strategy or broader purpose of the war.  Corbett consistently emphasized the 
difficulty in bringing about a decisive naval engagement and that decisive battle was not the sole 
function of the fleet.  Corbett pointed out that the study of the Seven Years War revealed that 
command of the sea was only a means to an end and the primary function of the fleet was to 
support or obstruct diplomatic efforts, protect or destroy commerce, and hinder or support 
operations ashore.  Corbett first advanced the argument that those who focus solely on 
destroying the enemy’s fleet are confusing the means with the ends of naval strategy.  Corbett, 
also, for the first time delineated between strategy and minor strategy to which he relegates naval 
strategy and the movement of fleets within a theater of war.  He declared that “the great dramatic 
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moments of naval strategy have to be worked for,” a thought he expanded on in Some Principles 
to argue against Mahan and his overwhelming emphasis on concentration of force.77 
Corbett also first advanced the idea of a broader maritime strategy that incorporated the 
functions of the fleet rather than the more narrowly focused naval strategy, a central argument in 
Some Principles.  In the Seven Years War, Corbett saw the most effective and efficient use of 
combined operations and an example of how a nation with a weak army can effectively employ 
that army in conjunction with overwhelming naval power to effect the war on the continent.  In 
analyzing the Louisburg and Quebec combined operations, Corbett identified a “remarkable 
advance in naval thought.”  He argued that “every problem of naval strategy resolves itself 
ultimately into a question of attacking or defending maritime communications…because 
command of the sea means nothing but the control of sea communications.”78  Corbett was 
developing his maturing principles concerning command of the sea and maritime operations.  In 
his study of this war, he first developed one of his central arguments in Some Principles that, 
unlike on land, the sea is not subject to territorial ownership and its only value is as a means of 
communication.  He advanced the argument that destruction of the enemy’s fleet is nothing more 
than a “means of seizing or preventing the enemy from seizing the main lines of 
communication.”79  Corbett came to recognize that the British and French shared the exact same 
lines of communication in the Seven Years War, a phenomena that could not occur on land.  
Neither side could defend their own lines of communication without attacking their enemy’s line 
of communication.  From these insights, Corbett argued that the “communication theory of naval 
strategy” was the foundation of British naval strategy from the time of the Seven Years War, in 
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which the British both attacked and defended lines of communication by placing a powerful fleet 
off the enemy’s coast and ports and another off the objective coast and ports at each end of the 
lines of communication.  He described the British establishment of Hawke’s Channel Fleet off 
the French coast and ports and Boscawen’s squadron off of Louisburg as securing the end points 
which, in turn, provided the security of the extended sea lines of communication.80  Later in 
Some Principles, Corbett more fully developed these ideas on what it meant to command the sea.   
Corbett also provided his first reference to Clausewitz’s discussion of limited and 
unlimited war that he further developed in Some Principles.  In England in the Seven Years War 
Corbett first raised the distinction between limited and unlimited war in arguing that the 
“strategy of both sides had been designed on the lines of a limited war” through 1758 with the 
British focused on the capture of Canada.81  He introduced Clausewitz’s theory of escalation and 
noted that the limited war continued to escalate as it spread to both the East and West Indies.  
British strategy had to incorporate the mission of global commerce protection and eventually 
escalated to include direct attacks on colonies in the East and West Indies.  For Corbett, these 
regions became the focus of “cruiser warfare,” which included independent scouting, commerce 
protection, and commerce raiding, and led to Corbett’s initial discussions on the functions and 
missions of the various parts of the fleet.  As France continued to suffer defeats in the limited 
war, Corbett argued that the theory of escalation naturally led the French in 1759 to propose a 
direct invasion of Britain.82  In discussing the later years of the war, Corbett re-emphasized how 
military and naval strategy are deflected by politics.  He noted the debates over the Mauritius 
expedition, aid to Prussia, potential Spanish entry into the war, and the Havana expedition were 
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all caught up in the “tangled politics of war.”83  Corbett argued that the Seven Years War 
demonstrated a clear change to a more scientific conception of naval warfare and the war 
provided “no clearer lesson in history how unwise and short-sighted it is to despise and ridicule a 
naval defensive.” 84  Corbett’s understanding of Pitt’s strategy became the foundation of his own 
strategic thought.  Corbett solidified that foundation through addressing the great military 
theorists of the nineteenth century and then adapted for the “Dreadnought Age.”  
Throughout his teaching at the Royal Naval College, Corbett continued working on his 
archival research.  He had also continued his work with the Navy Records Society, cataloguing 
and editing two major works on official Royal Navy tactical instructions from the “Age of Sail,” 
Fighting Instructions: 1530-1816 (1905) and Signals and Instructions: 1776-1794 (1909).  
Despite the intense focus on strategy and policy in his own works, Corbett, through his work 
with the official records, was recognized as the preeminent expert on tactical fighting during the 
“Age of Sail.”  In his final major historical work based on archival research, Corbett tackled the 
most discussed, remembered, and written about campaign in British history, the Napoleonic 
Wars, Trafalgar, and Admiral Horatio Nelson.  In his most controversial historical work to that 
time, The Campaign of Trafalgar (1910), Corbett, as was his nature, analyzed the underlying 
British strategy behind the campaign. In focusing on the Admiralty’s overall strategy and 
operational combinations that ultimately brought on the battle, he approached the campaign from 
a different perspective than most previous writers and commentators who tended to concentrate 
on Nelson’s leadership and the battle itself.  He noted the extensive amount of source material 
that most chroniclers had ignored in their obsessive focus on Nelson and the tactics and glory of 
the battle.  His exhaustive research in the Admiralty records led Corbett to place the battle within 
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a much broader strategic and operational context.85  Corbett carefully reviewed strategic cause 
and effect to show that British sea power was a limited but effective arm of British foreign 
policy.86  Sea power alone, however, was insufficient to defeat Napoleon and it ultimately 
required the combined efforts of Britain and the continental powers.  Corbett argued that, 
“Trafalgar is ranked as one of the decisive battles of the world and yet of all the great victories, 
there is not one which to all appearance was so barren of immediate results… It gave England, 
finally, the dominion of the seas, but it left Napoleon dictator of the continent.”87  In his final 
estimation of Trafalgar and the broader naval operations of the Napoleonic Wars, Corbett 
returned to the limitations of sea power.  Through its overwhelming maritime operations, Britain 
had secured the British Islands and the Empire, it had swept French naval power and commerce 
from the seas, and “against any other man than Napoleon it might have done much more…as it 
was the sea had done all that the sea could do, and for Europe the end was failure.”88  In another 
unique aspect of The Campaign of Trafalgar, Corbett tied the strategic and tactical together 
throughout the narrative.  Corbett argued that Nelson’s true genius lay in always keeping the 
ends of the campaign in sight and recognizing battle as nothing more than a means to that end.  
Nelson, from the beginning of the campaign, recognized his mission was to protect Sardinia, 
Sicily, and Malta and remained focused on that mission when the French fleet escaped Toulon. 
His (Nelson’s) dominate function was to keep command of the Mediterranean.  For him 
that was always the end; the destruction of the Toulon fleet was only the means…No 
great captain ever grasped more fully the strategical importance of dealing with the 
enemy’s main fleet, yet no one ever less suffered it to become an obsession; no one saw 
more clearly when it ceased to be the key of a situation, and fell to a position of 
secondary moment.89 
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In addressing Nelson’s “true genius,” Corbett was highly critical of certain writers, James 
Thursfield in particular, for selective use of source material that was directly contradicted by 
unimpeachable evidence.  After the publication of The Campaign of Trafalgar, Thursfield 
demanded and received a full Admiralty Committee hearing, chaired by Admirals Bridge and 
Reginald Custance, on the truth of Corbett’s claims with respect to Nelson’s intent.  The 
committee ruled in Corbett’s favor, but the incident demonstrated the importance of Nelson and 
Trafalgar within Royal Navy tradition and British myth and memory.  Corbett’s representations, 
while accurate and complimentary, did not fit the popular perception of the Nelsonian tradition.  
The Campaign of Trafalgar was Corbett’s last major work based on archival research.  He spent 
the rest of his life focused on theoretical works, contemporary strategy and policy, and 
documenting the conflicts of the early twentieth century.     
Corbett’s combined historical works revealed the genesis of a British maritime doctrine, 
which Corbett articulated in Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, incorporating his historical 
insights throughout the work.90  Throughout his career, Corbett used new and innovative 
approaches to the study of British strategic and naval history, but always remained rooted in 
archival resources and attempted to remain true to that source material, while simultaneously 
seeking to remain relevant to professional naval officers and policymakers.  While rooted in the 
study of the past, Corbett consistently maintained an orientation towards the present and future 
as he noted, “in trying to penetrate the past turn now and then to think of the future.  For history 
is not a dead thing of the past; it is a living growth.”91  For Corbett history served as the 
foundation for theory and theory was meant to educate. This integration of history and theory for 
the purpose of education was instrumental to Corbett’s developing maritime strategy.   
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MILITARY THEORY AND PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION 
 
While British history formed the foundation of Corbett’s approach to war and maritime 
strategy, he had quickly moved beyond the sole study of naval history to focus on the role history 
should play in informing contemporary approaches to policy, war, and strategy.  Corbett began 
to seriously study military theory because of his requirement to provide relevant lessons to senior 
naval officers at the Royal Navy College.  His reading of Mahan and Colomb had long exposed 
him to the inter-relationship between theory and history and Corbett, himself, had tentatively 
explored some of those concepts in his historical works.  His introduction to Clausewitz’s On 
War led to a much deeper engagement with military theory and its role in educating officers.  His 
Some Principles of Maritime Strategy stands in stark contrast to the predominate lines of 
nineteenth-century military thought which was increasingly focused on the evolving idea of 
“total war.”  In an era of the decisive battle and unconditional surrender, limited war was 
increasingly inconceivable and Corbett stood largely alone in his reinterpretation of On War.  He 
also broke with the conventional naval wisdom espoused by Mahan and Colomb.  Corbett, unlike 
the “blue-water” school, willingly recognized and discussed the limits of sea power and how 
maritime strategy contributed to the broader framework of national strategy. Corbett represented 
a clear break with nineteenth-century military theory.  The political scientist Azar Gat argued, 
Corbett “proceeded to turn nineteenth-century military theory on its head, reversing almost each 
and every one of its sacred tenets and articles of faith.”92    
In approaching Some Principles, Corbett structured the work around three major sections.    
In Part I, Theory of War, Corbett drew heavily on Clausewitz’s thought, which Corbett then 
                     





adapted and expanded to fit the maritime environment.  In Part II, Theory of Naval War, he 
advanced his own interpretation of command of the sea while responding directly to many of 
Mahan’s claims.  Finally, in Part III, Conduct of Naval War, which historian Eric Grove called 
“the most sophisticated and complete exposition of battle-fleet naval operational doctrine 
available in the English language,” Corbett presented the various ways naval power may be 
employed in gaining, disputing, and exercising command of the sea.93  First, however, Corbett 
felt the need to address the purpose and role of theory itself.   
Corbett was in complete agreement with Clausewitz on the role and importance of theory.  
It is no coincidence that Clausewitz, Mahan, and Corbett spent time studying and teaching 
history at their respective military colleges before writing theory.  For each of them, the purpose 
of theory was to educate the mind of the professional military officer and civilian statesmen with 
an emphasis on improving judgement.  Clausewitz described the purpose of theory in On War:  
theory then becomes a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books; it will 
light his way, eases progress, train his judgment, and help him to avoid pitfalls… Theory 
exists so that one need not start afresh each time sorting out the material and plowing 
through it, but will find it ready to hand and in good order. It is meant to educate the 
mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, to guide him in his self-education, 
not to accompany him to the battlefield; just as a wise teacher guides and stimulates a 
young man’s intellectual development, but is careful not to lead him by the hand for the 
rest of his life.94 
 
Mahan was an inveterate disciple of the Swiss military theorist Antoine-Henri Jomini.   Jomini 
had served as a corps chief of staff in the French Army during the Napoleonic Wars and firmly 
believed in the value of both history and principles of war.  Mahan, echoing Jomini, wrote: 
Each is a partial educator; combined, you have in time a perfect instructor. Of the two, 
history by itself is better than formulated principles by themselves; for in this connection, 
history, being the narrative of actions, takes the role which we commonly call practical. It 
is the story of practical experience. But we all, I trust, have advanced beyond the habit of 
thought which rates the rule of thumb, mere practice, mere personal experience, above 
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practice illuminated by principles, and reinforced by the knowledge, developed by many 
men in many quarters. Master your principles, and then ram them home with the 
illustrations which history furnishes.95 
 
 Throughout Some Principles, Corbett emphasized that theory cannot serve as a guide to 
decisions, instead, he consistently referred to judgement as the key to strategic decision-making 
and the role of theory as critical in developing that judgement.  In the introduction to Some 
Principles, Corbett quoted Clausewitz on the role of theory, “it (theory) is meant to educate the 
mind of the future commander, or, more accurately to guide him in self-education; not 
accompany him to the battlefield” and then expanded with his own assertion that, “theory is, in 
fact, a question of education and deliberation, and not of execution at all. That depends on the 
combination of intangible human qualities which we call executive ability.”96  Both Corbett and 
Mahan believed that contemporary officer education had become overly technical and scientific 
and neglected the broader requirements for developing “executive ability.”  Mahan wrote in 
“Naval Education” (1879): 
I confess to a feeling of mingled impatience and bitterness when I hear noble duties and 
requirements of a naval officer’s career ignored, and an attempt made to substitute for 
them the wholly different aims and faculties of the servant of science… Science has been, 
and still is, achieving her magnificent conquests; and men, as always, in the presence of 
the achievements of the moment forget the triumphs of the past.97 
 
Both Mahan and Corbett used the term “executive ability” in much the same sense as Clausewitz 
referred to military genius.  Clausewitz described the central components of military genius: 
During an operation decisions have usually to be made at once: there may be no time to 
review the situation or even to think it through… If the mind is to emerge unscathed from 
this relentless struggle with the unforeseen, two qualities are indispensable: first, an 
intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retain some glimmerings of the inner light which 
leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead. The 
first of these qualities is described by the French term, coup d’oeil; the second is 
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determination…Coup d’oeil therefore refers not alone to the physical but, more 
commonly, to the inward eye…the quick recognition of a truth that the mind would 
ordinarily miss.98 
 
Mahan argued that decision-making was a critical element of war and that it could be improved 
through education. He, like Clausewitz, believed intuition was at the heart of judgment and was 
developed through wartime experience and through an education based on the study of history.99   
Corbett, on the other hand, was much more reluctant than Clausewitz or Mahan to define the 
abilities required in a commander, yet he mirrored their analysis: 
the conduct of war is so much a question of personality, of character, of common sense, 
of rapid decision upon complex and ever shifting factors, and those factors themselves 
are so varied, so intangible, so dependent upon unstable moral and physical conditions, 
that seems incapable of being reduced to anything like true scientific analysis.100 
 
While Corbett clearly intended Some Principles as a tool to help educate senior naval officers in 
dealing with the contemporary maritime issues, unlike Clausewitz or Mahan, he saw the 
development of executive ability as outside the realm of theory.101  Based on his experiences 
teaching senior officers, it is likely that as a civilian Corbett was more reluctant than Clausewitz 
or Mahan to directly address the executive ability required of military leadership.    
The nineteenth century generated a burgeoning output of military theory informed by the 
experiences of French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars.  Jomini and Clausewitz were the great 
interpreters of the changes in warfare brought on by the Revolution and Napoleon.  Throughout 
the second half of the nineteenth century their theories were adapted, advanced, and interpreted 
in various ways as militaries increasingly wrestled with the new technologies generated by the 
Industrial Revolution.  The Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871) became the interpretive lens 
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through which previous military theory was adapted into a growing “continental school” of 
military thought.  The German Continental School had its legacy in the Prussian reforms of 
Gerhard von Scharnhorst, August von Gneisenau, and Clausewitz.  However, Helmuth von 
Moltke’s (Elder) own thoughts, interpretations, and experiences came to dominate the German 
school in the late nineteenth century.  Moltke foresaw the consequences of rising nationalism, 
urbanization, mass education, and communications in the politicization of the population and the 
likely effect this was to have on war.102  Under Moltke, the Prussian (later German) Army 
focused on concentration of force to take the offensive and destroy the enemy in a decisive 
battle, a system based on the “nation-in-arms” and modern industrialized war. While Moltke 
fundamentally rejected universal rules or systems of war and consistently argued for flexibility in 
approach, his overwhelming success led to the eventual systemization of his thought into a 
German Continental School.  
This German Continental School developed around a collection of intellectual officers, 
including Colmer von der Goltz and Friedrich von Bernhardi.  They developed the theoretical 
framework for systematizing Moltke’s practices during the German wars of unification and 
incorporating Social Darwinism.  Von der Goltz argued for the inevitability of war in his The 
Nation in Arms (1883) and believed it would employ the moral force of all the nation’s people in 
a life and death struggle for existence.103  Bernhardi incorporated many aspects of Social 
Darwinism in his Germany and the Next War (1912) when he argued war had become a struggle 
for existence that would eliminate the weakest nations.104  Both von der Goltz and Bernhardi 
advocated for the total mobilization of the nation’s resources making the “nation-in-arms” a 
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reality.  In 1890, Hans Delbruck, a German civilian military historian, advanced an argument for 
two types of strategy – the strategy of annihilation and the strategy of exhaustion.  Unlike von 
der Goltz and Bernhardi, the controversial Delbruck wrestled with Clausewitz’s limited war 
formulation and argued that Frederick the Great had used his limited resources to achieve limited 
aims and never sought the destruction of his enemies.105  Delbruck, however, was rarely 
translated into English or mentioned in British military debates prior to the First World War.106  
Corbett also focused on Clausewitz’s limited war construction and his own expanded argument 
for limited war stood in stark contrast to the German Continental School.  Corbett focused his 
argument against those in Britain who he felt were unduly influenced by the German Continental 
School and its interpretation of On War.    
J.J. Graham had first translated On War into English in 1873, but serious British 
engagement with Clausewitz and the eventual incorporation of the German Continental School’s 
interpretation of On War did not occur in Britain until after the Boer War (1899-1902).  Serious 
dissatisfaction with the British Army’s performance in that war led to the famous “Haldane 
Reforms” and Britain’s re-engagement with military thought and theory.  Historian Christopher 
Bassford identified the period between the Boer War and the First World War as the “first golden 
age in Clausewitz studies” in Britain.107  Numerous British officers, historians, and intellectuals 
read Clausewitz between 1900 and 1910. In 1905, the British Colonel and military historian, 
F.N. Maude, linked On War and Darwin in a fashion reminiscent of the German Continental 
School when he wrote:  
Clausewitz was the first to define war as an extreme form of human competition.  In 
other words he did for the nation what Darwin subsequently did for individuals, he 
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showed that war was nothing more or less than the ‘struggle for the survival of the fittest’ 
on a national plan.108 
 
Spenser Wilkinson advanced von der Goltz’s thoughts in his War and Policy (1900): 
war in our time is bound to be a struggle for national existence, in which everything is 
risked, and in preparation for which, therefore, no conceivable exertion must be spared… 
The absolute form of war is deduced, not from any of the changes in weapons or in the 
organizations of armies, but from the entrance of nations into the arena which was before 
occupied by ‘sovereigns and statesmen.’ The national form is a bitter quarrel, and a fight 
which ends only when one or the other combatant lies prostrate and helpless at the mercy 
of his foe, whose first anxiety will be to prevent the beaten enemy from ever recovering 
sufficient power to be able to renew a quarrel with the hope of success… each side 
would, from beginning to end, aim at the total destruction of the enemy’s forces.109 
 
Wilkinson became Corbett’s most virulent critic after the publication of Some Principles in 1911 
due, in part, to Corbett’s advancement of Clausewitz’s limited war theory.  Corbett was often a 
voice in the wilderness, criticizing the arguments of the German Continental School as well as 
his contemporaries in Britain.  He critiqued the false assumptions that he believed they had 
drawn from the Napoleonic Wars: 
First, there is the idea of making war not merely with a professional standing army, but 
with the whole armed nation – a conception which of course was not really 
Napoleon’s…It was but a revival of the universal practice which obtained in the barbaric 
stages of social development, and which every civilization in turn had abandoned as 
economically unsound and subversive of specialization in citizenship. Secondly, there is 
the idea of strenuous and persistent effort – not resting to secure each minor advantage, 
but pressing the enemy without pause or rest till he is utterly overthrown… Scarcely 
distinguishable from this is a third idea – that of taking the offensive… Finally, there is 
the notion of making the armed forces of the enemy and not his territory or any part of it 
your main objective.110 
 
Corbett sought to dispel these assumptions and was one of the earliest to develop an 
understanding of some of the deeper aspects of Clausewitz’s nature of war as he expanded 
Clausewitz’s theory into the realm of maritime strategy.   
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In addition to the German Continental School, many other late nineteenth-century 
military theorists selectively used Clausewitz’s ideas, often taken out of context.  The French 
Army focused heavily on the importance of morale and genius in On War, but ignored much of 
the deeper, more complex aspects, which placed morale and genius within the context of 
Clausewitz’s unitary theory of war.  Mahan read On War, but concluded that Clausewitz agreed 
with Jomini on all important points. Corbett, however, became one of the first to recognize 
aspects of Clausewitz’s overarching nature of war and break from the German Continental 
School’s interpretation.  In Some Principles, Part I, General Theory of War, Corbett integrated 
his understanding of British military history with the broader theories advanced by Clausewitz to 
define limited war as applied to a maritime nation.  Lieutenant Colonel G.F.R. Henderson, who 
had introduced Corbett to On War, called Clausewitz “the most profound of all writers on war.  
Clausewitz was a genius and geniuses and clever men have a distressing habit of assuming that 
everyone understands what is perfectly clear to themselves.”111  While Corbett was one of the 
earliest military theorists to incorporate some of the deeper aspects of Clausewitz’s thought, he 
was also arguably the first in a long Anglo-American liberal tradition of divorcing war as a 
rational instrument of policy from Clausewitz’s broader nature of war.   
Corbett lectured at the War Course on “The System of Clausewitz” and first used 
Clausewitz’s ideas and language in his Strategical Terms and Definitions used in Lectures on 
Naval History, more commonly referred to as the Green Pamphlet.  Corbett, working with 
Captain Slade, the course director, first published the Green Pamphlet in 1906 and revised and 
reissued it in 1909.  The Green Pamphlet was Corbett’s first theoretical/doctrinal work and was 
intended to establish a common language and conceptual framework for teaching strategy at the 
                     





College.  Corbett opened the Green Pamphlet with “war is a form of political intercourse, a 
continuation of foreign politics which begins when force is introduced to attain our ends.”112  In 
addition to war as an extension of politics, Corbett also co-opted Clausewitz in explaining the 
difference in the offensive and defensive. “The offensive, being positive in its aim is naturally 
the more effective form of war” while “the defensive, being negative in its aim, is naturally the 
stronger form of war.”113  While incorporating these aspects of Clausewitz’s thought, the Green 
Pamphlet remained distinctly Jominian in style, language, arrangement, and purpose.  
Additionally, Corbett advanced his own early views on command of the sea, common lines of 
communication and passage, and the objectives of naval warfare.  The Green Pamphlet served as 
a forerunner to Some Principles and used many of the same themes and arguments, allowing 
Corbett to refine his thought and arguments over time.   
While working on the Green Pamphlet, Corbett was also structuring England in the 
Seven Years War (1907) around Clausewitz’s political nature of war as discussed in the previous 
chapter.  In Some Principles, his understanding of Clausewitz dominates Part I Theory of War.  
Clausewitz proposition that war is a political act and must remain subservient to the political 
purpose was a consistent theme in Corbett’s work. It was not new for Corbett; the emphasis on 
war, policy, and strategy was central to all of his historical writing.  His own study of history had 
brought him to resounding agreement with Clausewitz, and in Some Principles, Corbett 
consistently delineates between a war’s purpose and the means used to achieve that purpose.114  
He accused many writers, including Mahan, of constantly confusing ends and means.    
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Corbett adopted and, in many ways, clarified some of Clausewitz’s arguments concerning 
the relationship between the offense and defense.  In Some Principles, Corbett built on 
Clausewitz’s concepts: 
If our object be positive our general plan must be offensive, and we should at least open 
with a true offensive movement; whereas if our object be negative our general plan will 
be preventive, and we may bide our time for our counter-attack. To this extent our action 
must always tend to the offensive. For counter-attack is the soul of defense. Defense is 
not a passive attitude, for that is the negation of war. Rightly conceived, it is an attitude 
of alert expectation. We wait for the moment when the enemy shall expose himself to a 
counter stroke, the success of which will so far cripple him as to render us relatively 
strong enough to pass to the offensive ourselves.115 
 
Corbett’s description of the nature and the relationship of the offensive and defensive was taken 
directly from his reading of On War.   Corbett, however, continued to develop that relationship 
along Clausewitzian lines when he argued that offense and defense are not about the object of 
war but about the means of achieving that object.  Corbett argued that offensive and defensive 
are not mutually exclusive, rather, they are fundamental truths of war which are complementary.  
His views on the offensive and defensive differ considerably from Mahan.  Mahan conceptually 
viewed the navy as the offensive element of sea power and a navy’s bases and fortifications as 
the defensive: “In war, the defensive exists mainly that the offensive may act more freely.  In sea 
warfare, the offensive is assigned to the navy; the defensive (guarding bases), it simply locks up 
a part of its trained men in garrisons.”116  Corbett concluded it would be “better to lay aside the 
designation ‘offensive and defensive’ altogether and substitute the terms ‘positive and 
negative.’”117  While these concepts are also present in On War, Corbett focused the argument on 
ends and means and developed the relationship so that it had a better conceptual application to 
war at sea in which positive and negative aims had better resonance than offense and defense.   
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Corbett’s thoughts on limited war became one of the most reviewed aspects of his theory.  
He advanced his limited war arguments as a counterweight to the rising influence of the German 
Continental School in the debates surrounding British Army reforms and the country’ future 
strategic options.  Corbett recognized in Clausewitz’s discussions of “absolute war” and limited 
war the perfect analogy for explaining much of British strategic history.  Corbett noted that 
Clausewitz came to his theory of limited war late as a result of his dialectic discussion of 
“absolute war” and the role of policy, but was never able to fully integrate his revelations before 
his death.  Debatably, Corbett claimed Clausewitz would have come to the same conclusions if 
he had time to finish the work and recognize the ability of a maritime power to more fully 
execute limited war through command of the sea.118  Clausewitz had consistently focused on 
continental wars.  While he recognized the fact that policy often led to limited wars, the principle 
of escalation made the execution of a limited war, between nations that shared a common border, 
problematic.  Clausewitz recognized that limited war was dependent on the geographical position 
of the objective, but he never associated the problem with its maritime potential.  Corbett clearly 
recognized the implications of Clausewitz’s limited war theory in the often quoted aphorism of 
Sir Francis Bacon, “he that commands the sea is at great liberty and may take as much or as little 
of the war as he will.”119  In commanding the sea, Corbett recognized that Britain had been able 
to isolate various theaters of war and conduct truly limited operations in locations of their own 
choosing. Corbett argued that:  
limited war is only permanently possible to island powers or between powers separated 
by sea, and then only when the power desiring limited war is able to command the sea to 
such a degree as to be able not only to isolate the distant object, but also to render 
impossible the invasion of his home territory.120 
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Through his study of British history, Corbett recognized that “limited wars do not turn upon the 
armed strength of the belligerents, but upon the amount of strength they are able or willing to 
bring to bear at the decisive point.” Corbett then credited Clausewitz with unknowingly 
discovering the secret of “the expansion of England.”121  In adapting Clausewitz’s limited war 
theory to Britain’s maritime strategic context, Corbett developed his own innovative theory and 
led to the historian Hew Strachan’s assertion that Corbett was “the first really important strategic 
thinker produced by Britain.”122 
It was Corbett’s limited commitment to an unlimited war, which he termed “war limited 
by contingent,” which became the foundation of a “British Way in War” promoted by Liddell 
Hart during the interwar years.  The Peninsular War waged against Napoleon (1807-1814) was 
the classic case study of “war limited by contingent.”  Corbett noted that:  
it was not until the Peninsular War developed that we found a theater for war limited by 
contingent in which all the conditions that make for success were present…The real 
secret of Wellington’s success, apart from his own genius, was that in perfect conditions 
he was applying the limited form to an unlimited war. Our object was unlimited. It was 
nothing less than the overthrow of Napoleon.123 
 
Corbett recognized the opportunities for executing a “war limited by contingent” on the 
continent of Europe had greatly receded due to the increasing continental mobility and flexibility 
brought about by the Industrial Revolution.124  The technology of the Industrial Revolution made 
limited intervention in an unlimited war on the continent of Europe impracticable.  Yet, it was a 
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concept that still held great sway within Royal Navy planning circles during the first decade of 
the twentieth century and into the First World War. 
Corbett, the first in a long Anglo-American liberal tradition, also divorced war as a 
rational instrument of policy from Clausewitz’s broader nature of war.  Corbett, through his 
historical research, had already come to see maritime power as an instrument of the state and his 
reading of On War only reinforced that view.  Clausewitz’s “wondrous trinity” was the 
intellectual underpinning of his nature of war.  Clausewitz described the “wondrous trinity” as:  
composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as the 
blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit 
is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which 
makes it subject to reason alone.125  
 
In divorcing the instrument of policy from primordial violence and chance, Corbett served as a 
precursor to the largely American idea, developed during the Cold War and perpetuated after the 
fall of the Soviet Union, that war was a rational instrument of policy that could be focused and 
controlled to achieve a political purpose without regard for the other two legs of Clausewitz’s 
trinity.  This approach has also contributed to a unilateral view of war in which strategy is driven 
solely by policy goals with little regard for the enemy and their potential reactions, another 
concept anathema to Clausewitz’s reciprocal nature of war.  Corbett’s failure to incorporate 
primordial violence, passion, chance and probability and their influence on war contributed to his 
misperceptions about British strategic options entering the First World War and the eventual 
course of that war.    
Before introduction to Clausewitz and his nature of war, Corbett had long wrestled with 
Mahan’s historical writings and all of their theoretical implications for naval thought.  In Some 
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Principles, the influence of Mahan’s structure and language is evident throughout Part II, the 
theory of naval war, and Part III, the conduct of naval war.  Both men developed their theoretical 
concepts through the study of British military history during the “Age of Sail” and, while they 
used the same examples and case studies, they differed significantly in analysis and emphasis.  
Corbett was one of the first and most successful at coming to terms with Mahan’s theories and, 
according to many modern naval historians, rectifying many of Mahan’s perceived flaws.  
According to historian John Gooch, “both men related naval activity to political purpose – which 
is the fundamental requirement of all strategic theories.  In this much they agreed, but when it 
came to detailed analysis and prescription, they differed profoundly.”126   In addition to his 
historical analysis of British sea power, Mahan’s theoretical approach was greatly influenced by 
the writings of Jomini.  During the nineteenth century, Jomini, through multiple publications, 
had become the most prominent authority on the Napoleonic Wars.  Mahan’s father, Dennis Hart 
Mahan, was a professor at the United States Military Academy and relied heavily on Jomini’ s 
writings in educating American officers of the Civil War generation.  Mahan was exposed to 
both the French language and Jomini’s strategic and theoretical writing from a young age.  
Jomini’s writings influenced Mahan to always maintain the connection between war and policy, 
a view Corbett shared.  Mahan expressed this view in a letter to President Theodore Roosevelt: 
Have you read Corbett’s Seven Years War? It is a good book. He brings out clearly that 
Pitt, besides imminent ability, had control of all three threads, – diplomatic, military, and 
naval, – and that in this, concentrated in one efficient man, consisted his great advantage. 
Jomini taught me from the first to scorn the sharp distinction so often asserted between 
diplomatic and military considerations. Corbett simply gives the help of putting the same 
idea into other words. Diplomatic conditions affect military action, and military 
considerations diplomatic measures. They are inseparable parts of the whole; and as such 
those responsible for military measures should understand the diplomatic factors, and 
vice versa. No man is fit for Chief of Staff who cannot be entrusted with knowledge of 
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the diplomatic situation. The naval man also should understand the military conditions, 
and the military the naval.127  
 
Jomini’s influence on Mahan and Clausewitz’s influence on Corbett with respect to the 
connection between war and policy are almost identical.   
Mahan combined his understanding of Jomini with his historical research to formulate his 
fundamental principles of naval strategy.   Mahan’s strategic focus on commerce shaped his 
tenets of naval warfare which tremendously influenced navies around the world prior to the First 
World War.  Through his later writings, Mahan directly advocated for American maritime 
expansion and became a propagandist for sea power.  During the Second World War, Secretary 
of War Henry L. Stimson sarcastically proclaimed, “Neptune was God, Mahan his prophet, and 
the United States Navy the only true church.”128  Mahan’s focus on sea power as an instrument 
of national power, seaborne commerce as essential to economic prosperity, and the necessity for 
colonial expansion, was a distinct product of the late nineteenth century.  Mahan influenced 
naval proponents and future writers to adopt a broader conceptual basis that related sea power, 
seaborne commerce, and maritime activities to a nation’s foreign policy, strategy, and 
economy.129  Mahan identified six principle conditions that influenced sea power: geographical 
position, physical conformation, extent of territory, number of the population, national character, 
and the character and policies of the government.  In discussing geographical position, Mahan 
contrasted Great Britain as an island power without fear of a land threat in opposition to France’s 
many competing threats.  He viewed the United States in the same light as Great Britain, with 
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two great oceans separating the country from potential threats.  By physical conformity, Mahan 
described the importance of a significant coastline with excellent harbors and ports.  The extent 
of territory referred to the proportion of the population compared to its resources and length of 
seaboard.  The number of population referred to the proportion of the population engaged in 
maritime activities.  In discussing national character, Mahan focused on a nation’s openness to 
commerce and fully developing and integrating colonial possessions into a broader worldwide 
economy.  Finally, governments, in Mahan’s view, played a critical role in fostering, 
maintaining, and protecting this integrated maritime system.130  Nations that met these 
requirements were best positioned to take full advantage of the leverage of sea power to advance 
its foreign policy and commerce.   
Mahan felt the United States met the first five required elements, despite some being less 
than ideal, and saw his role as influencing the government, the sixth requirement, to support the 
development of naval power and overcome some of the United States’ natural limitations, such 
as a lack of colonies.  Mahan was the first to seriously relate naval power to acquiring overseas 
colonies, expanding commerce, and increasing national wealth.  He viewed Britain’s dominant 
global position and great commercial wealth as resulting from its naval supremacy.  Mahan’s 
theoretical models were based on his study of British history, but he clearly saw them as 
transferable to the United States.  Roosevelt, with whom Mahan developed a close and lasting 
friendship, relied on Mahan’s work to justify an already expansive American “navalism,” leading 
to the United States’ emergence as a great naval power during this period.  Kaiser Wilhelm II 
also praised Mahan’s work and had it distributed across the German Navy.  In 1894, the Kaiser 
wrote, “I am just now not reading but devouring Captain Mahan’s book (The Influence of Sea 
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Power upon History) and I am trying to learn it by heart.  It is a first-class book and classical in 
all points.  It is on-board all of my ships and constantly quoted by my captains and officers.”131  
Ultimately, however, the Germans failed to understand the true essence of the geographic and 
economic underpinning of Mahan’s principles.132 
Mahan sought to draw lessons from the strategic level because he believed they were less 
susceptible to rapid technological change.  Mahan also sought immutable principles for war at 
sea comparable to Jomini’s principles of land warfare.  In a letter to Commodore Luce, President 
of the United States Naval War College, Mahan emphasized, “I will keep the analogy between 
land and naval warfare before my eyes.  I expect to begin with Jomini.”133  Mahan, Luce, and 
Jomini shared an enlightenment positivist approach to science and applied the same approach to 
their search for principles of war.  Luce, in setting his vision for the Naval War College in which 
he sought to apply the scientific method to naval warfare, wrote, “the naval battles of the past 
furnish a mass of facts amply sufficient for the formulation of laws or principles which, once 
established, would raise maritime war to the level of a science.”134  Mahan insisted that 
principles of land and sea warfare were essentially the same and relied heavily on Jomini’s ideas 
on positional advantage.   Mahan agreed that the offensive was essential to success in war, 
writing in The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future (1897), “War, once 
declared, must be waged offensively, aggressively.  The enemy must not be fended off, but 
smitten down.”135   Mahan held that the enemy’s main battle fleet was the primary objective and 
victory in a decisive battle would guarantee command of the sea.  Mahan wrote, “if the true end 
                     
131 Gat, A History of Military Thought, 455. 
132 Margaret Tuttle Sprout, “Mahan:  Evangelist of Sea Power,” in Makers of Modern Strategy:  Military Thought 
from Machiavelli to Hitler, ed. Edward Mead Earle (New York:  Atheneum.  1970), 444. 
133 Mahan to Luce, January 6 and 22, 1886, In Gat, A History of Military Thought, 448. 
134 Stephen Luce, “Naval Warfare as a Science,” in Gat, Development of Military Thought, 175-176. 






is to preponderate over the enemy’s navy and so control the sea, then the enemy’s ships and 
fleets are the true objects to be assailed on all occasions.”136  In order to bring about this decisive 
battle, Mahan returned to Jomini’s principles of land warfare and focused on the central position, 
interior lines, and concentration of force.  Mahan used the term communications much in the 
same way Jomini discussed logistics with a focus on sources and lines of supply.  Distant coaling 
stations were critical for establishing sources of supply, extending the operational reach of the 
fleet, and allowing flexibility in establishing lines of communication.  Mahan also saw the 
importance of threatening an enemy’s communications in order to force a decisive fleet 
engagement.  The value of the central position allowed the fleet to operate on interior lines to 
threaten the decisive point and bring on the decisive battle.  In that decisive battle, the fleet, in 
Mahan’s view, must be composed of capital ships.  Mahan’s concepts formed an integrated 
whole and were tremendously influential at the turn of the twentieth century not only in the 
United States and Germany, but also in Britain.  In 1893, John Knox Laughton, in the first of an 
ongoing correspondence with Mahan, wrote: 
I venture to hope that you will not be annoyed at receiving a letter from me thanking you 
for the pleasure I have derived from your works and more especially from your last on 
the French Revolution & Empire. It is a great work, & ought to open the eyes of many on 
this side who are obstinately blind to many of the truths you have so clearly put forward.  
You will probably have seen Admiral Colomb’s collected essays, lately published.  It is 
interesting to note the general agreement between your views & his, though there are 
some points of difference, which are possibly more apparent than real.137 
 
Laughton was referring to Admiral Philip Colomb’s Naval Strategy published in 1891.  Philip 
Colomb and his brother, John, were two of the first British officers to use history to inform naval 
thought.  In 1867, Captain Sir John Colomb, a Royal Marine officer, advanced the idea that, 
historically, Britain’s power was based on its permanent position as a great imperial trading 
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nation.  He, therefore, argued the entire imperial structure and trading system must be defended 
by combined army-navy co-operation and colonial contributions from around the globe.  John 
Colomb was not a naval historian or a careful student of history, but was the first to place the 
navy’s role in imperial defense within the context of British history and Britain’s economy.138  
Admiral Philip Colomb was one of the first active naval officers in the period to take the study of 
history seriously and he became a strong advocate for its inclusion in all professional naval 
education.  Philip retired from the Navy in 1886, became a professor of tactics at the Royal Navy 
College, and brought historical analogy into the classroom.  Like Mahan, however, he 
predominately focused on using selected aspects and interpretations of history to promote his 
preferred naval strategy.  In 1891, he published his greatest work on naval history and theory, 
Naval Strategy, in which he consistently interpreted facts to fit his conclusions and advance his 
own arguments.139   He presented naval warfare and “command of the sea” as independent from 
national policy. Rather than separating strategy, operations, and tactics, Colomb blended them 
and did not distinguish differences in the levels of war.  Colomb’s work was completely 
overshadowed by Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History which had been published 
the year before.  Laughton noted the general agreement between Mahan and Colomb on most 
aspects of naval strategy and their collected analysis became central to a forming consensus in 
Britain around a “blue-water” school of naval thought.  Corbett, despite some agreement with 
this emerging “blue-water” school, became one of the first and the most effective challengers to 
the growing coalescence in late nineteenth-century naval thought.       
Mahan’s approach to naval war had infused the British military and naval establishment 
by the time Corbett published Some Principles in 1911.  Spenser Wilkinson, a staunch advocate 
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of Mahan, was representative of many within British military circles that turned Mahan’s theory 
into absolute dogma.  In 1894, responding to the increasing French threat to British control of 
Egypt, Wilkinson wrote: 
The admirable treatises on naval war which have appeared during the last five years have 
left no room for doubt as to the broad features of a conflict between England and France. 
Such a war must begin by a fight for the command of the sea – that is, the two navies will 
fight until one has destroyed the other or broken its force so that it must withdraw from 
the contest and retire to his fortified harbours.…Every motive impels each side to collect 
the strongest fleet that it can muster, and to go in search of the enemy and attack him.… 
On the outbreak of a war the Admiralty must get together the strongest fleet they can 
make up, and send it to find and attack the French fleet or the principal French squadron. 
Wherever the French fleet is the English fleet must go, must attack it, defeat it if possible, 
and then attack it again, never letting go until the French fleet is destroyed. The time for 
dividing the English fleet is after victory… But until a decisive battle has been won 
dispersion of the force is an opportunity to the enemy.140 
 
In 1909, Wilkinson continued to emphasize the centrality of decisive battle to naval warfare in 
his response to the rising naval threat from Germany: 
By victory, of course, I mean crushing the enemy. In a battle in which neither side is 
crippled, and after which the fleets part to renew the struggle after a short interval, one 
side or the other may consider that it has had the honors of the day.… It does not lead to 
the accomplishment of the purpose of the war, which is to dictate conditions of peace. 
That result can be obtained only by crushing the enemy’s force and making them 
powerless to renew the contest.… The true strategical doctrine that the prime object of 
naval warfare is the destruction of the enemy’s fleet, and therefore that the decisive point 
in the theater of war is the point where the enemy’s fleet can be found.141 
 
In addition to reflecting Mahan’s views of naval warfare, Wilkinson’s arguments also reflected 
the same underlying interpretation of Clausewitz advanced by the German Continental School 
that had become so pervasive in Great Britain.  Corbett’s reinterpretation of Clausewitz and his 
break with Mahan led to much criticism of Some Principles within the British military and naval 
community, especially from Wilkinson. 
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Corbett, in his writings, adopted the same broader strategic approach as Mahan and 
focused on the purpose of naval operations and their linkage to overall national strategy and 
foreign policy.  In a clear break with Mahan’s approach, however, Corbett addressed war as an 
integrated whole, rather than separating naval warfare into an autonomous area of strategy.  
Corbett clearly recognized that land and sea warfare could not be separated from the greater 
whole, and, therefore, army and naval strategy could not be separated.  According to Corbett: 
it is the theory of war which brings out their (military and naval strategy) innate relation. 
It reveals that embracing them both is a larger strategy which regards the fleet and army 
as one weapon, which coordinates their actions, and indicates the lines on which each 
must move to realize the full power of both.142 
 
This concept led Corbett to focus his theory on a maritime strategy, which combined naval and 
military strategy in a broader approach to sea power.  Corbett relegated naval strategy to 
addressing the movement of fleets to carry out the broader maritime strategy.  At the heart of any 
maritime or naval strategy was the concept of “command of the sea.”  Mahan described 
command of the sea as: 
It is not the taking of individual ships or convoys, be they few or many, that strikes down 
the money power of a nation; it is the possession of that overbearing power on the sea 
which drives the enemy’s flag from it, or allows it to appear only as a fugitive; and 
which, by controlling the great common, closes the highways by which commerce moves 
to and from the enemy’s shores.143   
 
Mahan treated these “highways” as Jomini treated lines of communication on land.  In England 
and the Seven Years War, Corbett had demonstrated that Jomini’s lines of communication must 
be approached differently at sea.  Corbett disagreed with equating command of the sea with 
control of territory on land: 
the error is a very general assumption that if one belligerent loses command of the sea it 
passes at once to the other belligerent…the most common situation in naval war is the 
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neither side has command; that the normal position is not the command of the sea, but an 
uncommanded sea.”144  
 
With an “uncommanded sea,” Corbett focused on the right of passage and the sea as a barrier as 
much as a highway, which led to him defining command of the sea as the control of maritime 
communications.145  Corbett viewed command of the sea as a relative concept and provided a 
lasting contribution to naval theory with his redefinition of command of the sea in Some 
Principles.  This concept of command of the sea, led to Corbett’s argument that the primary 
objective of the fleet was to secure control of communications.  If any enemy fleet threatened 
those communications, it must be destroyed, but that was only a means of securing control of 
communications which in turn was a means to further a greater policy objective.  Corbett 
returned to his argument from The Campaign of Trafalgar that Nelson epitomized this 
understanding that command of the sea meant controlling communications, writing: 
in Nelson’s practice at least their (cruisers) paramount function was to exercise control 
which he was securing with his battle squadron…the strategic distribution of his force 
was consistent throughout the whole period of his Mediterranean command…no man 
ever grasped more clearly than Nelson that the object of naval warfare was to control 
communications, and if he found that he had not a sufficient number of cruisers to 
exercise that control and to furnish eyes for his battle-fleet as well, it was the battle-fleet 
that was made to suffer.146 
 
Once a nation had control of communications, it could exercise its command of the sea in order 
to defend against potential invasion, attack or defend trade, or support expeditionary forces. 
Corbett also disagreed with Mahan and the “blue-water” school’s dogmatic adherence to 
concentration of force at the decisive point to bring on the decisive battle.   Corbett focused on 
battle as a means rather than the end of maritime and naval strategy.  Corbett’s argument that 
battle was one of multiple means stemmed from his adaptation of Clausewitz’s thought on 
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offense and defense to the maritime environment. In particular, Corbett felt the defense had 
received too little study in British naval thought and had been consistently underplayed by the 
British naval establishment.  While tactically there may be no place for the defense at sea, 
Corbett argued, “the strategical defense has been quite as common at sea as it has been on land.” 
He used examples from the recent Russo-Japanese War to demonstrate the value of strategic 
defense and counterattack.147  His consistent opposition to Mahan’s overwhelming focus on 
concentration of force derived from the fact that the enemy’s fleet could avoid battle.  Corbett 
argued for dispersal in order to lure an enemy out, followed by “bold strategic combinations” to 
strike the enemy.  He wrote, “war has proved to the hilt that victories have not only to be won, 
but worked for.”148  Colomb also disagreed with Mahan on the adherence to concentration of 
force as an immutable principle of war.  In reviewing French efforts during the Napoleonic 
Wars, Colomb argued that the inferior fleet maintained a distinct advantage in not concentrating: 
The strength of the (French) strategic position consisted only in the division of the allied 
fleets in secure ports whence, under direction from a central station, they could issue and 
strike in combination on the isolated squadrons which their presence in poor compelled 
the masters of the sea to keep in watch upon them. It was their sudden issue and their 
unexpected stroke which gave them their power; as soon as their fleets were concentrated 
in one port, the danger to the masters of the sea had passed away, for they could 
concentrate too, and were no longer open to unexpected attacks by superior forces.… It 
was clear that by their concentration in one port they had ceased to become of any 
account during the remainder of the war.149 
 
Corbett followed in Colomb’s path in arguing for bold combinations based on judgment and 
executive ability. Corbett examined the decision-making of Britain’s naval high command during 
the Napoleonic Wars in detail.  His analysis centered on the intersection of diplomacy and 
military and naval action during the campaign of Trafalgar. He highlighted the circumstances 
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that produced Britain’s dilemma, as presented by Colomb above, and justified the British 
decisions that also violated fundamental principles of concentration of force.  In the summer of 
1805, the British government divided the fleet to cover major operations in Italy and Africa as 
well as providing for the security of home waters. Although Corbett recognized the enormous 
dangers posed by such conduct, he concluded that “the whole question will serve as a warning 
that the broad combined problems of Imperial defense are not to be solved off-hand by the facile 
application of maxims which are the outcome of narrower and less complex continental 
conditions.”150  He argued for a flexible response that included attack and defense along with 
concentration and dispersion designed to meet the specific needs of the occasion and break from 
an unthinking dogmatic focus on concentration and decisive battle. 
In his maritime strategy, Corbett expanded on Mahan’s theories and went beyond his 
focus on fighting the decisive battle to destroy the enemy’s main battle fleet.  Corbett did not 
disagree that decisive battle was the only way of securing permanent command by naval means 
and the sooner it could be brought about, the better.  Through his study of history, he also 
recognized that the decisive battle was fully embedded in Royal Navy tradition.  He concluded 
with some sarcasm that, “No one will dispute it, no one will care even to discuss it, and we pass 
with competence to the conclusion that the first business of the fleet is to seek out the enemy’s 
fleet and destroy it.”  However, he then made clear, “nothing is so dangerous in the study of war 
as to permit maxims to become a substitute for judgment.”151  Corbett was also critical of the 
“continental theorists” for taking this conception too far in their own overwhelming focus on 
destroying the enemy’s army in a decisive battle:  
An impression appears to prevail—in spite of all that Clausewitz and Jomini had to say 
on the point—that the question admits of only one answer. Von der Goltz, for instance, is 
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particularly emphatic in asserting that the overthrow of the enemy must always be the 
object in modern war. He lays it down as "the first principle of modern warfare," that "the 
immediate objective against which all our efforts must be directed is the hostile main 
army." Similarly Prince Kraft has the maxim that "the first aim should be to overcome the 
enemy's army. Everything else, the occupation of the country, &c., only comes in the 
second line."152 
 
According to Corbett, the primary object of naval forces was to secure communications and the 
fastest way to that end was through the destruction of the enemy fleet.  At sea, however, the 
enemy could often avoid decisive battle and, therefore, it could not be the only means of securing 
the objective.  He noted that often permanent control was not required to achieve a nation’s 
objectives and it was more important to stop the enemy from using the sea for his own purposes, 
while ensuring the ability to use the sea for your own purpose.  On many occasions, local or 
temporary control would suffice, leading to a much broader range of options in naval warfare.153  
Corbett’s arguments over decisive battle failed to convince many in the “blue-water” school, 
including Mahan.  In 1911, commenting on a U.S. Naval War College wargame, Mahan wrote to 
the College’s president, Rear Admiral Raymond P. Rodgers:  
In this connection, I question the soundness of Corbett’s dictum of not attacking the 
enemy where he is strongest; and the apparent inference, in the second paper, that “Blue’s 
security lies in an approach on Orange’s weakest flank.” Corbett relies mainly on 
Clausewitz, whose authority is of the very first; but I conceive it is not the enemy’s local 
strength, but the chance of success, and the effect produced by success, which should 
influence (the decision).154 
 
Corbett’s attempt to broaden the discussion of naval strategy beyond the sole focus on decisive 
battle drew the most criticism from the blue-water school throughout Corbett’s lifetime.   
 Corbett also broke with Mahan over the value of defensive or negative operations in 
naval warfare.  Corbett saw defensive operations for an inferior force as inherent in all attempts 
                     
152 Ibid., 74-75. 
153 Ibid., 91-93. 





to dispute command of the sea and he brought forward these views in the debate over the ‘fleet in 
being.’  The one area that Mahan and Colomb never came to agreement was over the ‘fleet in 
being’ concept.  The ‘fleet in being’ arose from the Earl of Torrington’s (Admiral Arthur 
Herbert) explanation of his failure to bring the French Admiral Tourville’s much larger fleet to 
battle in 1690 until directly ordered by the Queen.  This order led to the disastrous British defeat 
at Beachy Head.  Colomb used Torrington’s defense of his actions to advocate the concept that 
an inferior fleet can avoid battle with a superior fleet and prevent invasions by remaining a 
constant threat.  Colomb praised Torrington as a profound strategist who clearly understood the 
situation and maintained his calm in a difficult situation.  Colomb argued that “if he (Torrington) 
could altogether avoid fighting and merely wait and watch, he would render the great French 
armament powerless, and entirely defeat its ends.  It could do absolutely nothing if Torrington 
declined to be drawn into battle.” 155  In what became an ongoing debate, Mahan disagreed with 
Colomb’s analysis, arguing in a letter to Laughton in 1893: 
I cannot, alas, go as far as he does in estimating the deterrent force of the smaller and 
weaker fleet, when the stronger lies between it and the operation which the stronger 
wishes to cover. One can admit to excellence of Torrington’s management in 1690, 
without being convinced, as I am not, that it was possible for Herbert to prevent the 
crossing of the force at Cherbourg if Tourville held his ground in mid-channel.156 
 
In second letter to Laughton later in the year, Mahan continued his argument: 
The inferior fleet should certainly fall back on its reinforcements, and avoid action; it’s 
‘in being’ has doubtless its utmost effect while unimpaired by battle.  I think Torrington 
in pleading his case naturally overstated his position; and of Colomb’s endorsement the 
ill effect appears to me in the recent Quarterly article, where ‘a fleet in being’ theory is 
accepted practically without qualification.  My treatment of Torrington excited more 
adverse comment than any point in my first book… I have never conceded the position 
that his fleet after – or before Beachy Head prevented Tourville’s action, in the crossing 
of the French army.157 
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In the preface to the second edition of Naval Warfare, Colomb responded: 
I committed myself to the belief that Tourville’s action was an attempt to gain the 
command of the sea with a definite ulterior object, and that his failure to annihilate 
Torrington’s fleet was, if not the only cause, yet a predominating cause, in preventing the 
ascent of the Thames, invasion of the south coast, and the insurrection of James’s 
adherents. I did, in short, accept the view that Torrington and his naval supporters 
understood the real situation better than the English statesmen of the time, and most of 
the historians who subsequently wrote on the subject.  A considerable body of critics 
have challenged my position…When leaders undertaking such descents almost invariably 
express the conviction that any “fleet in being” must be put out of being before the 
descent can be made; and because each of the two notable attempts to invade in defiance 
of the doctrine were disastrously frustrated by the “fleet in being” which it sought to 
ignore. Hence Torrington’s operations are no more, and can be taken as no more, than 
one of a great group of occurrences whose cumulative evidence proves the rule.158  
 
Corbett agreed with Colomb’s assessment of Torrington’s actions, but expanded the argument 
beyond its focus on defense from invasion to a method of disputing command of the sea.  Corbett 
drew on a memorandum from Richard Kempenfelt, Chief of Staff of the Channel Fleet, during 
the War for American Independence which gave the “fleet in being” the highly aggressive spirit 
that was, in Corbett’s opinion, its essence.  Corbett quoted Kempenfelt’s instructions to the 
Channel Fleet:  
I may say all depends upon this fleet. ‘Tis an inferior against a superior fleet.  Therefore 
the greatest skill and address is requisite to counteract the designs of the enemy, to watch 
and seize the favorable opportunity for action, and to catch the advantage of making the 
effort at some or other feeble part of the enemy’s line; or if such opportunities don’t 
offer, hover near the enemy, keep him at bay, and prevent his attempting anything but at 
risk and hazard; to command their attention, and obliged him to think of nothing but 
being on their guard against your attack.159 
 
An inferior navy could avoid battle and prolong the time in which the command of the sea was in 
dispute by its existence, and more importantly for Corbett, its aggressive actions short of 
bringing on Mahan’s decisive battle. This led to Corbett’s second option for securing command 
of the sea, the blockade.   As with defense against invasion, Corbett’s extensive discussion of 
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open and closed blockades reflected the ongoing strategic debates during Admiral Fisher’s time 
as First Sea Lord and are addressed in the following chapter.  
In Mahan’s view, the importance of a nation’s commerce to its economy was 
fundamental to a nation’s strength, which in turn led to his belief that wars were won by cutting 
off an enemy’s trade at sea, bringing eventual economic collapse.  The fundamental aim of naval 
strategy was the destruction of the enemy’s commerce.  In an article on the “Lessons of the War 
with Spain,” Mahan made clear the centrality of commerce to his concept of sea power:  
If navies, as we all agree, exist for the protection of commerce, it inevitably follows that 
in war they must aim to depriving their enemy of the great resource, nor is it easy to 
conceive what broad military use they can sub-serve that at all compares with the 
protection and destruction of trade.160  
 
In the 1880s, France’s traditional rivalry with Britain was reignited by the British occupation of 
Egypt. The French Jeune Ecole school of naval thought advanced a new theory of naval warfare 
that revived the traditional guerre de course by adding the new technologies of the industrial age.  
The movement reached its peak in 1886-7 when Admiral Theophile Aube, the leader of the 
Jeune Ecole, served as the Minister of Marine.  Aube argued for an aggressive commerce-
destruction campaign against Britain combined with strong coastal defenses.  Aube’s campaign 
was to be based on light commerce-raiding cruisers and torpedo boats, each carrying the newly 
developed self-propelled torpedo.  The Jeune Ecole argued that the torpedo had made the 
battleship, the battle-fleet, and the blockade obsolete.  Aube was planning to wage offensive war 
in the Mediterranean, defend in the Channel, and conduct commerce warfare in the Atlantic.   
The Jeune Ecole’s leading thinkers believed commercial warfare would produce an economic 
panic in Britain that would bring about social collapse.161  The movement was short-lived and 
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left the French Navy badly divided after Aube left office in 1887.  Both Mahan and Corbett 
argued against the guerre de course.  They did not believe raiding was an effective means of 
destroying enemy commerce and that it failed to protect one’s own commerce.  Mahan favored 
the decisive fleet action to destroy the enemy’s main battle fleet, thereby gaining command of 
the sea and allowing the unhindered strangulation of an enemy’s commerce, while also 
protecting a nation’s own.  Mahan concluded that, after gaining command of the sea:  
the noiseless, steady, exhausting pressure with which sea power acts, cutting off the 
resources of the enemy while maintaining its own, supporting war in scenes where it does 
not appear itself, or appears only in the background, and striking open blows at rare 
intervals.162 
 
Corbett drew many of the same conclusions on the attack and defense of trade and shared 
Mahan’s views. He never saw the benefit of commerce raiding, from a British perspective, and 
rated French efforts at the guerre de course throughout history as little more than a nuisance.  In 
England and the Seven Years War, Corbett argued that French commerce raiding had so little 
effect because British commerce was so large and the sea so vast that it overwhelmed French 
resources.  Corbett wrote, “When the volume of commerce is so vast and its theatre so 
widespread as ours was even in those days, pelagic operations against it can never amount to 
more than nibbling.”163  The attack on the enemy’s trade, however, was just as central to 
Corbett’s maritime strategy as it was to Mahan’s.  Corbett wrote in Some Principles:  
Since the object of war is to force our will upon the enemy, the only way in which we can 
expect war on commerce to serve our end is to inflict so much damage upon it as will 
cause our enemy to prefer peace on our terms to a continuation of the struggle.  The 
pressure upon his trade must be insupportable, not merely annoying.  It must seriously 
cripple his finance or seriously threaten to strangle his national life and activities.164 
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Corbett captured the underlying rationale behind the Fisher Admiralty’s developing plans for 
economic warfare against Germany.  Economic warfare, blockades, and amphibious operations 
were all central to British naval planning prior to the First World War. Corbett’s thoughts on 
each were shaped by the debates of the first decade of the twentieth century.  Corbett was a man 
of his age and his theory in Some Principles of Maritime Strategy was heavily influenced by the 
challenges Britain faced prior to the First World War.  The strategic debates of Corbett’s era 
revolved around Admiral Fisher’s naval reforms, the “Dreadnought Age,” and the rise of 







A MAN OF HIS TIMES: MARITIME THEORY IN THE AGE OF FISHER 
 
Despite the great variety of influences on Julian Corbett and his thinking, Some 
Principles of Maritime Strategy was first and foremost a product of the “Dreadnought Age” and 
was meant to educate Britain’s civilian policy-makers in addressing strategic challenges at the 
turn of the twentieth century.  The period between 1880 and 1911, during which Corbett 
developed his thinking on maritime strategy, was filled with unprecedented changes in naval 
technology, ship design, personnel, education, strategy, and tactics, all of which combined with 
equally unprecedented changes in Britain’s social, political, and international contexts.  These 
changes were inherently linked, drove the strategic debates of Corbett’s generation, and colored 
all aspects of Some Principles of Maritime Strategy.   
Central to this period’s rapidly changing naval technology was the transition from iron to 
steel in naval construction.   The transition to steel went beyond new hulls and armor.  It also 
brought dramatic changes in propulsion, armaments, and ammunition.  Steel allowed the 
increased pressures in water-tube boilers, leading to the adoption of the triple-expansion steam 
engine followed by the turbine engine.  Steel allowed for stronger gun barrels leading to the 
transition from muzzle-loading to breech-loading naval cannons, the introduction of new, more 
powerful propellants, improved armor-piercing shells, and quick-firing guns.  These new breech-
loading cannons were mounted first in open steel barbettes and then the modern steel turret.  
Armor, during the period, transitioned from iron to steel and was rapidly improved through the 
use of compound armor, Harvey nickel-plated steel, and the Krupp cement-hardening process.  





wireless communication, mechanical and computer-assisted fire control, and early airships were 
all new technologies incorporated into naval warfare.    
Following a period of great experimentation in ship design (1860-1880), the maturation 
of these new technologies actually led to increasing stability in ship designs and the emergence 
of standardized classes.  The capital ship of the period transitioned from the monitor to the en 
echelon battleship, the pre-dreadnought, dreadnought, and finally the super-dreadnought.  The 
frigate transitioned to the steel cruiser, taking on varying forms consisting of the protected 
cruiser, scout cruiser, armored cruiser, and eventually the battle cruiser.  The torpedo led to the 
development of the torpedo boat and torpedo boat destroyer.   It also became the primary weapon 
of the newly developed submarine.  Minelayers, minesweepers, colliers, and a return of armed 
merchant ships all became factors in naval warfare during this period.         
This rapid technological change had broad implications across all aspects of naval and 
maritime service, including tactics, personnel, education, training, funding, basing, and logistics.   
It also overlay a period of increasing challenges in Britain’s social, political, and international 
situation.  The era of the Pax Britannica was coming to an end and Britain was rapidly losing her 
relative industrial advantage over much of the developed world.  Both the United States and 
Germany passed Britain in industrial output during this period.  Rising social issues and demands 
for reform placed increasing pressure on British politicians to reduce expenditures on imperial 
defense.  Yet, the same press, politicians, and broader public fed an increasing navalism.  The 
international environment was increasingly shaped by rising imperialism, nationalism, social 
Darwinism, industrialization, and navalism, all inherently linked.  As the Pax Britannica came to 
an end, so too did the era of Britain’s “Splendid Isolation.”  Throughout the 1880s and 1890s, 





threat of war with Russia in 1878 over the Dardanelles and Russia’s advance on Constantinople.  
Another crisis arose in 1885 over Russian expansion into Afghanistan and Central Asia.  France 
clearly targeted Britain during the apogee of the Jeune Ecole and the guerre de course strategy 
under Admiral Aube in 1886-7.  In 1894, France and Russia agreed to the Dual Alliance.  Britain 
perceived this alliance as a direct threat to its interests in East and Central Asia, the Northern 
waters, and most importantly, the Mediterranean.  As France launched new building programs 
for torpedo boats and commerce-raiding cruisers, Russia joined in the production of large, long-
range commerce-raiding cruisers that could target Britain’s vast ocean-going trade.  The Fashoda 
crisis of 1898, France’s brief challenge to British control of Egypt, created another war scare 
now exacerbated by the Dual Alliance.  The French retreated, but the crisis highlighted the 
increasing challenge of imperial defense.  The Royal Navy wrestled with plans to protect its 
imperial lines of communication, maintain naval superiority in the Channel, North Sea, and East 
Asia while also preventing the French Toulon Squadron effecting a potential junction with the 
Russian Black Sea Fleet in time of war. 
Each of these war scares led to subsequent debates over operational plans and naval 
readiness.  Not only were these debates carried out in Parliament and its subcommittees, but they 
were also played out in the press and broader public.  In 1879, the Carnarvon Committee 
reviewed British imperial defense in this new age of steam and steel and framed the increasing 
challenges, many derived from the work of Captain John Colomb.  In 1884, W. T. Stead 
published a provocative and controversial attack on British naval readiness, promulgating the 
notion of British naval weakness in an article in the Pall Mall Gazette entitled “What is the Truth 
about the Navy?”  In response to the war scares and charges of unpreparedness, Parliament 





that point in British history.  Historian Roger Parkinson characterized the 1889 Naval Defense 
Act as a significant overreaction to the true threats posed to British security and credited this act 
with starting the naval arms races that characterized the next two decades.165   In response, 
France and Russia both increased their own naval building programs, which led Britain, in 1893, 
to initiate the even larger “Spencer Program.”  At the turn of the twentieth century, Britain, 
France, and Russia had launched the first great naval arms race.  
The naval officers and historians discussed in previous chapters injected their own 
reflections on the lessons of history and implications for the future into this rising tide of 
navalism.  Mahan and Colomb published their most influential works between 1890 and 1892.  
Laughton founded the Naval Records Society in 1893 to better inform historical and current 
strategic debates with documentary evidence.  Wilkinson published Imperial Defense (1892), 
The Command of the Sea (1894), and The Brain of the Navy (1895).  Additionally in Britain in 
1895, a select group of politicians, industrialists, retired naval officers, and other advocates 
formed the Navy League to publically advocate on issues concerning British defense policy. This 
rising navalism was on full display during the 1897 Spithead Naval Review for Queen Victoria’s 
Diamond Jubilee.  Yet, for all the war scares and charges of naval unpreparedness, it was the 
Boer War (1899-1902) that brought the debates over defense and naval policy to a head and led 
to the end of “Splendid Isolation.”   
Britain’s traumatic experience in the Boer War had broad implications that drove social, 
economic, political, and military reforms, many of which will reappear throughout this chapter.  
In the short run, however, it led to Britain’s search for allies to relieve the effects of imperial 
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overstretch and allow cuts in the increasingly debilitating expense of imperial defense.  In 1902, 
Britain signed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to help protect British interest in East and Southeast 
Asia from Russian and French encroachment.  In 1904, Britain signed the Entente Cordiale with 
France to bring about an end to Anglo-French colonial competition.   That year was momentous 
in its implication for British defense policy and, more specifically, for the Admiralty.  In addition 
to the Entente Cordiale eliminating France as a primary threat to British security, the Japanese 
attacked the Russians at Port Arthur, launching the Russo-Japanese War.  This war ultimately 
devastated the Russian navy and eliminated Britain’s other major maritime competitor.  
Additionally in 1904, Arthur Balfour’s Unionist government established the Committee on 
Imperial Defense (CID) to ostensibly provide political oversight of defense policy and coordinate 
defense planning between the War Office and the Admiralty.  Finally, and most importantly for 
the Royal Navy and Julian Corbett, on October 20, 1904, the day prior to Trafalgar Day, Admiral 
Sir John Fisher became First Sea Lord of the Admiralty.166   
Sir John Arbuthnot Fisher, who first went to sea as a young midshipman in 1854, remains 
arguably the most controversial admiral in British naval history.  Fisher has been almost 
universally portrayed as a materialist and volatile genius, who “was as renowned for his 
intelligence, wit, determination, and industry as he was for his deviousness, ruthlessness, and 
vengefulness.”167  While Fisher’s reforms transformed the Royal Navy into a modern fighting 
force, they also divided the Navy and led to increasingly vitriolic attacks on both Fisher and his 
supporters, including Corbett.  Fisher transformed Corbett’s life by bringing him to the Royal 
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Naval College and later into the Admiralty, becoming a friend and driving force behind much of 
Corbett’s writing.168  Historian Arthur J. Marder placed Fisher at the center of this entire age 
(1880-1919) with his magisterial works on the Royal Navy.  Marder declared Fisher to be “the 
father of the material school” within the navy.169  Many historians have followed this line and 
have portrayed Fisher as the arch-materialist in juxtaposition to a historical school which 
includes Corbett.  They use Fisher’s often quoted aphorism from his letter to Joseph 
Chamberlain to demonstrate his disdain for the study of history: 
As regards the naval war, ‘history is a record of exploded ideas,’ because steam and 
wireless telegraphy have changed all the conditions… with the one great exception so 
eloquently described by Captain Mahan, Vol. II, page 118 (I know the place by heart, so I 
can quote it!) That sea power governs the world: Nelson’s far distant storm-beaten ships, 
upon which the Grand Army never looked, stood between it and the dominion of the 
world.170 
 
While Fisher was certainly the leading advocate of new and innovative maritime technologies, 
any cursory reading of Fisher’s correspondence and official papers demonstrate a broad 
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historical background whether discussing his heroes, Nelson, Napoleon, and Cromwell, quoting 
Mahan, or immediately reading Corbett’s latest book as soon as it was published.  Fisher was 
never constrained by history and never allowed principles or the “lessons of history” to trump his 
own judgement.  Fisher described some of his views to First Lord Selborne in response to his 
opponents’ charges of inconsistency: 
Absolutely regardless that what is right today may be wrong tomorrow! But he traded on 
what we all dislike – the charge of inconsistency! Why! The two most inconsistent men 
who ever lived, the two greatest men who ever lived, and the two most successful men 
who ever lived, were Nelson and Napoleon! Nelson most rightly said that no sailor could 
ever be such a born ass as to attack forts with ships (he was undoubtedly right), and then 
he went straight at them at Copenhagen…Circumstances alter cases! That’s the answer 
to the charge of inconsistency.171 
 
Fisher certainly had been in the forefront of many of the key technological changes within the 
Royal Navy and had a unique ability to see beyond the limitations of early prototypes to envision 
the future impact of mature technologies on naval warfare.  
Early in his career, Fisher was exposed to the growing technological demands placed on 
officers in the late Victorian navy.  He served an early tour at Britain’s premier gunnery school, 
HMS Excellent, and returned in 1871 to serve a four-year tour as the first Chief of Torpedo 
Instruction, becoming one of the staunchest advocates of the torpedo within the Royal Navy.  In 
1881, Captain Fisher became the inaugural commander of Britain’s first en echelon battleship, 
Inflexible.  Inflexible was also the first British warship to have electric lights.  Fisher led 
Inflexible in the bombardment of Alexandria in 1882, in, arguably, the Royal Navy’s last action 
as a force designed for the Pax Britannica.  The Royal Navy, previously organized for deterrence 
through coastal bombardment and policing the seas as a constabulary force, started three decades 
of increasingly rapid change.  Fisher was at the center of that change.   
                     





In 1883, Fisher returned for his third tour on HMS Excellent, this time as its commanding 
officer.  The contemporary historian of the Excellent noted “this period [1883-6] may be 
considered to mark the ‘revolution’ in Naval Gunnery, particularly as regards training.”  The 
historian made clear not all credit should go to Fisher.  He was served by some very progressive 
staff officers that revolutionized gunnery training programs.172  Fisher was clearly building a 
reservoir of equally progressive and reformed-minded followers that would eventually become 
known as the “Fishpond.”  During his time commanding Excellent, Fisher placed great emphasis 
on the development of the quick-firing medium gun.  After his appointment as the Director of 
Naval Ordnance in 1886, he saw the guns incorporated across the Royal Navy.  During this 
period, Fisher also provided information to the journalist W.T. Stead to support his scathing 
critique of the Royal Navy’s unpreparedness for war.  Fisher never shied away from using the 
press to advance his reform agenda.   
Fisher, promoted to Rear Admiral, became the Admiral Superintendent of the Portsmouth 
Dockyard in 1891.  He oversaw the reorganization of the yard and expedited the construction of 
the Royal Sovereign, first of the 1889 Naval Defense Act pre-dreadnoughts.  A year later, Fisher 
joined the Admiralty as the Controller where he led the fight for the adoption of the water-tube 
boiler and, relying on the technical expertise of William White, played a major role in 
championing the development of the torpedo-boat destroyer.  Fisher was Commander-in-Chief, 
North America and West Indies from 1897-1899.  He took a keen interest in the Spanish-
American War and hosted the American Admiral William Sampson on his flagship Renown at 
Bermuda to congratulate Sampson on his victory over the Spanish in the Battle of Santiago de 
Cuba.  Fisher was subsequently appointed to Britain’s most prestigious fleet command, 
                     





Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean (1899-1902), at a time when Britain feared the threat of a 
Franco-Russian combination in the Mediterranean designed to exploit Britain’s war in South 
Africa.  According to Fisher’s biographer Ruddock Mackey, “the next two years were to find 
him at the peak of his powers and in his most creative vein” and while Fisher’s dynamism was an 
important ingredient, his ability to listen, learn, and experiment with the ideas of gifted junior 
offices, specialists from all fields, was the key to his success.173    During his tenure in the 
Mediterranean, Fisher developed relationships and experimented with the ideas of several 
subordinates including Captain Percy Scott, Commanders Reginald Bacon and John Jellico, 
Lieutenant Herbert Richmond, and Marine Captain Maurice Hankey.   For each ally Fisher won, 
however, he was equally adept at creating enemies.  Later Admiral of the Fleet, Enrle Chatfield, 
served as a lieutenant in Fisher’s Mediterranean Fleet and recorded his judgements of Fisher in 
his memoir: 
 Fisher had a practice of consulting young officers which was proper enough in itself. 
But, regrettably, he spoke to them in a derogatory way about their superiors. It was his 
ruthless character and his scorn of tact that led to violent criticism… There were many 
who hated him, and he hated them. His was not a method of leading smoothly but of 
driving relentlessly and remorselessly… Whether the Navy could ever have emerged 
from its old ways in time for the Great War without his forceful acts is difficult to 
estimate, but in my opinion it could not. At our end of the scale he helped us, devoured 
our ideas, and stimulated us with his own, while at the other end his record was one of 
ruthlessness, creation of enemies and the splitting of the Navy into two parties.174 
 
The opposition to Fisher continued to build during his tenure in the Mediterranean as Director of 
Naval Intelligence Admiral Reginald Custance became a keen opponent because of Fisher’s 
constant complaints to the Admiralty.  Fisher also publicly reprimanded his Second-in-
Command, Admiral Charles Beresford, over a minor ship-handling error at Malta.  Fisher did not 
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like Beresford, probably because of his social status and mixed role as a naval officer and a 
politician.  In 1894, Fisher had written to Lord Spencer to:  
draw your attention to Beresford’s indirect criticism of the Admiralty in his interview as 
to rearming certain ships, reserves, Gibraltar, etc. He really is very stupid, but he can’t 
resist self -advertisement. What I fear is an explosion by Sir Frederick [First Naval Lord 
Admiral Frederick Richards], who justly thinks it outrageous that an officer on full pay 
should act in this way.175 
 
Beresford and Custance came to lead the “opposition party,” discussed by Chatfield in his 
memoir.  That opposition became known as the “Syndicate of Discontent.”   
 As Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, Fisher had direct access to Lord Selborne, the 
First Lord of the Admiralty, and he started developing a relationship with the First Lord in an 
attempt to win his support for his reform agenda.  Specifically, during Selborne’s visit to Malta, 
Fisher advocated reform of the Naval College.  He followed the conversation with a letter to the 
First Lord:  
We want the Naval War College very, very, badly, and we want a Naval Von Moltke at 
the head of it… There are a great many things we want our Naval Von Moltke to tell us 
when you have started him at the head of the Naval War College! What distance shall we 
open fire? How near shall we approach the enemy in view of the gyroscope? If not within 
2500 yards, what is the use of fighting tops weighing tons and tons and the weight of the 
still weightier masts that carry them? Also, in such a case, how about the utility of small 
machine guns, and is it any use keeping locked up in submerged torpedo rooms those 
valuable and highly trained Torpedo Officers and Seamen Torpedo Men? What are the 
cruisers going to do in a general action? We have our own ideas in the Mediterranean! 
What are the ideas elsewhere?176 
 
 On February 9, 1902, Lord Selborne offered Fisher the post of Second Naval Lord at the 
Admiralty despite the reservations of First Naval Lord Admiral Walter Kerr. 
Julian Corbett first came to Fisher’s attention later in 1902 when Corbett became closely 
involved in the reform of professional military education. Corbett had worked with Richmond on 
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the “Education in the Navy” series of articles discussed previously.  Fisher expressed his 
gratitude to Corbett and hinted at further plans for officer education. 
I have just finished reading your most excellent article in the monthly review. It is 
conceived in the exact right vein to meet the present situation. I cannot thank you 
sufficiently for it!…You must please come and stay with me when I am Admiral at 
Portsmouth, and I hope to make your mouth water when unfolding further plans, which I 
must wait a year to disclose.177 
 
While he was Second Naval Lord, Fisher started his reforms with officer entry, training, and 
education, which became known as the “Selbourne Scheme.”  Fisher’s decision to adopt 
common entry, training, and interchangeabilty for engineering and line officers was a social 
revolution within the navy and the most controversial of Fisher’s early reforms within the fleet.  
Because of his consistent portrayal as an arch-materialist, Fisher rarely has received credit for 
creating and resourcing the War Course at the Royal Naval College.178  Corbett’s hiring to teach 
at the War Course, later in 1902, was part of Fisher’s agenda for improving senior officer 
education.  While Fisher and Corbett agreed on the vital importance of the War Course, their 
priorities and focus were clearly different, as expressed in Fisher’s previous letter to Lord 
Selborne which focused on training senior officers on the best techniques for employing the new 
technologies in development.  In “Naval Necessities,” published soon after Fisher became First 
Sea Lord to outline his reform agenda, he revealed the importance of the new War Course: 
How many of our Admirals have got minds?...The paucity of efficient admirals is the 
most serious matter…The least capable in the respective ranks of the Navy are the 
admirals.  It’s not their own fault solely, they have had no education, and this blot will 
continue till we have a Naval War College established at Portsmouth.179   
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Fisher wanted the War Course and the Naval War College moved to Portsmouth so that flag 
officers and captains could practice fleet maneuvers using squadrons of destroyers.  Corbett 
started his long association with the Royal Naval College at Greenwich and later moved with it 
to Portsmouth.  Corbett, a committed liberal imperialist, had matured during the events of the 
previous twenty years; his thought had been shaped by his own study of British naval history 
starting when he had joined the Naval Records Society in 1894.  By 1904, he had published his 
first book, compiled specifically from his War Course lectures, as England in the Mediterranean, 
but he had remained on the fringes of the great military and foreign policy debates of the 
previous two decades. The “Fisher Revolution” was about to begin and it had a tremendous 
impact on Corbett and his thoughts on maritime operations.  Corbett became intimately involved 
with the reform agenda during Fisher’s term as First Sea Lord (1904-1910). The strategic debates 
surrounding Admiral Fisher’s naval reforms, the rapid pace of technological change, and the rise 
of Germany as a naval power, colored all aspects of Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. 
Fisher became the First Sea Lord on October 20, 1904 with a mandate from Lord 
Selborne and the Conservative government to reduce the naval estimates.  The month before 
announcing Fisher was to replace the retiring Kerr, Lord Selborne had listed his priorities for the 
incoming First Naval Lord, starting with: 
1. Economy of Estimates.-It is quite certain that the Navy Estimates have for the present 
reached their maximum in the present year.  In 1905-1906 not only can there be no 
possible increase, but if necessary, for the influence of the Admiralty over the House of 
Commons and for stability of national finances, that we should show a substantial 
decrease.180     
 
The Naval Defense Act of 1889 and the Spencer building programs of the 1890s had caused 
monumental growth in the British naval estimates.  Following the costly Boer War and the split 
                     





in the Conservative party over Joseph Chamberlain’s tariff reform and imperial preference plan, 
the Conservative cabinet was determined to reduce defense spending to cut income taxes and 
lower the corn duty.  In 1903, when Joseph Chamberlain’s son, Austen, became the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, he faced a serious budgetary crisis and sought immediate cuts in defense 
spending with a focus on the naval estimates.181  The sweeping Liberal electoral victory in 1906 
only brought increased pressure on Fisher and the Admiralty to continue to reduce the naval 
estimates to allow the new Prime Minister Henry Campbell-Bannerman’s Liberal government to 
implement its social welfare reform agenda.  For Britain’s political leadership in the first decade 
of the twentieth century, the greatest selling point of Fisher’s reform agenda was the promise of 
substantially reducing the naval estimates.  Under Fisher, the Admiralty reduced Britain’s naval 
budget by ten percent in 1905 and, by 1908, had further reduced it by another three percent.182 
The hallmark of Fisher’s administrative style was his relentless drive to achieve efficiency and 
effectiveness, maximum effectiveness with minimum waste.   
Fisher had foreseen the coming requirement to cut the naval estimates while Second 
Naval Lord, writing to journalist James Thursfield in 1903:  
“We can’t go on with such increasing Navy Estimates and I see my way very clearly to a 
very great reduction WITH INCREASED EFFICIENCY! That sounds nice and will I 
think come true! But the Reform will require the 3 R’s: Ruthless, Relentless, 
Remorseless.”183   
 
When Fisher became the First Sea Lord, he had a fully developed reform agenda that he believed 
would not only reduce the naval estimates but greatly increase military effectiveness.  He sent 
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that plan to Lord Selborne two days prior to becoming First Sea Lord.  He shortly thereafter 
published it to the Board of Admiralty as “Naval Necessities” better known as “the Scheme.” 
According to Fisher, it was a completely integrated approach: 
It will be obvious then that the whole of this business is the regular case of “the house 
that Jack built,” for one thing follows another, they are all interlaced and interdependent! 
That’s why it was said to begin with:- 
                 The Scheme! The Whole Scheme!! 
                   And Nothing But the Scheme!!!184 
 
Fisher moved immediately to extend his revolutionary reforms across the service by initiating 
changes in manning, organization, ship design and procurement, communications, finances, and 
logistics.  Corbett found himself called to serve as a publicist for the Fisher Admiralty.  Corbett 
wrote regularly in journals, supporting Fisher’s reforms with historical analysis, while also 
continuing his own teaching, archival research, and professional writing.  This dual role led to 
increasing tension between Corbett, the historian, and Corbett, the theorist and publicist, as he 
contributed to the most complex and controversial policy debates of the age.  In 1907, Corbett 
publicly supported two of Fisher’s most controversial policies, the building of the revolutionary 
all-big gun Dreadnought and the fleet reorganization.  
Fisher and the Admiralty’s decision to design and build an all-big gun, turbine-driven 
battleship and subsequent battle cruisers have drawn much historiographical debate over the 
years.  Global trade defense remained a central Admiralty focus during the first five years of the 
twentieth century.  Historian Roger Parkinson notes that Britain spent more on cruisers than 
battleships from the passage of the Naval Defense Act in 1889 to 1904.185  Since the French had 
shifted focus to armored cruisers with the launching of the Dupuy de Lome in 1890, followed by 
Russia’s launching of their large armored cruisers Rurik (1892) and Rossia (1893), Britain had 
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turned to the development of large armored cruisers to protect her vast sea lanes, laying down 
thirty-two armored cruisers in the six years (1898-1904) before Fisher became First Sea Lord.  
Revisionist historians, led by Jon Sumida and Nicholas Lambert, argue that Fisher envisioned 
merging the battleship and armored cruiser designs into a “fusion ship” that would ultimately 
save money in the extremely tight budgetary conditions faced by the British government in the 
first decade of the twentieth century.  Fisher designed the fast all-big gun “fusion ship” to protect 
Britain’s vast overseas trading empire, while defense of the British Islands from invasion was 
left to a “flotilla” of torpedo boats and submarines.  It is clear that Fisher was obsessed with 
speed and his resultant fusion design became known as the battle cruiser.  Fisher had completed 
the outline of his designs by May, 1904 while he was Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth.186  He 
personally selected and appointed the members of a Committee on Design to develop the final 
Dreadnought and armored cruiser designs.  During the earliest planning meetings, the 
Committee saw the French and Russian navies as the greatest threat to Britain’s lines of 
communication.   
Throughout much of 1904, Balfour’s early CID meetings debated the training, 
provisioning, and transport of British Army reinforcements to India in case of war with 
Russia.187  Fisher, on October 22, 1904, two days after becoming First Sea Lord, faced the 
Dogger Bank incident in which the Russian Baltic Fleet fired on and sank several British fishing 
trawlers leading to a rising fear of war with Russia, which was already at war with Britain’s ally, 
Japan.  Fisher’s Committee of Design started meeting later that fall and approved the final 
designs for Dreadnought and Invincible in January, 1905.  Fisher continued to be the staunch 
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advocate of the battle cruiser and argued for increased battle cruiser production at the expense of 
dreadnoughts for the remainder of his administration.  In 1909, Fisher wrote Lord Esher, “the 
First Sea Lord wanted ‘Indomitables’ alone and not Dreadnoughts; but we had to compromise, 
as you know, and got 3 ‘Indomitables’ with the Dreadnoughts; and all the world now, headed by 
A.K. Wilson, have got ‘Indomitables’ on the brain! Hip! Hip! Hurrah!”188 When Fisher returned 
to the Admiralty in October, 1914, he immediately ordered five new battle cruisers laid down 
between January-June, 1915.  He was not, however, able to replace dreadnoughts with this 
“fusion design” due to conservative naval and political resistance, as well as, the rising German 
naval threat in the North Sea.  The Entente Cordiale (1904) with France, Russian defeat at 
Tsushima (May 27-28, 1905), and the Moroccan Crisis (1905) gradually shifted British defense 
focus from France and Russia and the “two-power standard” to a rising Germany and the new 
“60% fleet standard.”  Political leaders and the public became enamored with the dreadnought 
“arms race” with Germany and a potential great fleet engagement in the North Sea.  
For both Fisher and Corbett, however, it is clear they believed the revolutionary nature of 
the Dreadnought and subsequent Invincible-class were in their speed, not their armament or 
armor.  As Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean in 1900, Fisher had described his views on a 
new type of battleship to Lord Selborne:  
The golden rule to follow is not to allow ourselves to be ‘out-classed.’ The French are 
going to build vessels of 14,865 tons, and that means that our new battleships must be of 
considerably larger displacement, and we must certainly exceed them in speed, for, if we 
do not, we give them the option of refusing or bringing on an action! We give them the 
‘weather gauge’ of the old days.… I will give you my experience of the value of speed in 
battleships (an experience that impressed me immensely!) When I was Commander-in-
Chief in North America. I, on one occasion, ‘mopped up’ all the cruisers one after 
another with my flagship the battleship Renown.189 
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In a 1901 letter to naval journalist Arnold White, Fisher recounted a job offer he had received to 
replace Andrew Noble at the head of the Armstrong’s Elswick shipbuilding firm and expanded 
on his thoughts concerning ship design: 
I should immediately set to work to revolutionize naval fighting by building on 
speculation a battleship, cruiser, and destroyer on revolutionary principles – oil fuel, 
turbine propulsion, equal gunfire all around, greater speed than any existing vessels of 
their class, no masts, no funnels, etc., and I should then build them all in 18 months and 
sell them for double their cost and ‘stagger humanity’ – and put up the Elswick shares 50 
per cent! Now, don’t quote any of the above: it’s copyright, and I don’t want it to get 
out!190 
 
Corbett defended Fisher’s Dreadnought design against critics, such as Custance and Mahan, in 
“The Strategical Value of Speed in Battle-ships” (1907). Corbett based his defense almost 
entirely on the importance of speed in the strategic and operational employment of these new 
ships.  Mahan had argued that firepower and range should never be sacrificed for speed.  Fisher 
was not impressed with Mahan’s arguments: 
I see Mahan has been trotted out by The Times, but as a Yankee officer told me lately, he 
is passé, and has become a second Brassey and equally a bore! The advocates of small 
battleships and low speed have been so often pulverized (and never so effectually as by 
the French Admiral Gervais) that it’s a wonder how they can ever get anyone to print 
such nonsense.191  
 
Corbett acknowledged Mahan’s opposition yet questioned his methods: 
the arguments in favor of this view have been ably presented, amongst others, by Capt. 
Mahan in America… Yet the fact remains that they have entirely failed to convince the 
Admiralty Staffs of any naval power… It is never pleasant to find that the theorists and 
practical men are not at one…It is that the theorists are once again arguing on the surface, 
while active men have probed to the bed-rock.192  
 
In Corbett’s argument, endurance and radius of action, the source of much opposition to 
increasing speed, was more dependent on the number and location of coaling stations than on a 
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ship’s coal carrying capacity.  In Corbett’s view, forcing an enemy to conform to speed in 
battleships offered a tremendous advantage to the British due to the vast number of coaling 
stations across the British Empire.193  Corbett, however, in an introduction to the War Plans later 
in 1907 provided the clear warning from history concerning the battle cruiser:  
beware of the tendency of intermediate types to merge into primary types.  Just as 
mounted infantry twice merged into cavalry, so may the “Invincibles” tend to assert 
themselves as the sole type of battleship, and this, whether correct or not in the future, 
would be to overstep the limits within which at present their existence is justifiable.194  
 
In his defense of the dreadnought policy, Corbett attacked the tradition that the Royal Navy must 
always take the offensive and argued that: 
You cannot get perfect concentration on any one point of the war, the secret of all 
strategy, without defensive operations elsewhere…the foundation of all strategy is that 
the offensive connotes the defensive always.  The worst of all mis-readings of British 
naval history is that extraordinary fetish of the offensive, as if the offensive were a thing 
that could stand by itself. It is a fetish that kills strategy.  It grew up in the days when we 
had that easy command after Trafalgar.  It killed strategy just as Trafalgar killed 
tactics.195 
 
For Corbett, this remained a foundational principle throughout his strategic writings.   
Another of Fisher’s major reforms to come under criticism during his early 
administration was the reorganization of the fleet, the concentration of the battleships in home 
waters, establishment of the nucleus crew system, and, most controversial, the decommissioning 
and scrapping of many aging and obsolete vessels, ships which Fisher had deemed too weak to 
fight and too slow to run away.  The reorganization was largely based on increasing financial and 
manning constraints.  The decommissioning of so many ships and the fact that many of the 
battleships relocated to the British Islands were placed into reserve status with nucleus crews was 
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a clear response to financial and manning shortfalls following the Boer War.   Opposition to 
Fisher and his reforms within the navy began to coalesce around Beresford, Custance, and 
Admiral Cyprian Bridge as the “Syndicate of Discontent” grew increasingly outspoken in their 
opposition to Fisher.    Beresford was the most prominent British naval officer after Fisher and 
Sir Arthur Wilson.  Beresford, however, was also a Member of Parliament.  Fisher’s promotion 
to Admiral of the Fleet and extension as First Sea Lord on December 4, 1905 effectively blocked 
Beresford from becoming First Sea Lord himself, further increasing Beresford’s animosity 
toward Fisher.  Beresford replaced Wilson in command of the Channel Fleet in April 1907 and 
remained in direct and open conflict with Fisher and the Admiralty for the rest of Fisher’s tenure. 
Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg, a friend of Fisher, attributed much of the blame to the First 
Sea Lord, writing in 1909:  
J.F [Fisher] was determined that Beresford would not have so big and honorable a 
command [as Wilson had held]. I think C.B. [Beresford] has been treated badly, although 
he is not a patch on Arthur Wilson, as he himself firmly believes…You know how much 
I admire J.F. He is a truly great man, and almost all his schemes have benefited the Navy. 
But he has started this pernicious partisanship in the Navy.196 
 
The “Syndicate of Discontent” launched increasingly hostile attacks on Fisher and his reforms in 
local newspapers and journals.  Fisher enlisted Corbett to respond to these attacks and, in 
February, 1907, Corbett published “Recent Attacks on the Admiralty” in which he took on 
Fisher’s critics and proved influential in retaining support for Fisher’s reform program.  Corbett 
attacked each of the charges against the Admiralty often discrediting their historical analogies 
and assertions, developed primarily by Custance:  
To history they have appealed, and by history let them be judged…A naval historian is 
the last person in the world to belittle the value of naval history in clearing questions of 
today, but he cannot deny how misleading history may be if we look for guidance on the 
surface instead of seeking the underlying conditions which give that surface its 
conformation.  The value of history is not only to set forth the experience of the past, but 
                     





also to show when some radical change of fundamental conditions has made that 
experience dangerous precedent.197   
 
While Fisher believed Corbett’s efforts bought him an additional eighteen months to advance his 
agenda, the “Syndicate of Discontent” continued their attacks by combining their efforts with the 
War Office in attacking the Admiralty’s war plans for the defense of Britain against invasion.   
 Until the creation of the Admiralty War Staff under the leadership of First Lord Winston 
Churchill in January, 1912, the First Sea Lord directly handled naval war planning with limited 
assistance from the Department of Naval Intelligence.  Fisher, against the recommendations of 
Corbett and other close associates, consistently opposed the creation of a naval staff for war 
planning, preferring instead to keep planning firmly under his personal control.  When Corbett 
approached Fisher recommending creation of a naval staff in December, 1905, Fisher replied, “I 
have not seen my way to dis-associate the 1st Sea Lord from the present way of doing business, 
but there’s force in your remark that an effete 1st Sea Lord would be the very devil!”198  The 
Assistant Secretary, and later Secretary, of the CID, Sir Maurice Hankey, a confident of both 
Fisher and Corbett, noted in his memoirs that the lack of a naval staff “did not matter much, so 
long as the strategical side was directed by a genius like Fisher, who supplied the need himself, 
with the personal assistance of men of the caliber of [Captain Charles] Ottley [Director of Naval 
Intelligence, 1905-1907].”199  Fisher had always relied on a close circle of confidants.  In 1902, 
as he started developing his “scheme” that became the foundation of his reforms, he had relied 
on his “seven brains” which included Jellicoe, Henry Jackson, and Charles Madden each of 
whom eventually served as an Admiral of the Fleet.200  Later during his tenure, he added others, 
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including Captain George Ballard, as his primary operational planner, Captain Ottley as DNI, 
Hankey at CID, Captain Edmund Slade, the new director of the Royal Naval College and later 
DNI, and Corbett, “the pen behind the fleet.”201  In 1906, Fisher had decided to incorporate the 
Royal Naval College into his war planning apparatus, writing to Corbett, “Someday later I want 
to interest you in my scheme for the extension of the Naval War College at Portsmouth.  I hope 
to fascinate you!”202  Corbett responded extremely positively: 
I rejoice at what you tell me…those who are in strongest and most serious opposition to 
you – so far as I understand them – will find, if you carry this new idea through, the main 
strength of their current switched off.  It is your supposed neglect [of war planning] of 
what you are now devoting yourself to, that is their strongest line of attack.203    
 
Corbett then published two articles in The Times supporting the expansion of the War Course to 
include strategic planning, and Fisher responded:  
I have nothing but praise again for your second article, as it is precisely what is required 
to assist in our expansion…Dear Ottley is a little fearful of his Department being 
lowered, but I have reassured him, and you have plainly indicated that there will nothing 
be done to ‘wrong or overshadow the well-tried Department of Intelligence.204  
 
Under the directorship of Slade and with the assistance of Corbett the Royal Naval College took 
on this new role in Admiralty war planning.  As previously discussed, Slade and Corbett 
produced “Strategic Terms and Definitions used in Lectures on Naval History” to establish a 
common doctrinal foundation for students and to facilitate staff planning.  Ballard led the 
planning effort from December 1906 to April 1907 and was assisted primarily by Hankey and 
supported with wargames carried out by Slade at the War College.  The War Plans established 
economic warfare through commercial blockade as the primary means of waging war against 
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Germany.  If additional pressure was required, they explored the possibility of amphibious 
descents along the German coast to increase the pressure.  Of note, it made no mention of a 
decisive battle with the German High Seas Fleet.  Fisher asked Corbett to write the introduction 
to the final draft of these war plans, “I would be glad to see you on a very secret matter about 
some war plans to which I think you could add most materially in their educational value.”205  
Corbett drew heavily on the Green Pamphlet to write the introduction.  “Some Principles of 
Naval Warfare” for “War Plans-1907” provided the theoretical and historical foundation for 
naval strategy and, in some cases, contradicted the plan itself.206  Corbett used many of the same 
constructs he employed later in Some Principles and firmly argued for his communications 
theory of naval warfare.  After receiving Corbett’s first draft of the introduction, Fisher returned 
it with his comments and changes, stating “Please do not hurry as the sole object I have in view 
is to make it appeal to the non-professional and you’re the only one I know who can do this.”207  
Upon completion, Fisher sent the War Plans to Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary, with 
the comment that “I think you will find Part I (Some Principles of Naval Warfare) the finest bit 
of strategical exposition you ever (will) read.”208  Fisher also sent copies to King Edward VII, 
Lord Tweedmouth, Richard McKenna, and other key members of the Cabinet.  Fisher had 
developed deep respect for Corbett’s ability to use theoretical and historical insights to explain 
Admiralty strategic concepts in an extremely accessible way for civilian decision-makers.  It is 
notable in this introduction that Fisher highlighted the impossibility of developing viable war 
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plans unless one understands the situation which led to war and the political objectives 
established by the civilian leadership: 
Naval strategy even in war never has a clean slate. Its whole purpose is to gain diplomatic 
and political ends and to diplomacy and foreign politics it must always be subservient, 
particularly in peace.  The fleet exists to secure our ends in the easiest way and the easiest 
way is peacefully without treading on our neighbours’ toes or stirring up needless 
opposition.209   
 
Fisher’s respect for Corbett’s abilities to educate a civilian audience on naval and maritime 
strategy eventually led him to ask Corbett to publish a broader primer on naval warfare and 
Admiralty strategic thought for Britain’s civilian leadership.    
Late in 1907, the Admiralty’s war planning came under increasing criticism from both 
the “Syndicate of Discontent” and the British War Office.  A CID sub-committee, chaired by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Herbert Henry Asquith, held a series of hearings on the potential 
threat of German invasion.  Both services had a history of exaggerating the threat of invasion.  
The navalists emphasized the danger of invasion to maintain the navy’s share of the defense 
budget, while Lord Roberts and the army used the danger of invasion, or “the bolt from the 
blue,” to emphasize the need for universal training and conscription.210  In defense of the 
Admiralty’s planning, Corbett presented a historical analysis of previous threatened invasions of 
England: 1588, 1744, 1759, 1779, and 1805.  Corbett’s argument proved central in convincing 
the Committee to back the Admiralty and Fisher’s defense plans over the opposition of the War 
Office.  Fisher, increasingly frustrated with what he believed was unwarranted scrutiny and 
criticism, held to his 1904 pronouncement that “if the Navy is not supreme, no Army however 
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large is of the slightest use.  It’s not invasion we have to fear if our Navy is beaten.  IT’S 
STARVATION!”211  Corbett expressed the same sentiment in Some Principles, arguing that “an 
invasion of Great Britain must always be an attempt over an uncommanded sea…if we have 
gained complete command, no invasion can take place, nor will it be attempted.  If we have lost 
it completely no invasion will be necessary.”212  According to Corbett, Britain’s traditional 
system made the invading army’s transports the primary objective of the flotilla under the cover 
of the battle-fleet.213  In a letter explaining the Admiralty’s position to his good friend and key 
ally, King Edward, Fisher expressed one of his often repeated aphorisms, which, in this case he 
attributed to Foreign Secretary Grey:  
our intervention in a Continental struggle by regular land warfare is impracticable, and 
combine naval and military expeditions must be directed by us against the outlying 
possessions of the enemy, or, in the splendid words of Sir E. Grey, ‘the British Army is a 
projectile to be fired by the Navy.’ The foundation of our policy is that the 
communications of the Empire must be kept open by a predominant fleet, and ipso facto 
such a fleet will suffice to allay the fears of the old women of both sexes in regard to the 
invasion of England or her island colonies.214 
 
In Some Principles, Corbett argued for this same expeditionary role for the British Army within 
his communications theory of maritime war.  Fisher’s constant battles with the War Office and 
Army leadership between 1904 and 1910, however, severely limited coordination and helped 
prevent any combined Army-Navy training for expeditionary warfare.   
The final showdown between Fisher and Beresford occurred just after Beresford’s 
retirement when Beresford wrote to Asquith, now the Prime Minister, alleging the total 
mismanagement of the navy by the Fisher Admiralty.  Beresford forced Asquith’s hand, leading 
to another hearing on Admiralty policy and planning in the CID in 1909 with Asquith as chair.  
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Ultimately, Fisher again won the day, but to his great frustration only won the tepid approval of 
the Committee.  This combined with the divisions in the navy, led to his early retirement in 
January, 1910.   During and after each of these sets of hearings, the calls for Fisher to create an 
Admiralty War Staff increased and Corbett again joined the effort.  Corbett recognized Fisher’s 
genius and supported most of his initiatives, but he never became a blind follower.  Late in 1908, 
after the “invasion scare,” Corbett’s advocacy for the permanent formation of a combined Army-
Navy planning staff, over Fisher’s objection, and his refusal to publish views in which he 
disagreed with Fisher led to a straining of the relationship and Corbett’s subsequent decline in 
influence within the Admiralty.  In refusing Fisher’s latest propaganda request, Corbett replied 
that his historical research was more important and too time consuming.215  Corbett did, 
however, continue teaching at the Royal Naval College and wrote to Fisher on his retirement:  
What a glorious command it has been! No one, I think, has ever had such a five years.  
Historians in the coming time will bring up against it, as they do now at Trafalgar.  It will 
mark an epoch as clearly and indisputably as Nelson did his.  There are not many of 
whom it can be said, ‘He realized his epoch,’ and that is what you have done.  You have 
shown men what they were trying to do and shown them how to do it.  The great art of 
war has made a stride that can never be retraced, and it is your work.  To me it is a great 
source of intense pride to have been associated with it.  For half a century at least, and 
probably more, they will be able to say of you: ‘Si monumentum requaeris, circumspice’, 
[if you seek his monument, look around you] and your monument will cover the face of 
the seas and tell the world that England is still in front.  What a glorious work!216 
 
In this, Corbett was certainly correct; for whether historians call it the “Dreadnought Age” or the 
“Fisher Revolution,” they continue to argue over Sir John Arbuthnot Fisher and the age he 
marked.  Undoubtedly, Fisher made a lasting impact on Corbett and his strategic thought and, in 
April 1910, Fisher encouraged Corbett to expand on his ideas from the war plans introduction 
into what became Some Principles of Maritime Strategy.  Fisher’s intent was for Corbett to 
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publish a clear statement on naval warfare and the Admiralty’s naval doctrine to better educate 
British civilian leadership, key decision-makers, and the broader public on the traditional and 
proper employment of British military forces.217   
 In discussing the role of the historian in contemporary policy debates, Corbett argued for 
the “free collaboration between the historical expert and the naval expert.”  The naval expert 
brought technical expertise and the modern experience of seamanship and Corbett relied 
extensively on the naval expertise of men like Fisher, May, Slade, Richmond, and Hankey in 
formulating the concepts in Some Principles.  The historical expert, however, brought a sense of 
scholarship which:  
is only attained by long and devoted service – by long mental discipline, by regular 
initiation into methods of dealing with historical evidence, of tracing it to its sources, of 
testing their value, and finally by raising upon it conclusions which are as free, as fallible 
human minds can make them, from preconceived ideas.218 
 
Judgment in strategic thought and the political ends dominated Corbett’s approach to writing 
Some Principles.  Corbett’s “Theory of Naval War” in Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, in 
addition to being a response to Mahan, was also an exposition of Fisher’s broader naval thought 
and direction.  Corbett’s views on command of the sea and control of communications matched 
those of Fisher and were reflected in some of the goals behind his naval reforms.   
In advocating for “flotilla defense,” which Corbett covers extensively in Some Principles 
under defense against invasion, Fisher hoped to free his high-priority battle cruisers to serve in 
the role of Nelson’s cruisers securing control of Britain’s extended sea lines of communications.   
Facing significant budget shortfalls, but remaining focused on imperial defense, Fisher believed 
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battle cruisers, using wireless telegraphy, could replace the numerous protected cruisers in the 
role of securing Britain’s control of the sea on a global scale.  In addition to the battle cruiser, 
Fisher also invested heavily in submarines, torpedo boats, destroyers, and communication and 
intelligence services.219   During Fisher’s administration, British naval spending on flotilla craft 
(submarines, destroyers, and torpedo boats) increased from one-tenth to one-quarter of overall 
naval expenditures by 1909.220  Fisher was one of the earliest and strongest advocates of the 
submarine in the Royal Navy.  He wrote to Prince Louis of Battenberg in 1904:  
1) the submarine is coming into play in Ocean Warfare almost immediately; 2) with a 
Whitehead torpedo the submarine will displace the gun and revolutionize naval tactics; 3) 
no single submarine will ever be obsolete…Drop the battleship out of the programme but 
at any cost double the output of submarines…This is big talk but it’s coming! I’ve been 
living with the submarines lately or would not say this!221 
 
In his “Constitution of Fleets” chapter, Corbett described each of these priorities and their fit in 
the overall fleet structure.  This exposition was a clear outgrowth of Fisher’s thought.  Britain, 
according to Corbett, had historically relied on the “flotilla” to defend the narrow seas against 
enemy privateers and lightly armed transports. These small vessels had always been the first line 
of defense against invasion.  Cruisers had the dual and often conflicting role of securing 
communications and providing the “eyes of the fleet.” Corbett argued that the function of the 
battle-fleet was to protect the cruisers and the flotilla in the execution of their missions:  
If the object of naval warfare is to control communications, then the fundamental 
requirement is the means of exercising that control…in no case can we exercise control 
by battleships alone.  Their specialization has rendered them unfit for the work…We 
could exercise control with cruisers alone if the enemy had no battle-fleet…on cruisers 
depends our exercise of control; on the battle-fleet depends the security of control…the 
true function of the battle-fleet is to protect cruisers and the flotilla at their special 
work.222 
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In finding the solution to the problem of control through armored cruisers, Corbett agreed with 
Fisher and noted that, historically, Britain had solved this problem by the “introduction of a 
supporting ship, midway between frigates and true ships-of-the-line…the 50-gun ship came to be 
essentially a type for stiffening cruiser squadrons.”  He also recognized, with the development of 
the battle cruiser, the same argument had re-emerged from Nelson’s day surrounding the proper 
employment of the cruisers to control communications or to reinforce the battle-fleet as the “eyes 
of the fleet.”223  Corbett never resolved the issue and neither did the Royal Navy. 
 Corbett identified the traditional roles of the battleship, cruiser, and the flotilla; Fisher’s 
modern conceptions remained consistent with traditional British experience.  Corbett saw these 
concepts and distinctions as rooted in Britain’s historical adherence to a communications theory 
of maritime warfare of which “no man ever grasped more clearly than Nelson that the object of 
naval warfare was to control communications.”224  Corbett, however, argued that the “mobile 
torpedo” has truly brought on a revolution in naval affairs.  According to Corbett, the torpedo 
had, for the first time, given the flotilla a true battle power; the flotilla now threatened the battle-
fleet. Corbett recognized that “the battle-fleet became more an imperfect organism than ever” 
and this “new condition meant that unaided it could no longer ensure its own defense.” 225   
According to Corbett, the most absorbing problem within naval circles at the time was the 
defense of the battle-fleet.   Corbett was again completely in line with Fisher and the Admiralty, 
and he provided a foreshadowing of the later “Grand Fleet of Battle” concept in which cruisers 
and flotilla vessels were required to protect the battle-fleet itself.  Corbett argued that the only 
real distinction in modern times was between vessels primarily armed with guns and those 
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primarily armed with torpedoes.  Due to the recurrence of a formidable rival in the North Sea, 
however, Corbett left open the possibility of adapting the “overthrow” theory of the British 
soldier-admirals of the Anglo-Dutch Wars in which first priority was destruction of the enemy 
fleet in the North Sea. 226              
Once a nation had control of communications, it could exercise its command of the sea, 
to defend against any potential invasion, attack or defend trade, or support expeditionary 
operations.  After decisive battle, Corbett’s second option for securing command of the sea was 
the blockade.   As with defense against invasion, Corbett’s extensive discussion of naval and 
commercial blockades, as well as open (distant) and close blockades, reflected the ongoing 
strategic debates during the Fisher years.  For Corbett, the naval blockade was a means of 
gaining command of the sea, while the commercial blockade was a means of exploiting that 
command.  The Jeune Ecole had first argued in the 1880s that technological changes had made 
the blockade obsolete.  Through fleet maneuvers and his increasing exposure to, and belief in, 
torpedoes, submarines, and destroyers, Fisher no longer saw a close blockade as feasible and 
Corbett agreed in the opening of his discussion of blockades in Some Principles.  However, 
Corbett became much more contradictory in his arguments in the rest of the chapter.  After 
clearly stating his own and Fisher’s view that the close blockade was not feasible, Corbett left 
open the possibility of a close blockade being required by circumstances and executed just 
beyond the night range of destroyers and the day range of submarines.227  Corbett’s argument 
reflected the more limited capabilities of destroyers, submarines, and torpedoes in 1911 as well 
as changing thought within the Admiralty.    
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Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson, who replaced Fisher as First Sea Lord in 1910, was actively 
reconsidering the close blockade of German ports after becoming increasingly concerned with 
German submarines escaping into the North Sea and threatening Britain’s battle fleet and 
cruisers.  Wilson and the Admiralty re-considered a close blockade using flotilla forces backed 
by cruisers to prevent the escape of German submarines from the North Sea ports. They viewed 
the seizure of German coastal islands, such as Heligoland and Borkum, as critical to Britain’s 
ability to base and sustain a blockade using the short-range flotilla.  In 1913 after retiring from 
the Navy, Wilson revisited the close blockade as an influential member of the CID: 
I think the advent of the submarine is the reason which makes the close blockade 
absolutely necessary, and that the Admiralty must put its wits together to see how they 
will keep that close blockade, or else the submarine will get out.  The principal danger is 
the submarine which will get out.228  
 
While Corbett kept the possibility of close blockade open in Some Principles as potentially 
required for protecting British trade, he clearly advocated for an open, or distant, blockade 
designed to strangle Germany through a long-term commercial blockade, but did not account for 
the growing threat of the submarine now under consideration at the Admiralty under Wilson.229 
Corbett’s approach to the employment of submarines in 1911 was distinctly British and 
completely in line with Fisher’s own thinking on the subject during his tenure as First Sea Lord.  
The submarine, based on its state of development in 1910, was seen as a defensive weapon and a 
centerpiece of the “flotilla defense.” Corbett was entrenched in the British model of commerce 
attack and prevention, which consisted of destroying or blockading the enemy’s main battle-fleet 
and then sweeping his commerce from the sea or blockading it in port.  He never saw the benefit 
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of commerce raiding, from a British perspective.230  Corbett, with his strong respect for 
international and maritime law, could not envision submarines sinking commercial shipping 
without warning.  Here he differed dramatically with Fisher.  Corbett’s respect for the law 
stemmed from his legal background and his understanding of the multiple legal arguments over 
neutral shipping and prize regulations that developed during the “Age of Sail.”231  Fisher, 
however, never carried any compunctions about international law or treaty restrictions.  After his 
retirement from the Admiralty, Fisher recognized the submarine’s continued growth in capability 
and, with his much more realist views of war, clearly envisioned German unrestricted submarine 
warfare.232  In May, 1913, Fisher wrote “The Oil Engine and the Submarine” in which he clearly 
predicted German unrestricted submarine warfare.  He wrote a second version in June and 
distributed it to key cabinet ministers.  The section on submarines and commerce shocked both 
Churchill and Asquith.233  In response to Fisher’s concerns, Admiral Jellico responded to 
Churchill that “I cannot conceive that submarines will sink merchant ships without warning.”234  
Fisher had asked Corbett to review his submarine memorandum and Corbett after reading the 
work replied “this is immense. It makes me feel as if I had a flash of lightning by the tail.” 
Corbett also went on to ask “do you really think the power now-a-days would incur the odium of 
sinking merchant ships out of hand?”235  It was one of the few areas in which Corbett proved less 
than prescient, while Fisher continued to demonstrate his understanding of technological change 
and its impact on the future of war at sea. 
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Corbett, however, clearly understood the broader importance of economic warfare to a 
maritime power.  Economic warfare was absolutely central to Corbett’s theory of maritime 
warfare and British strategy against a continental power.  In Some Principles, Corbett argued: 
interference with the enemy’s trade has two aspects. It is not only a means of exerting 
secondary economic pressure, it is also a primary means towards overthrowing the 
enemy’s power of resistance. Wars are not decided exclusively by military and naval 
force. Finance is scarcely less important. When other things are equal, it is the longer 
purse that wins… Anything, therefore, which we are able to achieve towards crippling 
our enemies finance is a direct step to his overthrow.236   
 
Corbett’s respect for international law combined with his understanding of maritime strategy led 
him to argue vehemently against all limitations on belligerent rights prior to both the 1907 Hague 
Conference and the 1909 London Naval Conference.  In 1907, Corbett published “The Capture 
of Private Property at Sea” in support of the Admiralty campaign against limiting belligerent 
rights at the Second Hague Conference.  Many radical Liberals in Britain during the late 
Victorian age had argued for free trade and against belligerent rights with the slogan “free ships, 
free goods.” Many felt commerce should continue between belligerents in wartime and that 
reciprocal commercial arrangements would eventually eliminate war altogether.237  In the 
“Capture of Private Property at Sea” and, later, in Some Principles, Corbett argued that economic 
warfare was the primary means for a maritime power to oppose a continental power, “all, then, 
that we can possibly gain from our enemy upon the sea is to deny him its use and enjoyment as a 
means of communication” and that private property is treated much more equitably at sea than it 
is in land warfare.238  He also appealed to the many traditionalists that sought victory through 
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decisive naval battle.  He argued that “if we are denied the right to attack an enemy’s commerce 
we should lose the one sure and rapid means of forcing his battle-fleet to a decision.”239   
Fisher, however, was never concerned about the effect of international law on British 
naval strategy or policy and remained quite outspoken from his own attendance at the Hague 
Conference in 1899.  In 1908, Fisher wrote in response to the Liberal government’s call for the 
London Naval Conference:   
it don’t signify a ‘tinkers damn’ what laws of blockade you make.  ‘MIGHT IS RIGHT’ 
& when war comes we shall do just as we jolly well like! No matter what your laws are! 
We’ve got to win and we ain’t going to be such idiots as to keep one fist tied behind our 
back! There’s a law against sinking neutral merchant ships but we should sink them – 
every one! … these worms don’t understand it & looked at me as a wild lunatic.240   
 
Eyre Crowe informed Foreign Secretary Grey, sponsor of the London Naval Conference, of 
Fisher’s private views: 
Sir J Fisher told me personally 3 days ago that in the next big war, our commanders 
would sink every ship they came across, hostile or neutral, if it happened to suit them.  
He added with characteristic vehemence, that we should most certainly violate the 
declaration of Paris and every other treaty that might prove inconvenient.241 
 
Fisher certainly understood the limits of his and the Navy’s power over these types of policy 
decisions.  Through his own bellicose bluster and Corbett’s refined historical and legalistic 
arguments, Fisher focused on influencing policy-makers and impressing upon them the keen 
importance of commercial warfare within British maritime doctrine. In the introduction to the 
“War Plans – 1907,” Corbett compared war at sea with war on the land: 
Naval war asks nothing but to be permitted to control the active life of the enemy at sea.  
To demand control of a maritime Power that it should surrender the right of controlling 
communications at sea is no more reasonable than to demand a military Power that it 
should surrender controlling an enemy’s roads and railways…It is only necessary, 
                     
239 Ibid., 86. 
240 Fisher to Garvin, November 5, 1908, in Lambert, Planning Armageddon, 99. 
241 Records of Meeting with Mr. McKenna in Edward Grey’s Room at the HOC, December 15, 1908, in Lambert, 





therefore, to keep the communication theory of naval warfare in mind to lay bare the 
fallacy of the whole idea of immunity of private property at sea.242 
 
 In Some Principles, Corbett argued that commercial war must be extensive in application to 
bring an enemy to the negotiating table:   
Since the object of war is to force our will upon the enemy, the only way in which we can 
expect war on commerce to serve our end is to inflict so much damage upon it as will 
cause our enemy to prefer peace on our terms to a continuation of the struggle.  The 
pressure on his trade must be insupportable, not merely annoying.  It must seriously 
cripple his finance or seriously threaten to strangle his national life and activities.243   
 
Commercial war for Corbett consisted of a distant blockade which “in the long run a rigorous 
and uninterrupted (commercial) blockade is almost sure to exhaust him before it exhausts us, but 
the end will be far and costly.”244   Economic warfare for Corbett was clearly a long-term 
strategy to defeat a continental opponent.   
As part of that long-term strategy, Britain had to defend its own trade; and, in accordance 
with contemporary conventional wisdom, Corbett argued against the old convoy system as a 
means of protecting trade.  Corbett contended that “modern developments and changes in 
shipping and naval material have indeed so profoundly modified the whole conditions of 
commerce protection.”245  As early as the Carnarvon Commission following the 1878 war scare, 
British merchants, ship owners, and naval officers had declared that convoys were not efficient 
nor practicable in the modern circumstances.246  These modern developments and changes 
included the abolition of privateering, the fact that steam reduced the range of warships while 
greatly increasing the variability of trade routes, and the development of wireless telegraphy.  In 
Corbett’s view, these changes fundamentally altered the circumstances of trade protection.  
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Corbett clearly saw the volume of British trade as a great protection in itself and that British 
trade could sustain losses as it always had in the past.   
The final means of exploiting command of the sea that Corbett addressed in Some 
Principles was the execution of amphibious expeditions, which were also important in Fisher’s 
own strategic planning.  Fisher’s War Plans from 1907 had reviewed multiple potential 
expeditions against the German North Sea and Baltic coasts as a secondary way of increasing 
pressure on Germany.  In a letter to Lord Esher, Fisher supported combined amphibious 
operations with the army under navy command: 
Again, I say, the Regular Army should be regarded as a projectile to be fired by the Navy! 
The Navy embarks it and lands it where it can do the most mischief!...They never know 
where the devil the brutes are going to land! Consequently, instead of our military 
maneuvers being on the Salisbury Plain and its vicinity (ineffectually apeing the vast 
Continental Armies!), we should be employing ourselves in joint naval and military 
maneuvers, embarking 50,000 men at Portsmouth and landing them at Milford Haven or 
Bantry Bay! This would make the foreigners sit up!247 
 
Yet, Fisher was constantly antagonistic towards the Army and its leadership, as he expressed to 
journalist Arnold White in 1910, “comparatively, the Navy is vital and the Army a plaything! It 
is not invasion we have to fear; it’s starvation! The Army is a plutocracy and rules Society.  The 
Navy is poor and democratic.” 248  After Corbett reviewed Britain’s long history of expeditionary 
warfare, he continuously emphasized the need for a combined staff to plan and execute 
amphibious expeditions.249  As with their disagreement over the naval staff, Corbett broke with 
Fisher over the control of amphibious expeditions.  Fisher believed in naval control of all 
expeditions and his attitude towards the War Office always hindered expeditionary planning and 
combined training during his years at the Admiralty.   
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Corbett’s support for the “Fisher Revolution” and the opposition from the “Syndicate of 
Discontent” contributed to the opposition to Some Principles.  While Corbett’s work found little 
support within the Royal Navy beyond Fisher’s inner circle, it did portend many aspects of the 
way the Great War was fought at sea.  What was almost unique about this period of rapid 
technological transformation, however, was Britain’s lack of experience and opportunity to 
employ the new technology in a major war at sea.  The Sino-Japanese and Spanish-American 
Wars were often dismissed by navalists because in each the losing side was deemed to be too 
weak and backward to pose a serious naval threat.  However, the Russo-Japanese War, pitted the 
British-trained and equipped Japanese Navy against Britain’s long-time rival Russia.  It was the 
most studied war of the age as naval officers sought the lessons of modern naval warfare. Corbett 
was no different and his review of the Russo-Japanese War had a significant impact on his 






CORBETT’S MARITIME STRATEGY AND THE REALITY OF WAR 
 
Few modern scholars have reviewed Corbett’s “official” Admiralty publications on the 
Russo-Japanese War or the Great War with an eye towards better understanding his military 
theory. While working on Some Principles, Corbett was simultaneously researching and writing 
a two-volume study on Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905.  All of the 
world’s major navies keenly observed the Russo-Japanese War in order to draw lessons on the 
impact of new technologies on modern naval warfare.  It was the first war between major powers 
in over thirty years, a period which had seen tremendous technological change.  As discussed in 
the previous chapter, Britain considered France and Russia the primary challengers to her empire 
at the turn of the twentieth century.  In response to increasing European expansion into Asia, 
Britain had turned to the emerging Imperial Japanese Navy as a potential counterbalance. British 
naval attachés serving with the Japanese Navy provided training, material, education and 
guidance to Japan’s rapidly developing navy.  During the war, the Royal Navy also embedded 
observers with the Japanese fleet. 
The lessons drawn by the Royal Navy generally focused on the impact of new 
technologies, such as the mine and torpedo.  In the Admiralty’s “Review of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance,” written in the immediate aftermath of the war, the principle focus was on mine 
warfare, drawing extensive conclusions of about the effectiveness of mines in closed waters.250  
The British naval observers also concentrated on long and intermediate range gunnery and 
heavily influenced the gunnery debate over large caliber batteries and quick-firing secondary 
batteries.  Advocates on both sides of the Dreadnought debate attempted to use lessons from the 
                     





war to support their own arguments for or against the elimination of secondary armaments on 
capital ships. Many naval officers and defense commentators, however, were frustrated by their 
study of the Russo-Japanese War and often concluded that there were no universal lessons.251  
Most reviews revolved around the fear of mines, which many believed had dominated the war. 
They also emphasized the importance of the quality and morale of the officers and crews which 
mattered much more than the ships or material.252  Corbett, however, consistent with his previous 
historical studies, took a very different approach to the study of the Russo-Japanese War.  Rather 
than focus his analysis on the impact of technology, Corbett provided a strategic and operational 
analysis of the war using the ideas he was developing for Some Principles as his framework for 
understanding the war.  These two works, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy and Maritime 
Operations in the Russo-Japanese War, clearly informed each other.   
Corbett had lectured extensively on the Russo-Japanese War at the Royal Naval College 
with a focus on how an island power had overthrown a continental power through the combined 
efforts of its fleet and army.  In 1909, Admiral Alexander Bethel, Director of Naval Intelligence, 
asked Corbett to write a naval history of the war which presented “strategy illustrated by 
historical analogues.”253  In August 1910, after the Admiralty resolved a debate over whether a 
civilian or naval officer should be employed for the work, Corbett agreed to write a two-volume 
study of the war.  Corbett’s research was heavily based in secret material provided by the 
Japanese and augmented by the correspondence between the British Admiralty and Foreign 
Office.  Corbett’s work had to be reviewed and approved by a committee composed of the new 
DNI Captain Thomas Jackson, who had replaced Bethel, Captain Ballard, then Director of Naval 
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Operations, and Admiral Ernest Troubridge, chief of the new Admiralty war staff.  Upon 
completion of the review in January 1914, the Admiralty classified the work confidential and 
only published six copies, all of which were maintained under the control of the Admiralty 
Library for use by senior naval officers.254  Overcome by the events of July 1914, Corbett’s 
Maritime Operations was largely forgotten until naval historian John Hattendorf was able to get 
it declassified and published in 1994.     
Corbett approached the Russo-Japanese War with the same methodology and style that he 
used in all of his historical writing.  As with his previous works, his analysis was from a 
distinctly British perspective rather than Russian or Japanese.  Corbett framed the war as a 
“combined or amphibious war” which did “not depend upon the relative strength of the national 
armies, but upon how far the respective fleets could control the relative amount of military force 
that could be brought to bear on the territorial objectives.”255  Writing in 1911 in the midst of the 
naval arms race with Germany, Corbett was distinctly drawn to the lessons of this particular war 
because it matched an island (sea) power against a continental (land) power and illustrated many 
of the principles Corbett had drawn from his own study of British history.  The war, from the 
Japanese perspective, clearly fit within Corbett’s limited war framework.   Corbett argued that:  
for Russia the war must take the unlimited form in the sense that victory could only be 
obtained by the complete overthrow of her enemy and the entire destruction of his power 
of resistance. Yet,…the object was not of sufficient importance to warrant the 
expenditure of force such a war would demand…The interest of Russia was, indeed, so 
remote and small relatively to her great historical interest in Europe.256 
 
Japan, however, strictly limited its objectives to the Korean peninsula and Port Arthur, both of 
which were susceptible to command of the sea.  Japan could wage a classic limited war which 
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Corbett had described in the opening chapters of Some Principles.  Corbett made extensive use 
of the Russo-Japanese War in Some Principles to illustrate Clausewitz’s argument that the 
divergent values nations place on their own wartime objectives limited wars.  He concluded that 
“every statesman knows that in counting forces for war the first thing to determine is to what 
extent the spirit of the people will be enlisted, and what sacrifices they will be induced to make 
for the objective in view…in Russia the limit of willing sacrifice would be quickly reached” and, 
due to the limited nature of the object, “Japan was able to undertake the war with all the moral 
elements of strength…and that is the simple explanation of why the weaker power was able to 
force its will upon the stronger.”257  Corbett’s key conceptual addition to limited war theory, 
maintaining command of the sea effectively prevented an opponent from escalating the war and 
provided the perfect opportunity for conducting a limited war, was central to his analysis.  
Corbett’s theory informed his study of the war which in turn informed his theory.     
Many British observers argued that the war and specifically the Battle of Tsushima 
confirmed Mahan’s ideas on concentration of force, offensive action, and the decisive battle 
leading to command of the sea.  Mahan, himself, highlighted the strategic importance of the 
concentration of the battle fleet from his own observations of the Russo-Japanese War.  In 
Mahan’s view, the dispersion of Russian forces led to the resounding success of the Japanese 
Navy.  Russian division of forces, he noted, failed to protect either Port Arthur or Vladivostok in 
the Pacific.  Additionally, Mahan wrote, “with the fleet divided between the two oceans, one half 
may be overmatched and destroyed, as was that of Port Arthur; and the second (the Baltic Fleet), 
on coming, prove unequal to restore the situation.”258  Mahan’s thought was shaped specifically 
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by the American challenge of dividing the fleet between the Atlantic and Pacific.  Mahan’s focus 
fit American circumstances but did not, in Corbett’s view, meet British requirements.  Corbett 
believed that the British needed to fully exploit the advantages of attack and defense as well as 
concentration and dispersal.  Corbett repeatedly emphasized sea power’s need to influence the 
situation on the ground and took a different view of naval operations in the Russo-Japanese War.   
Corbett noted that the objectives of the Imperial Japanese Navy throughout the war were 
defensive in nature.  The Japanese Army was responsible for the offensive action required to 
defeat the Russians in Korea and Manchuria and secure the peninsula from Russian 
encroachment.  The Navy supported the Army through combined operations that included both 
amphibious operations and coastal bombardment.  The Navy’s most critical task, however, was 
to defend the sea lines of communication.  Admiral Stepan Makarov was the first Russian 
commander to realize that the only path to Russian victory lay in aggressive offensive action by 
the Russian Navy to dispute, then gain command of the sea and attempt to cut the Japanese lines 
of communication.  Admiral Heirhachiro Togo employed aggressive actions within a broader 
defensive framework.  According to Corbett, during the first phase Togo “without fighting a 
decisive battle, had paralyzed the action of the Russian main fleet and had finally exposed it to 
destruction by the Army.”259  Both the blockade of Port Arthur and the victory at Tsushima arose 
from the defensive nature of the Japanese maritime campaign.  The example fit perfectly with 
Corbett’s arguments in Some Principles for the value of an aggressive, active defense that 
exploited both dispersion and concentration to achieve the political purpose of the war.  Corbett 
credited Togo with the idea to: 
hold his battle fleet back on the defensive, he intended to give his defense a highly active 
form, which we should class as a minor counter-attack to prevent an offensive movement 
on the enemy’s part…The Admiral’s view of his function was characteristic of his 
                     





unfailing grasp of a combined problem and was in full accordance with our own 
traditional practice.260 
 
Corbett remained frustrated by what he saw as the “blue-water school’s” excessive focus on 
concentration and the offensive at the expense of Britain’s much more flexible “traditional 
practice.”  For Corbett, the Battle of Tsushima was the result of the Japanese Navy’s defensive 
strategy as he noted in Some Principles: 
Probably the most remarkable manifestation of the advantages of the strategic defensive 
is also to be found in the late Russo-Japanese War.  In the final crisis of the naval 
struggle the Japanese fleet was able to take advantage of a defensive attitude in its own 
waters which the Russian Baltic fleet would have to break down to attain its end, and the 
result was the most decisive naval victory ever recorded.261 
 
Corbett also used the Russo-Japanese War to further explore combined operations.  He argued 
that the early phase of the war “is, perhaps, the most interesting and instructive and certainly the 
most original phase of the war.  That phase was specially distinguished by the Japanese as the 
period of ‘Combined Operations.’”262  He was duly impressed by the intimate cooperation 
between the two services in conducting tactical amphibious operations in this early phase of the 
war.  Corbett argued that the amphibious nature of the war made it impossible for the Russians to 
determine the Japanese line of operation.  Corbett identified the problem that the Russians had in 
detecting the probable location for landing the Japanese Second Army on the Liaotung Peninsula 
as “owing to the difficulty of locating a line of operation overseas, the Japanese were left to 
complete their disembarkation without any possibility of interruption from the Russian Army.”263 
In Some Principles, Corbett directly compared and contrasted British operations in Quebec 
during the Seven Years War with Japanese amphibious operations in the Russo-Japanese War to 
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argue that mobile amphibious operations offered tremendous flexibility in modern warfare to any 
nation that had gained command of the sea.264  
Yet, to Corbett, at the operational and strategic level the Japanese amphibious design 
“seems crude and immature” when compared with “the work of Wolfe and Saunders at 
Quebec.”265 The service cooperation was limited to the tactical level and, in Corbett’s view, the 
Japanese missed several operational and strategic opportunities to exploit the flexibility provided 
by the sea.  He argued that the Japanese combined operations simply used the sea for transport 
and, once landed, the Army reverted to independent operations on a continental model.  Corbett 
believed that the Japanese failed to exploit the mobility, surprise, and deception afforded by a 
truly mobile amphibious force and concluded that:  
the handling of the Japanese force was cramped and unenterprising, and that it showed no 
appreciation of the power that should lie in the kind of operations in which they were 
engaged.  Their crude divorcing of the army and the fleet and their rigid concentration on 
the Russian front are all the more inexplicable.266 
 
Corbett offered an interesting new addendum to his view of command of the sea, stating; “clearly 
what is needed in such cases is not mere physical preponderance—it is the sense of security…the 
test question then becomes, not have we a fair chance of success? But, is there not danger of 
disaster.”267  Corbett argued that the Japanese had won command of the sea in 1904; but, because 
the remnants of the defeated Russian fleet remained at Port Arthur, the Japanese never felt that 
sense of security that would allow them to exploit the great advantages of wide-ranging mobile 
amphibious operations.   This led Corbett back to the “fleet in being” concept, “a fleet defeated 
even severely need never cease to count” as long as it can cause anxiety on the part of the enemy 
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commander it could prevent the enemy from exploiting their command of the sea.268  Corbett 
drew the lesson that, when a fleet’s primary initial objective was defensive, such as defending 
the army’s sea lines of communication, it must carry out active minor operations for extending 
the area of control, as the Japanese had in the early phases of the war.269  Corbett clearly saw 
application for this principle in any future war in which the Royal Navy would have to secure the 
crossing of an expeditionary force to the European continent.   
 A key part of Togo’s defensive strategy was the employment of his main fleet as a 
covering force between Port Arthur, the main Russian base in the Yellow Sea, and Japanese 
amphibious operations and lines of communication.  This operation evolved into the blockade of 
Port Arthur and the viability of a close blockade became another key area of Corbett’s interest.  
Corbett had declared the close blockade a thing of the past in Some Principles, but then hesitated 
and opened the possibility of a close blockade using flotillas based off the immediate coast of the 
enemy.  Corbett found the precedent for this in the Russo-Japanese War in which Togo 
maintained the blockade of Port Arthur using the main battle-fleet during the day and replacing it 
with flotillas of destroyers and torpedo boats at night.  The key to this system was the ability to 
base the flotillas locally.  From the perspective of British naval planners prior to the First World 
War, this reinforced the importance of Heligoland and Borkum to any viable close blockade of 
Germany.  Corbett also recognized the impact of the mine and torpedo on the blockade and on 
naval warfare more broadly.  The mine was the most feared weapon to emerge from the Russo-
Japanese War and was used extensively around Port Arthur by both sides.  Corbett recognized 
the mine as “a new factor in the strategy of blockade which went far to obliterate any practical 
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distinction between the close and open form.”270  Yet, the Japanese continuously proved unable 
to effectively close Port Arthur, which caused Togo great anxiety.  It also prevented him from 
fully exploiting his command of the sea and again demonstrated the power of a “fleet in being.”  
Corbett also detailed the failure of the torpedo to have any meaningful impact during the war, 
often citing the overwhelming numbers fired during engagements without any hits.  Corbett 
offered mixed views on the torpedo’s impact on blockades, writing:  
it will be seen that the Japanese blockade was in effect much closer than that of the 
British prototype, a conclusion of no little interest in view of the opinion, which was then 
held universally in European navies, that the torpedo had rendered a blockade of the 
Brest type no longer a possible operation of war.  The explanation would seem to be that 
in practice the torpedo danger proved to be no greater under steam than the weather 
obstacle under sail.271 
 
  After equating the torpedo’s threat to the blockade as being no greater than the weather during 
the age of sail, Corbett also provided this caveat to the torpedo’s failure in the war:  
as the range and accuracy of the weapon itself are continually increasing, and higher 
direct effects may be looked for with higher training and improved tactics, defensive 
evolutions by the squadron attacked will remain more necessary than ever…brilliant and 
devoted as was the spirit in which the Japanese handled their flotillas, it is clear that they 
never rose to this higher grasp of the true functions, and until we see the torpedo used 
with boldness and sagacity in just coordination with the other arm it would be more than 
unwise to condemn it as ineffective.” 272   
 
Clearly, based on his writings in Some Principles, Corbett recognized the increasing capability of 
the torpedo and had much greater confidence in the effectiveness of British flotillas.  He, 
however, learned very little about the challenges of employing destroyer and torpedo boat 
flotillas from his study of the war due to his condescending view that the flotilla’s failures were 
due in large part to the Japanese and Russian lack of boldness and sagacity.   In Some Principles, 
Corbett opened the door to new possibilities for the torpedo’s impact on naval warfare: 
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since that war (Russo-Japanese) the art of torpedo warfare has developed very rapidly.  
Its range and offensive power have increased at a higher ratio than the means of resisting 
it…The unproved value of the submarines only deepens the mist which overhangs the 
next naval war.273 
 
The next naval war was on the minds of many at the Admiralty between 1911, when Some 
Principles of Maritime Strategy was published, and early 1914, when Maritime Operations in the 
Russo-Japanese War was finally published.  The theoretical study and debate over the history, 
technology, strategy, and tactics of maritime warfare was about to be tested under the hard 
reality of war, and Corbett had a front row seat.   
 At the outbreak of the First World War, Corbett was still occasionally lecturing at the 
Royal Naval College.  In late August, 1914, on the recommendation of Admiral Edmund Slade, 
Corbett was hired by the Committee of Imperial Defense to be the official historian of the war at 
sea with the additional duty of drafting official war memoranda for the Admiralty’s War Staff.  
Corbett was initially tasked with writing the Grand Fleet instructions sent to Admiral Jellicoe 
upon his assumption of command of that fleet in August, 1914.  Fisher had long-marked Jellicoe 
as the future commander of the fleet in time of war, having written in 1911 of a private visit with 
First Lord Winston Churchill: 
 “To get Jellicoe Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet prior to October 21, 1914, 
which is the date of the Battle of Armageddon.  He will succeed Callaghan automatically 
in two years from December 19, 1911, so will have all well in hand by the before-
mentioned date!...Everything revolves around Jellicoe!274 
 
 Upon the seventy-three year old Fisher’s recall to the Admiralty in December, 1914, Corbett 
regularly consulted with the First Sea Lord and returned to drafting papers advocating Fisher’s 
wartime proposals for the Cabinet and War Council.  Immediately after his return to the 
Admiralty, Fisher had Corbett draft a memorandum on the value of an attack to gain command 
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of the Baltic.  The Royal Navy’s access to the Baltic had been a central tenant of British naval 
operations throughout Fisher’s long career.  Since the Crimean War, access to the Baltic had 
proven critical in the British gaining leverage over Russia and during Fisher’s tenure as First Sea 
Lord access to the Baltic became a fundamental point of leverage against Germany.  Admiralty 
war planning between 1905 and 1907 focused extensively on cutting Germany’s vital line of 
communications with Scandinavia and Britain’s primary training exercises in 1905-6 were the 
Channel Fleet’s Baltic cruises under the command of Admiral Wilson.275  The Army, however, 
felt Fisher’s “Baltic Project” was not feasible and it was quickly dismissed by the War 
Council.276  Fisher published Corbett’s memorandum as “The Baltic Project” in his Memories 
and Records (1919) in what historian Andrew Lambert has characterized as “a criticism of 
Churchill’s strategic judgment.”277  Both Fisher and Corbett envisioned a long war that would 
ultimately be decided by the commercial blockade and they did not envision moving into the 
Baltic to cut Germany’s vital links to Scandinavia until 1917.  Fisher, after leaving the Admiralty 
for the final time, continued to push the “Baltic Project” with Prime Minister Lloyd George: 
And here we are with our Fleet passive and unable to frustrate this German Sea attack on 
Russia.  All this due to the grievous faulty Naval strategy of not adopting the Baltic 
Project put forth before Mr. Asquith in association with the scheme of a British Army 
advancing along the Belgian coast…An Armada of 612 vessels was constructed to carry 
out this policy, thanks to your splendid approval of the cost when you were Chancellor of 
the Exchequer.278  
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In 1915, however, Churchill was not content with Fisher’s long-term strategy and wanted the 
navy to make a more immediate impact on the war.  Corbett had described the nature of war 
against continental powers in England in the Seven Years’ War:  
Of late years the world has become so deeply impressed with the efficacy of sea power 
that we are inclined to forget how impotent it is of itself to decide a war against great 
Continental states, how tedious is the pressure of naval action unless it be nicely 
coordinated with military and diplomatic pressure.279 
 
In arguing for the validity of remaining on the defensive in 1915, Fisher quoted Corbett from the 
same work in writing to Lloyd George in January, “there is no clearer lesson in history of how 
unwise and short-sighted it is to despise and ridicule a naval defensive.”280  As Churchill shifted 
the Admiralty’s focus to the Dardanelles, Maurice Hankey, secretary to the War Council, asked 
Corbett to write a historical appreciation of Admiral John Duckworth’s campaign against 
Constantinople in 1807 to emphasize the requirement that it be a combined operation.  Fisher, in 
1906, had provided his own thoughts on the Dardanelles to then First Lord Tweedmouth and had 
used the Duckworth example: 
The forcing of the Dardanelles is, in the first place, a military operation, is sketched out 
in Ottley’s paper herewith, and with the altered conditions of German supervision and 
German handling of the Dardanelles defenses, and German mines and German torpedoes, 
I agree with Sir John French that we cannot now repeat [Admiral] Sir Jeffrey Hornby’s 
passage of the Dardanelles [1878], and even if we get passage, there is the getting back, 
as [Admiral] Sir John Duckworth found to his cost [1807].281 
 
Corbett produced the paper for the War Council as both he and Hankey supported the 
Dardanelles operation, but only if it was a true combined campaign.  In the paper, Corbett argued 
that the failure to land army forces could lead to a second humiliation and anger the expectant 
Russians.282  Corbett also produced a memorandum supporting combined operations to secure 
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the port of Alexandretta in Syria.  Each of these papers supported campaigns that fit within the 
strategic framework Corbett had developed in Some Principles, and he strongly opposed what he 
viewed as the continental shift in British strategy.  After Fisher’s resignation in May, 1915, 
Corbett’s role at the Admiralty returned to a much lower profile as the official historian of the 
naval war.   
Corbett, however, produced one additional paper before the war ended in 1918 entitled 
“The League of Nations and Freedom of the Seas” in response to President Woodrow Wilson’s 
call for freedom of the seas in his fourteen points.  Corbett repeated many of the same arguments 
from his days opposing similar conventions at The Hague and London conferences prior to the 
war.  He had no faith in a League of Nations bringing peace to the world, arguing, “the truth is 
that even the most devoted and sanguine advocates of a League of Peace realize that complete 
extinction of war by that means is not to be expected.  It is more than can be believed – at least 
until human nature has mellowed much farther.”283  As long as wars were to continue, nations 
must have the right to capture property at sea; without that right, naval battle, Corbett argued, 
would be entirely meaningless.  The interdiction of a nation’s commercial activity at sea “has 
always been a potent means of bringing it to reason” and, in Corbett’s view, one of the greatest 
deterrents to war.  It was a deterrent which this new League of Nations must have because “a 
voice in the council chamber is not determined by reason alone, but in a much higher degree by 
the force behind it.”284  Corbett, in making his argument, recognized that opinion in the United 
States on freedom of the seas had already shifted during the latter stages of the war as the 
pragmatic overruled the idealistic.     
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In 1916, Corbett, speaking in honor of Sir John Knox Laughton, maintained a very 
optimistic tone and vision for the role of history, while also urging the British people to keep the 
war within the broader spectrum of British history: 
Do not be discouraged by the present.  It may seem a catastrophe which renders all that 
went before insignificant and not worth study for men of action.  Let us remember that 
great wars always had this effect at the time.  While we are close to a stupendous event it 
seems like a flood that has gathered up and swept away everything on which the old lore 
rested.  But it is not so. As time gives us distance we see the flood only as one more pool 
in the river as it flows down to eternity, and the phenomena of that pool, however great it 
may be, cannot be understood unless we know the whole course of the river and the 
nature of all the tributary streams have gone to make its volume. No, a great war does not 
kill the past, it gives it new life.285 
 
After the Battle of Jutland, however, the criticism of Corbett and Some Principles from 
Wilkinson and Admiral Custance in the Times and Lord Sydenham (George Clarke) in the House 
of Lords increased.  They perceived a lack of aggressiveness in the Royal Navy officer corps for 
which they blamed Corbett and his theories.  Strategically, however, the British did not fight the 
war as Fisher or Corbett had envisioned.  In May 1918, Corbett lamented the course of British 
strategy in a much different tone than his earlier speech in 1916, writing to Fisher: 
I wept when I knew our whole Expeditionary Force was going to France, and felt what it 
would mean, and how Pitt [the Elder] would turn in his grave. Perhaps as Germany had 
got the initiative so completely, it could not be helped; but there is the cause of tears all 
the same. When the time came to strike amphibiously for a decision, we had nothing to 
strike with.  The first chance, as you saw, was at the Dardanelles, and once the decision 
obtained there we could have passed to the final one in the Baltic.  Oh these blessed 
Germanised soldiers with their decisive theatre… It is the most bigoted soldiers’ war we 
have ever fought, and this at the end of all our experience. Why didn’t I devote my life to 
writing comic opera, or collecting beetles?  I might just as well. But now my fate is to tell 
the stupid story of the war as it is; not, alas, as it might have been. I had hoped when you 
came back, but already the soldiers had entangled us too far even for you to drag us out. 
We deserve each other’s pity.286  
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 As the official historian of the war at sea, it was now his fate “to tell the stupid story of the war 
as it is; not, alas, as it might have been.”  Corbett completed the first three volumes of Naval 
Operations: History of the Great War before he passed away in 1922.  Corbett’s tone in his letter 
to Fisher pervaded Naval Operations.  It was a story of mistaken strategy, missed opportunities, 
and tragic consequences.   
In 1914, as he prepared to take on the official history of the naval war, Corbett had 
discussed his approach for writing “staff histories” or “histories which are required as soon as 
possible after a war had been fought.”  He discussed the drawbacks in attempting these histories:  
one is, that frankness about political and other external deflections is not entirely 
possible, since the time has not come when such matters can be laid openly upon the 
table. The other, that since they are written in the lifetime of the men who fought them 
there is a tendency to modify criticism.287     
 
In “Teaching of Naval and Military History,” Corbett “offered these two principles—first, never 
to lose hold of the essential unity of the Fleet and the Army; and, secondly, to avoid all criticism 
that does not come from the lips of the really great masters.  I would even say avoid criticism as 
a rule, altogether.”288  Corbett, for the most part, followed his own admonitions in writing Naval 
Operations.  He placed combined operations at the center of the war and discussed each in great 
detail with respect to both the Royal Navy and the Army.  Throughout Corbett’s later works, he 
was always keen to separate continental warfare theory (the German model) from a distinctly 
different maritime warfare theory (the British model).  Corbett’s strategic narrative of the war 
centered on the growing influence of the continental approach which, he argued, came to 
dominate the maritime approach that he had so staunchly advocated.  In 1915, Lord Esher wrote 
to Hankey, the secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defense and War Council:   
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do we worry about history? Julian Corbett writes one of the best books in our 
language on political and military strategy. All sorts of lessons, some of 
inestimable value, may be gleaned from it. No one, except perhaps Winston 
(Churchill), who matters just now has ever read it. Yet you and I are fussing about 
the strategical history of the war. Obviously history is written for schoolmasters 
and armchair strategists. Statesmen and warriors are left to pick their way through 
the dusk.289   
 
Both Esher and Hankey were strong advocates of the maritime approach and lamented 
the direction the war had taken.   
The war itself, rather than leading Corbett to adjust any of his previous 
contentions, only hardened Corbett’s ideas expressed in Some Principles and that fact 
comes through clearly in Naval Operations.  Corbett’s third and final volume concluded 
with Jutland and became the most controversial of his collected works.  Henry Newbolt, a 
long-time friend and colleague, finished the final two volumes of Naval Operations.   
Both Corbett and Newbolt worked solely with British sources, many of which remained 
classified until after the Second World War when Arthur Marder was granted exclusive 
access.  E. Y. Daniel revised Naval Operations in the 1930s using the German official 
history to correct many factual errors and misperceptions about German operations and 
intentions caused by the authors limited range of source material.  Corbett had remarked 
in “Staff Histories” that official histories:  
must also serve as a complete chronicle of the war, in which the part of every unit must 
have justice done to it, with the result that we are sometimes smothered with a mass of 
detail acquired at vast labor and expense which has little or no value for the main purpose 
in hand…still it must be said in the eyes of a professed historian these works are not quite 
history, rather they are like collections of documents – materials for history.290 
 
In regard to the mass of unit and operational detail, Corbett certainly met his intention.  Enough 
so to lead Marder to remark:  
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I have not attempted, as regards detail, to rival the official combat narrative in Naval 
Operations by Sir Julian Corbett and Sir Henry Newbolt.  These five stout volumes cover 
the details of the war at sea more than adequately, indeed to the point where one often 
finds oneself in need of a machete to hack one’s way through the jungle of facts.291   
 
Corbett knew he could not write an objective history of the Great War at Sea.  As a professional 
historian, he knew that he was too close to the event, too involved in the event, and lacked 
sufficient access to source material.  He, therefore, captured as much material as he could for 
future historians, while also inserting his own veiled interpretations.  As far as interpretation, the 
Admiralty declined all responsibility for what Corbett wrote in Naval Operations.  Despite near 
constant battles with the Admiralty and other senior officials, Corbett’s narrative remained 
largely intact.   Taking account of the many inevitable problems with official histories such as 
Naval Operations, Donald Schurman declared that Corbett’s strategic viewpoint “was advanced 
in detail showing cause and effect with clarity and brilliance” and he also highlighted how 
Corbett found ways to insert his own opinions and criticisms into the narrative if one “reads 
between the lines.”292   
 Under the framework for maritime operations that Corbett had detailed in Some 
Principles, the first volume of Naval Operations turned on the methods of securing command of 
the sea.  Corbett characterized this first phase of the war as the fight for general command of the 
seas.  It is an expansive volume that covers actions across the globe and concludes with Battle of 
the Falklands which, according to Corbett, gave Britain a working command of all the oceanic 
trade routes.  Throughout Naval Operations, Corbett reiterated many themes and arguments from 
Some Principles, starting with the primary function of the fleet and that “strange misreading of 
history:” 
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By a strange misreading of history, an idea had grown up that its primary function was to 
seek out and destroy the enemy’s main fleet. This view, being literary rather than 
historical, was nowhere adopted with more unction than in Germany, where there was no 
naval tradition to test its accuracy.293 
 
In the initial discussions of British strategy, Corbett argued that the commitment of the British 
Expeditionary Force for the defense of Belgium reflected Britain’s traditional historic precedents 
and he argued that the landing at Ostend “affords one more example of the freedom of maneuver 
which a fleet may give to a Continental army by a firm hold on the coastwise lines of supply and 
passage.”294  As the Army increasingly had to secure the French flank, Corbett lamented the fact 
that “the centre of military energy had drifted far away from the sea, and never, perhaps, since 
Blenheim had our army in a great war seemed so entirely divorced from the fleet.”295  In addition 
to the transport and securing of the Army’s lines of communication, Corbett covered the other 
combined operations to seize German overseas possessions.  These operations, he argued, were 
not about territorial acquisition, but were central to seizing command of the sea.  Corbett noted 
that “all operations were to be regarded primarily as designed for defense of our maritime 
communications …the single object was to deprive the enemy of his distant coaling and 
telegraphic stations.”296  Corbett pointed out that, for many officers expecting the great decisive 
sea battle during this initial phase of the war, things did not go as expected.  Yet, had they paid 
more attention to the historical rather than the literary they would not have been surprised: 
It was the inertness of the High Seas Fleet that was the greatest surprise to naval 
officers…Yet it was but the repetition of what occurred in the old French wars when 
France had the inferior fleet.  By massing an overwhelming concentration at the vital 
point the Admiralty had made sure of the command of the Narrow Seas upon which their 
whole system was built up.  They had also made sure of a crushing decision on “the day,” 
but incidentally they had made it inevitable that “the day” would be indefinitely 
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postponed.  All experience shows…an enemy will never risk battle except for some vital 
end which cannot be obtained any other way.297   
 
Corbett had thoroughly emphasized this very point in Some Principles, arguing that decisive 
battles “have to be worked for” and emphasizing the importance of dispersion to draw an enemy 
out, followed by rapid concentration of force at the decisive point.  Corbett had always argued 
that Britain’s greatest victories were products of aggressive leadership that was willing to accept 
the risk of dispersing the fleet and only concentrating in the face of the enemy.   
 When Fisher returned to the Admiralty in October, 1914, he immediately began to 
implement some of the ideas that had inspired several of Corbett’s arguments in Some 
Principles.  After the Battle of Coronel on November 1, 1914, Fisher directed that two battle 
cruisers be detached from the Grand Fleet and dispatched to the South Atlantic to deal with 
Admiral von Spee’s Squadron.  In addition, he ordered the construction of the three shallow-draft 
battle cruisers, the Furious, Glorious and Courageous, for his eventual “Baltic Project.”  Fisher 
also ordered an increase in construction of flotilla vessels and included monitors and other craft 
that would become part of what Corbett called Fisher’s “siege fleet.”  Many of Fisher’s actions 
in reorganizing the force on his return to the Admiralty were based on the same ideas and 
priorities that had inspired Corbett’s chapter on the constitution of fleets in Some Principles; and 
unsurprisingly, Corbett was complimentary of Fisher’s actions in Naval Operations.  Corbett 
closed the first volume after the Falklands with the assessment that “in a little more than four 
months the command of the outer seas had been won, and we were free to throw practically the 
whole weight of the Navy into the main theatre.”298  Upon the conclusion of the first volume, 
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Corbett entered into a battle with the Admiralty and other powerful figures to get his work 
approved and published.   
 Winston Churchill was dissatisfied with his portrayal in volume one and posed strong 
opposition to its being published.  Admiral Rosslyn Wemyss, First Sea Lord at the time, advised 
Corbett to revise his own work and remove any criticism that was merely Corbett’s opinion, but 
not change any of the facts even if the presentation of those facts implied criticism.  Churchill, 
however, continued to object even after Corbett made certain revisions.  Maurice Hankey 
supported the publication of the book and had its discussion added to the Cabinet’s agenda.  The 
Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, read the book and told Hankey, “no one could have dealt 
with these difficult matters with such perfect discretion.”299  Corbett enlisted the support of noted 
historians Charles Oman and Charles Firth in preparation for taking his fight public, when 
Churchill finally agreed to publication with his own comments added as Appendix D to the 
work.  Corbett’s revisions, based on Wemyss’ recommendation, left others to “read between the 
lines.”  In Corbett’s view, the strategic choices during this phase of the war evoked little debate 
or controversy.  Britain had followed its traditional strategy and, while there had certainly been 
mistakes and setbacks, at the end of the first four months of the war the Royal Navy had attained 
working command of the sea more quickly than anyone had expected.  As Corbett moved into 
the second volume, he had to address how Britain would exploit its command of the sea and 
review what he viewed as the first real controversial choices in British strategy.   
 While Corbett officially followed Wemyss’ advice in the second and third volumes, the 
“reading between the lines” became much more obvious as Corbett skillfully expressed his 
                     
299 Schurman, Julian S. Corbett, 181-182.  Schurman’s final chapter is devoted to covering the controversy 
surrounding Naval Operations and Corbett’s fight to publish each of the three volumes with the least revisions.  It is 





criticisms without directly attacking or blaming anyone.  It was during this phase that Corbett 
believed British strategy started to diverge from its historical traditions with tragic consequences.  
It is also during this phase that Corbett was most actively involved in the strategy and policy 
debates.  He had supported Fisher with papers advocating “the Baltic project,” objecting to a 
purely naval attack on the Dardanelles, and supporting combined operations at Alexandretta.  
Corbett was invested in the policy-making during this period and it is evident in his writing.   
 According to Corbett, Britain had established a general command of the sea after the 
destruction of von Spee’s squadron at the Falklands.  Only in home waters, the Channel and 
North Sea, was Britain’s command of the sea in dispute.  In Some Principles, Corbett had outline 
the two methods of disputing command: the “fleet in being” and minor counterattacks.  The 
Germans employed both methods to dispute command of the Channel and North Sea.  The 
husbanding of the High Seas Fleet clearly fit Corbett’s definition of a “fleet in being” and forced 
Britain to concentrate its capital ships for any potential sortie of the High Seas Fleet.  Corbett 
also went into great detail about the German Navy’s minor counterattacks, which included 
coastal raids, mining, and submarine operations as both sides disputed command of the North 
Sea and Channel.  As with much of Corbett’s writing, however, his real focus was at the strategic 
level and the methods of exercising command of the sea.   
 The Dardanelles was the central driving narrative of the second volume.  Corbett had 
supported Fisher’s “Baltic Project” which included combined operations between the Army and 
Fisher’s “siege fleet” to capture German-controlled submarine and Zeppelin bases in Flanders as 
the project’s first phase.  Corbett argued that “whenever it had been found impossible for the 





seek out and destroy the enemy’s bases in concert with the army.”300  After securing the Flanders 
coast, specifically the Zeebrugge-Ostend-Bruges triangle, the second phase consisted of 
extensive mining of the North Sea to protect the Royal Navy’s flank, followed by the third phase, 
when the “siege fleet” backed by the three new shallow draft battle cruisers moved into the 
Baltic to sever Germany’s lines of communication with Sweden and complete the commercial 
blockade.  The Grand Fleet, in the North Sea, would await the sortie of the High Seas Fleet 
which both Fisher and Corbett felt would be forced to defend Germany’s critical lines of 
communication with Scandinavia.  In retrospect in Naval Operations, Corbett continued to argue 
this was the strategic option Britain should have followed and never adhered to those that argued 
that it was not feasible.  Corbett recognized the risks of moving into the Baltic when he delivered 
his “Baltic Project” memorandum to Fisher writing “the risks, of course, must be serious; but 
unless we are fairly sure that the passive pressure of our Fleet is really bringing Germany to a 
state of exhaustion, risks must be taken to use our command of the sea with greater energy.”301  
After laying out the planning and debate over the Flanders and Baltic operations, Corbett moved 
to the genesis of the Dardanelles campaign, which took center stage in the narrative. 
 While Corbett had preferred the Baltic project, the Dardanelles, in his view, was an 
equally viable option for executing Britain’s traditional maritime strategy and had consequential 
objectives that fully supported the war effort.  In fact, Corbett found that “diplomatically the case 
for developing our military power in the Eastern Mediterranean was overwhelming, and far 
outweighed all that could be said for the Flanders plan.”302  He, however, had never supported a 
purely naval attack on the Dardanelles; and, during the war, he had provided a historical analysis 
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arguing that any Dardanelles operation must be a combined operation with the army’s full 
support.  Corbett attributed the failure to provide troops to the Dardanelles initially to the army’s 
growing reliance on a continental doctrine that had taught them that force must always be 
concentrated at the decisive point in the decisive theater.  He argued that the decision to attack 
without troops was a fatal compromise between a major combined operation to achieve decisive 
strategic results and a simple diversion to support the struggling Serbian and Russian forces.303  
Corbett saw the issues with the Dardanelles planning as stemming from a failure to identify the 
problem, stating “history is filled with cases in which councils of war were unable to reach a 
sound and quick conclusion simply from a failure to state with perfect lucidity and precision 
what the problem was they had to solve.”304 
 At multiple points in his discussion of the Dardanelles campaign, Corbett developed an 
argument that was only implied in Some Principles.  He argued that the army had adopted a 
continental mindset that called for directly attacking the enemy’s strength.  The constant calls for 
more troops and more offensives on the Western Front was only enhancing Germany’s greatest 
strength.  Corbett argued that Britain’s advantages “were the power of freely combining naval 
and military force against the point where the system of the Central Powers was weakest, while 
standing securely on the defensive in the main theater.”305  According to Corbett, the debate over 
the Dardanelles:  
raised in acute form the fundamental differences between the traditional British method 
of conducting a great war and the Napoleonic method which with all continental nations 
had become strict orthodox creed.  Our own idea had long been to attack the enemy at the 
weakest point which could give substantial results, and to assume the defensive where he 
was strongest.  The continental method was to strike where the enemy’s military 
concentration was highest and where a decisive victory would end the war by destroying 
his armed forces….The obvious and logical [British] policy, therefore, was to postpone 
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the offensive in the main theater…the Dardanelles offered the ideal objective which 
supported our doctrine.306 
 
Corbett, throughout the second and third volumes, argued that Britain should remain on the 
defensive on the Western Front and reinforce the Dardanelles as that was the decisive theater for 
the British method of conducting the war.  He argued that, from the beginning and at every 
critical decision point in the Dardanelles campaign, the commanders were not provided sufficient 
resources for victory.307  At heart, Corbett believed in the use of Britain’s maritime power to 
defend the British Islands and attack the enemy’s weakness.  These same arguments became the 
foundation of Liddell Hart’s British Way of War and his later, much more developed, Strategy of 
the indirect approach.  After the introduction of ground troops, Corbett fully supported the 
Dardanelles campaign; he identified the breakdown of the May, 1915 combined offensive as the: 
definite landmark in the progress of the war. The hope of rapidly completing the 
investment of the Central Powers and opening up direct communication with Russia was 
at an end.  Further progress by combined operations was out of the question without 
many more troops.308 
 
Corbett concluded the second volume at this turning point in the Dardanelles campaign, and this 
second work surprisingly met little resistance and was published in 1921.  The next volume 
proved to be the most anticipated and controversial of all of Corbett’s works.  
 Corbett spent the first half of the third volume on the end of the Dardanelles campaign 
and the decision to withdraw from Gallipoli.  Corbett took the opportunity with the landings at 
Suvla Bay and the expert withdrawal of British and Commonwealth forces from the peninsula to 
tout Britain’s continued expertise in combined operations.  Corbett, in these descriptions, was 
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trying to influence British post-war strategic thinking to returning to a traditional maritime 
strategy.  Corbett began the chapter on the Suvla landings: 
in the long history of British warfare there is a special feature which distinguishes it from 
that of any other country. The precession of years is marked by a series of great 
combined expeditions which, over and above those which were planned as diversions or 
for seizing subsidiary strategical points, were aimed at definite thrusts at the decisive 
points of a world-wide war.309    
 
Corbett declared the conception, planning, and organization of the combined operation at Suvla 
to have surpassed those of Quebec and Walcheren and demonstrated significant improvement 
over the initial landings. He touted the British method of having co-equal commanders which, 
while not without its challenges, truly required them to coordinate their operations closely, 
taking each’s concerns into account.  Corbett was equal in his praise of the combined operations 
withdrawing the forces; but for him, this was the most tragic and far-reaching moment of the 
war.  In Corbett’s opinion, it marked the complete subversion of traditional British maritime 
strategy by a costly continental doctrine that was to have dire consequences for Britain.  Corbett 
described it in these terms:  
When the momentous order that was to end the tragedy of the Dardanelles went forth, to 
the deep regret of the navy… with the broader outlook their world-wide activities gave 
them, they were in a better position to know all that the order meant than men whose 
view of the war had long been almost entirely confined to the continental aspect of the 
great wars of the past… As naval thought read our long and rich experience, it was by 
close coordination of naval and military force that we had always held the balance and 
had built up the Empire. Now there was to be a complete divorce, and each service was to 
play a lone hand. Whether inevitable or not, at the moment it was a thousand pities.310 
 
Corbett’s entire description of the debates, the decision, and the withdrawal itself was tinged 
with an overwhelming sense of deep regret.   
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 As Corbett transitioned from the Dardanelles to describing the Battle of Jutland, he 
changed his entire style, tone, and approach.  Gone was the analytical historian who was trying 
to document every fact and every detail for future historians; Corbett the novelist had returned.  
Corbett had long before recognized that his writing of history never had public appeal and he had 
apologized to the public in previous works.  In describing Jutland, he gave the public what they 
wanted: a rousingly heroic sea battle that brought out the smell of cordite and the soaking splash 
of bracketing shells.  His writing in these chapters was often melodramatic and even theatrical, 
as one example describing the loss of Admiral Hood and the Invincible: 
Just as the mist was riven and from the Derfflinger her tormentor was suddenly 
silhouetted against a light patch of sky.  Then as another salvo from the Invincible 
straddled her she began rapid salvoes in reply, in which probably the Konig joined with 
just as many.  One after another they went home on the Invincible.  Flames shot up from 
the gallant flagship, and there came again the awful spectacle of a fiery burst, followed 
by a huge column of dark smoke which, mottled with blackened debris, swelled up 
hundreds of feet in the air, and the mother of all battle cruisers had gone to join the other 
two that were no more.  As her two consorts swerved round her seething death-bed they 
could see she was rent in two; her stem and stern rose apart high out of the troubled 
waters as though she touched the bottom…the intrepid Admiral met his end, gilding in 
his death with new lustre the immortal name of Hood.311 
 
Corbett’s complete change in tone and style served more than just to please the public.  Since the 
Battle of Jutland, several commentators had blamed Corbett’s teachings for an overriding caution 
in the Royal Navy’s officer corps which, in their view, led to indecisiveness at Jutland.  In 
Corbett’s rendition of the battle, all British officers and seaman acted aggressively and 
heroically.  During the Jutland account, Corbett repeatedly praised individual officers for acting 
within the finest traditions of the Royal Navy.  
Additionally, the Jellicoe-Beatty feud was ongoing when Corbett was writing Naval 
Operations.  Corbett likely had as much knowledge about Jutland as anyone, including the 
                     





participants.  Corbett had interviewed Jellicoe and many of the participating officers immediately 
after the battle in 1916 in his capacity as official historian.  He had extensively reviewed the 
Admiralty’s first official “Record of the Battle of Jutland” produced by Captain J.E.T. Harper 
and had refused to write the introduction for it because of the errors he believed it contained.  
Corbett had fully reviewed, and was just as skeptical of, the “Staff Appreciation” produced by 
Kenneth and Alfred Dewar.  Corbett clearly believed Jellicoe had made the correct decisions, 
based on the strategic situation and the information he had at the time, and that comes through 
very clearly in Naval Operations.  His criticisms are reserved for Admiral David Beatty, but the 
reader again has to “read between the lines” as Corbett often softens any criticism by pointing to 
the inevitable fog and friction of war.  On September 8, 1922, Corbett sent the final draft to the 
Committee on Imperial Defense for official review.  He died two weeks later on September 22, 
1922.  The controversy over publication of this volume continued well after Corbett’s death.  
Many of the same Corbett critics were not happy with his defense of Jellicoe; others at the 
Admiralty were not happy with Corbett implying they had not passed intelligence to Jellicoe in a 
timely fashion.  Beatty was not happy with his portrayal, and the Army strenuously objected to 
the narrative surrounding the Dardanelles decisions.  Ultimately, the Admiralty agreed to publish 
the work as written with an unprecedented, for their own sanctioned official history, disclaimer 
on the title page: 
The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have given the author access to official 
documents in the preparation of this work, but they are in no way responsible for its 
production or for the accuracy of its statements. Their Lordships find that some of the 
principles advocated in the book, especially the tendency to minimize the importance of 
seeking battle and enforcing it to a conclusion, are directly in conflict with their views.312 
 
Even in death, Corbett could not escape Mahan and the overwhelming allure of decisive battle.  
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 While Corbett covered the operational and tactical aspects of the commercial blockade 
and submarine war in the volumes he wrote for Naval Operations, he did not provide any greater 
strategic analysis of these two central aspects of the war at sea.  Corbett clearly recognized the 
importance of the submarine war and the fact that it was an entirely unexpected aspect of the war 
for him and many others.  In the introduction to the series, Corbett had written that no one before 
the war would have anticipated having convoy after convoy pressing to Europe or that the 
submarine could cut through the British system of commerce protection.313  It is likely that 
Corbett intended to cover these aspects of the war in the final two volumes of the series as 
Newbolt did after Corbett’s death.  Newbolt’s final volume of the series was almost entirely 
concerned with the submarine war.  Corbett also never provided his strategic assessment of 
Jutland, which was probably slated for the beginning of the fourth volume.  In 1921, he did, 
while writing the Jutland account, deliver the Creighton Lecture in which he addressed the 
Napoleonic Wars.  The lecture was a clear indication that the Great War had not significantly 
changed Corbett’s views of maritime strategy; it had actually reinforced them.  He addressed 
naval operations after Trafalgar, arguing that “judged by the standard of modern historical 
scholarship, naval history between Trafalgar and Waterloo is a trackless desert.”314  Corbett 
argued that the war violated all military doctrine; Britain should never have won this war 
according to continental doctrine.  Britain had violated the ultimate doctrinal principle of 
concentrating the greatest possible force against the enemy’s main strength.  Corbett continued: 
so valuable and even sacred is this article of faith that even seeming to question its 
applicability to all possible conditions of war is to raise at once a cry of heresy a charge 
of heresy connotes the existence of dogma; and, of all diseases from which strategical 
fault can suffer, dogma is the most fatal. When dogma steals in at the door, reason flies 
out of the window.315 
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Corbett then briefly detailed the vital naval and combined operations that occurred in the ten year 
period between Trafalgar and Waterloo.  These operations, according to Corbett, were ultimately 
more critical in engineering the defeat of Napoleon than either Trafalgar or Waterloo. After 
regaling the audience with the tremendous feats and exertions of the naval war after Trafalgar, 
Corbett concluded:  
nearly every current belief about the later exhausting years of our struggle with Napoleon 
needs modification – even the cardinal belief, the effect of Trafalgar. Going even lightly 
over the ground, its striking analogy to our latest struggle brings forth a whole harvest of 
unsettled queries; and the one which for me at least is the most insistent is this: What 
material advantage did Trafalgar give that Jutland did not give?316 
 
It was Corbett’s final question for the “blue-water school” of maritime strategists and his final 
plea for broadening the approach to maritime operations. 
 
 
                     








Most modern scholars of Julian Corbett and Some Principles of Maritime Strategy focus on 
Corbett’s use of history to inform his maritime theory, the influence of Clausewitz on his 
strategic theory, or the principles that remain most relevant to modern navies.  It continues to be 
studied in naval war colleges and military theory classes around the world alongside Thucydides, 
Sun Tzu, Jomini, Clausewitz and Mahan. While Corbett certainly made a lasting contribution to 
maritime and strategic theory, that was not Corbett’s purpose in writing Some Principles.  
Corbett was not attempting to write a Clausewitzian “universal theory” of naval or maritime war, 
or a Thucydidian “possession for all time,” or even Jominian/Mahanian principles of naval war.  
Corbett was attempting to capture the Royal Navy’s strategic and doctrinal thinking, as 
embodied in 1911 by the Fisher Admiralty, in an accessible form to educate senior military and 
political leaders.   
Some Principles of Maritime Strategy was the culmination of a turbulent decade of 
change within the British military establishment and British strategic thinking.  Corbett wrote 
from a British context, used British history, and was writing to educate British officers and 
statesmen who were preparing the most powerful navy in the world to both defend a global 
empire and defeat a great continental power.  In understanding any military theory, the context in 
which it was written is critical to understanding the implications of that theory.  In his approach 
to theory, Corbett was certainly much closer akin to Clausewitz than he was to Mahan or 
Colomb.  Corbett relied on his much deeper study of British history to establish the context for 
developing a British maritime doctrine, initially targeted against Russia and France but by 1911, 





approach to history, finding historical case studies that best supported their theories, rather than 
developing a much broader context for wrestling with current strategic concerns.  Historian 
Geoffrey Till points out that the military’s use of history is:  
often approached more in the spirit of finding ‘something that fits’ rather than something 
that helps us understand…After all, Corbett wrote, ‘the value of history in the art of war 
is not only to elucidate the resemblance of the past and the present but also their essential 
differences.’ In fact, the chief utility of history for the analysis of the present and future 
lies in its ability, not to point out lessons, but to isolate things that need thinking 
about…History provides insights and questions, not answers.317 
 
Corbett identified one of the most important aspects of using history to inform military and 
strategic thought in highlighting the need to understand their “essential differences,” rather than 
just looking for similarities. During the “Dreadnought Age,” Corbett had combatted the 
simplistic approaches to naval history that often searched for rules and principles to fit every 
situation.  Throughout Some Principles, Corbett had taken on Mahan, the German Continental 
School, and, most vehemently, the “blue-water” school in Britain that had turned Mahan’s theory 
into abject dogma.  While Clausewitz influenced Corbett’s approach, Corbett’s theory remained 
rooted in his study of history, which he applied to the challenges of educating modern British 
officers. 
Some Principles of Maritime Strategy was clearly a product of the “Dreadnought Age” 
and the “Fisher Revolution.”  It marked a unique blend of historical study, military theory, and 
Corbett’s experience in the Fisher Admiralty during this tempestuous first decade of the 
twentieth century.  History has long been the foundation of theory, and military theory the 
foundation for military doctrine and strategy.  Corbett was one of the most enduring contributors 
to fully establish the link between history, theory, doctrine and professional military education.  
He sought to be relevant to professional naval officers and policymakers, while always 
                     





attempting to remain true to the source material.  However, Corbett’s historical strategic message 
concerning the limitation of maritime power and the subordination of naval strategy to national 
strategy and government policy proved unpopular with a great number of Royal Navy officers 
raised in the Nelsonian tradition.  Neither Corbett’s message nor methods resonated beyond a 
small, select group of historically-minded officers and these attitudes carried over from his 
lectures to his writings on maritime strategy.  This integration of history and theory for the 
purpose of education was instrumental to Corbett’s developing principles of maritime strategy, 
but it was the “Fisher Revolution” and the rapidly changing British strategic environment that 
fueled Corbett’s work. 
Corbett sought to capture the strategic and doctrinal thought of the Fisher Admiralty and 
fit that thought within the broader context of British history in order to make it more accessible 
to officers and statesmen.  He was a clear adherent to Clausewitz’s descriptions of military 
genius and, in Admiral Sir John Fisher, Corbett had found what he saw as Britain’s modern 
strategic/naval genius.  In stressing the contemporary importance of Some Principles, some 
modern scholars have argued that Corbett greatly influenced Fisher, his reform agenda, and 
strategic thought.  However, the correspondence between the two men clearly indicates Fisher’s 
overwhelming influence on, not only Corbett, but all those around him.  Fisher has too often 
been misrepresented as the arch-materialist and hostile to the historical school of thought.  While 
Fisher certainly advocated for the rapid incorporation of new technologies, he was not beholden 
to technology and deftly discerned the advantages and limitations of technology and the new 
challenges that would confront the Royal Navy.  Fisher, however, was never hostile to history or 
the historical school, despite his rhetoric.  He pushed for education reform within the Navy and 





immersed in the history and traditions of the Royal Navy.  Fisher was an intuitive decision-
maker and relied on his vast experience with all aspects of the Royal Navy and all regions of the 
British Empire.  He inherently understood Britain’s broader strategic situation and needed 
Corbett to translate his understanding and vision for the employment of British maritime power 
for Britain’s civilian leaders.  History provided Corbett the context and correct questions for 
Fisher and his associates.  Fisher and the select officers around him provided the relevant 
answers for the Royal Navy prior to the First World War. Ultimately Corbett wrote Some 
Principles of Maritime Strategy, at Fisher’s behest, to educate British statesmen about the Royal 
Navy’s economic and maritime doctrine for dealing with the rising threat of Imperial Germany.  
Corbett effectively communicated that strategic/maritime doctrine in Some Principles of 
Maritime Strategy and, with the exception of the convoy system, it proved remarkably accurate 
in forecasting the First World War at sea. Understanding Corbett’s Some Principles of Maritime 
Strategy remains important today as an excellent example of how leaders should effectively use 
history and theory to build the context for current doctrine and future strategy and drive the 
questions that need to be asked of all future strategic options.  Any attempt to address grand 
strategic issues requires building context and recognizing complexity rather than trying to 
simplify problems.  Fisher and Corbett clearly recognized the importance of context, complexity, 
and judgment and continuously fought against simple principles and dogmatic axioms.  Because 
of its deep historical context and the clear German threat, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy 
is arguably the best strategic/doctrinal exposition ever written and came as close as any in 
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